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Abstract 
This thesis comprises research into the implementation of Best Value in council 
housing. Best value is a nationally determined framework specifying the process which 
local authorities must use to review and improve the full range of their activities with 
regard to performance, quality, accountability and cost. 
The aim of the research is to evaluate the extent to which local variables impact upon 
policy outcomes: the implementation of policy. The central research question is: 'In 
what ways were local relationships redefined following the introduction of Best 
ValueT. The basis for the study is a view that local deten-nination of policy by an 
influential group is enhanced through Best Value implementation, in contradiction with 
its intention. 
The theoretical footing of this work is derived from a notion that managers 'bureau 
shape' when conditions allow, rather than 'empire build' as competing theories 
maintain (Dunleavy 1991). It is hypothesised that Best Value was in part devised to 
check 'empire building' tendencies and this is a flawed assumption that could lead to 
unintended policy outcomes. 
This notion is tested through field research examining the views of councillors, 
managers, front line workers and residents from two London boroughs, Westminster 
and Newham. 
The conclusions drawn relay a set of determinants, each related: the nature of the policy 
in question; local actors' 'alignment' to that policy and the influence they have; and the 
extent and nature of change required to meet perceived policy directives. The essence of 
local policy determination relates to political context and the mediation of relationships 
between actors. 
The final point made is that future research could fruitfully examine process as the 
measure of policy successes and failures, rather than policy outputs. 
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PART ONE 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 1997 the Labour Party returned to power after seventeen years 
of Conservative government. For local government in England and Wales this 
meant a reappraisal of their capacity and role which had changed significantly 
under the Conservative administration. The central theme adopted by the new 
Labour government was 'modemisation', and councils saw the new proposals as 
presenting both opportunities and threats. 
The key element in the modemisation agenda was Best Value. This is a 
compulsory framework within which local authorities must review all of their 
services in terms of perfortnance, quality, accountability and cost. This thesis 
examines what happened in two local authorities' housing departments in the 
first year after Best Value was introduced. It explores how different actors 
positioned themselves in order to implement the changes required by Best Value 
in council housing management. Specifically, the research examines the extent to 
which the relationships between key actors affected senior management's 
capacity to influence and shapes these decisions. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to examine the way in which relationships 
among local actors change and impact upon the implementation of Best Value. 
This aim is addressed in general terms through an examination and analysis of 
Best Value and its proposed outcomes. The research specifically addresses the 
influence of those involved in Best Value processes in local authority housing 
departments through field studies based in two London boroughs. The research 
approach adopted reveals the routine of policy enactment and the ways in which 
local actors are able to influence policy. 
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This part of the thesis provides the general setting for Best Value, together with 
an explanation of the research focus. Chapter one provides detail of the policy 
environment prior to 1997, followed by a discussion of Best Value. This leads to 
the presentation of certain factors considered important in the implementation of 
housing policy: context, interpretation of policy, and influence. These factors are 
phrased as research questions in chapter two, followed by an explanation of the 
methodology adopted, and the presentation of key theoretical ideas that could 
serve to answer the research questions. The thesis plan is detailed in chapter 
three. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Best Value and Local Authority Housing Management 
1.1 Compulsory Competitive Tendering: the forerunner to Best Value 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering was introduced by the 1979-97 
Conservative Government in the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land 
Act, and required that specified activities should be put out to tender. If the local 
authority department was able to 'win' the contracts through this process, the 
activity remained with the local authority. The scope of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering was extended under the Local Government Act 1988 to include more 
blue collar functions, and the 1992 Local Government Act extended it to white 
collar functions, including housing management, and introduced systematic 
performance measurement (Malpass and Murie 1999, p. 81). By 1997 the 
combined primary and secondary legislation covered most housing management 
functions. The provisions could be enforced through anti-competitive measures 
where councils were "restricting, distorting or preventing competition" (Vincent- 
Jones 1999, p. 274), and the Secretary of State could intervene in cases of non- 
compliance. 
The gains from Compulsory Competitive Tendering were assumed to arise from 
the involvement of, and exposure to, alternative providers. Measurement of 
service improvement, while universal, did not follow any set criteria. Indeed, 
local authorities found it "difficult to 'measure' the quality of services actually 
delivered and most make judgements on the basis of raising standards in 
specifications ... [local authorities] have different interpretations of what 
constitutes a performance measure" (DoE 1997, s. 1.2). For the Government, the 
measure of success under Compulsory Competitive Tendering involved the 
volume of services exposed to tender. The temporary and transitional 
arrangements introduced by the Labour Government did specify the expectation 
of 'service improvement', where "authorities should develop robust measures to 
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validate their performance" (DETR 1997), although no specific measures were 
identified. 
A significant change brought about by Compulsory Competitive Tendering was a 
contractualised relationship between landlord and tenant, either through formal 
service contracts, or ad hoc agreements with residents on the nature and level of 
services, "... potentially transforming the relationship between the tenant and 
landlord" (Stewart 1996, p. 176). This new relationship brought new tension: 
residents could effectively be led on matters of contract and service specification, 
and become "... recast as the self-activating responsible customer" (Stewart 
1996, p. 177). 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering was not uniformly welcomed by all local 
authorities. In 1995, one year before Compulsory Competitive Tendering in 
housing would take effect, a survey of 25 northern local authorities concluded 
that "it was significant that many of the fears raised by professionals related to 
the housing service becoming more concerned with money rather than people" 
(Housing, March 1995, p. 30). Seal, in later research exploring the impact of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering on white collar workers found that the 
government was "engaged in a form of guerrilla war with the powerful 
Metropolitan Authorities over the latters' attempts to avoid or minimise white- 
collar CCT" (1999, p. 31 1). Rao and Young (1995), in their study of the impact 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, found that local authorities had been 
reluctant to adopt the regime, both as a reaction to its compulsory nature and the 
widespread belief that the Conservative government would not be re-elected. 
The legislation required authorities to participate in the tendering process, 
although many authorities were, at best, loose in their interpretation of that 
directive. Sixty-six cases of alleged anti-competitive behaviour were reported in 
1995,33 percent of which were for not accepting the lowest bid. The allegations 
led to twelve notices and seven directions to local authorities requiring 
compliance with competitive practice (DETR 1997). 
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In terms of the tendering requirement Compulsory Competitive Tendering did 
little to alter the nature of providers: 
The final survey of the market for CCT contracts in local government 
prior to abolition on I January reveals that despite 19 years of 
compulsory competition, in-house teams retained 70% of the blue 
collar business for council services - worth a total of E1.7 billion. In 
white-collar services, where CCT has operated for seven years, the 
Direct Service Organisation success rate was 83% of contracts by 
value for legal services and 92% for housing management. 
(Municipal Journal, 3 rd December 1999, p. 3) 
Although services were not generally contracted out to other providers, there is 
little doubt that Compulsory Competitive Tendering had an impact on 
operational form. With the arrival of Compulsory Competitive Tendering a new 
form of housing department organisation arose for many authorities: the client- 
contractor split. The Department of the Environment set out the requirements for 
a strict delineation between client and contract division where the client side role 
was to "set service standards and ensure that the contractor (whether in-house or 
not) conforms to them" (DoE 1994, p. 1). Walsh points to a third element to new 
organisational forms arising from competition and public services: the strategy 
and policy making corporate centre (1995, p. 197). 
Beyond this organisational change it is not clear what effect Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering had on services, and their providers and recipients, or the 
reasons for the small proportion of white-collar services contracted out: 
"Although blue-collar Compulsory Competitive Tendering has been reasonably 
well researched ... the impact of white-collar Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering remains largely unexplored" (Wilson 1999, p. 39). In addition, 
"Studies which evaluate the effects of competitive tendering in local government 
are few in number, cover a limited range of services, and are methodologically 
flawed" (Boyne 1998, p. 695). 
Further consideration of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and the experiences 
of local actors is given in Part Two. 
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1.2 Best Value: the response to Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
Best Value was introduced in the 1999 Local Government Act and its provisions 
came into force in April 2000. The aim was to improve local services in terms of 
both cost and quality: 
A best value authority must make arrangements to secure continuous 
improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having 
regard to a combination of economy, cfficiency and effectiveness 
(LGA 1999, section 3[1]). 
The range of activities affected has broadened to include all housing services, 
and indeed all local authority functions including for example social services, 
environmental health and planning. 
The first details of Best Value were set out in the 'Twelve Principles of Best 
Value' announced in June 1997. The bill to provide the statutory framework was 
introduced in the 1998/9 parliamentary session. In the period between 
announcement and introduction (May 1997 and April 2000) the Government 
sponsored 37 voluntary council 'pilots', 22 of which contained a housing 
element. The purpose of the pilots was to "test elements of the best value 
framework, and assess the extent to which actual improvements in service quality 
and efficiency have flowed from the new approach" (DETR 1997a). The 
rationale for the introduction of Best Value was summarised as follows: 
Under Compulsory Competitive Tendering service quality has often 
been neglected and efficiency gains have been uneven and uncertain, 
and it has proved inflexible in practice. There have been significant 
costs for employees, often leading to high staff turnover and the 
demoralisation of those expected to provide quality services. 
Compulsion has also bred antagonism, so that neither local 
authorities nor private sector suppliers have been able to realise the 
benefits that flow from a healthy partnership. All too often the 
process of competition has become an end in itself, distracting 
attention from the services that are actually provided to local people. 
CCT will therefore be abolished (DETR 1998, s. 1.5). 
Thus, the rationale for Best Value emphasised three points: the failure of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering; the importance of partnership in service 
provision; and the adverse affect of competition as a prime objective. 
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While the Conservatives' Compulsory Competitive Tendering was unambiguous 
about what was required - issue of tender, receipt of tender, selection of provider 
- Labour's Best Value proved more difficult to define. The notion of Best Value 
prior to implementation was enshrined within one key consultation document: 
Modernising Local Government - Improving local services through best value 
(DETR 1998). This set out four defining elements of Best Value. 
The first was the duty to secure economic, efficient and effective services 
continuously (the '3 Es'). 
The second required service reviews within which the authority must 
demonstrate that in the fulfilment of their duties under Best Value they have: 
compared their service provision with that of other private and public providers; 
consulted with local business and community; considered competition in 
provision; and challenged the reasons for, and methods of, provision (the '4 Cs'). 
An important 'C' in the context of council housing is 'consultation'. Power's call 
for an enhanced "formal role of residents in the running of their estates" (1987, 
p. 243) appears to have finally been acknowledged with the requirement that 
Tenant Participation Compacts accompany the implementation of Best Value. 
The Tenant Participation Compact is defined as a tool to ensure that "people 
know who exactly will be responsible for decisions and who will be actively 
involved in helping councils to reach those decisions" and enabling tenants to 
plan, improve and take remedial action (DETR 1999a, s. 2). 
The third defining element introduced a regime of audit and measurement of 
performance, with the broad expectation that, year-on-year, costs would reduce 
and quality would increase. Performance would be monitored locally through 
Best Value Performance Reviews (BVPRs), partly through adherence to locally 
and statutorily determined Best Value performance indicators (BVPIs), and 
disseminated annually through Performance Plans (BVPPs). 
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The fourth defining element of Best Value outlined the consequence of 
performance: Government intervention in cases of Best Value failure, and 
reward in cases of success. 
In turn these four aspects of Best Value are bound by adherence to twelve 
principles of Best Value (Appendix A). The answer to the question of what 
method of service delivery, precisely, the Government expected to arise from 
Best Value seemed to centre on local interpretation as satisfactory. The lack of 
clear definition was explained as follows: 
The paper does not attempt to define what best value in housing is - 
that is primarily a matter for individual local authorities in 
consultation with local people. The primary intention is to explain the 
process framework within which local housing authorities will need 
to operate in obtaining best value in housing (DETR 1999a, s. 1.3). 
Therefore, while the message was unequivocally that Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering was to be withdrawn, the replacement was to be less prescribed, with 
the intention that local authorities follow a responsive and locally determined 
method of service provision within a centrally defined framework. Best Value 
was not, therefore, about what local authorities should do: it was a framework 
that prescribed how they should decide what to do. 
Specifically Best Value would differ from Compulsory Competitive Tendering in 
three respects: organisation performance, organisation process, and the 
relationship between process and performance (Boyne 1999, p. 2). These 
elements are discussed below. 
1.3 Best Value and Performance 
The requirement to measure performance has been broadened under Best Value, 
and includes perfortnance indicators reflecting both local and national factors, 
together with two reporting mechanisms, annual Best Value Performance Plans 
and the five-yearly Best Value Housing Inspection. 
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The Best Value in Housing Framework document explains the role of the 
performance indictors as follows: 
Performance indicators and targets are important drivers of 
improvement. They are not a perfect science nor are they the only 
means of stimulating improvement. But they do provide an important 
measure against which authorities, service users, external auditors, 
the Housing Inspectorate and, in the context of [the] Housing 
Investment Programme, Government Offices can judge how well a 
service is performing. (DETR 2000, s. 6.35) 
The way in which performance is measured is through two forms of indicator: 
local and national. The national indicators are set each year by the Government 
and the collation of related data is a statutory requirement. The housing indictors 
for the financial year 2001/2 are set out in Appendix B. At the same time, local 
authorities "are strongly encouraged to develop and use local performance 
indicators to supplement those set nationally. Local indicators have an essential 
role to play in measuring performance" (DETR 2000, s. 6.52). In its guidance to 
councillors, the Audit Commission underlined the importance of local indicators 
and provided advice on their development. The Commission advised that 
authorities should involve users, staff and councillors in their design, establish 
systems to "produce consistent, good quality data", and link the local indicators 
to Best Value Reviews (Audit Commission 1999a, p. 8). 
In terms of local indicator selection local authorities should consider their entire 
range of services, and for housing indicators they should draw comparisons with 
local Registered Social Landlords (DETR 2000, s. 6.54-6.55). The Audit 
Commission underlines the point that local indicators "are not mandatory but we 
would, nonetheless, encourage housing management organisations to make use 
of this type (or other) indicators according to their local needs and priorities" 
(Audit Commission 200 1, p. 18). 
Local authorities will, therefore, have a 'suite' of performance indicators - 
mandatory national and discretionary local. The general intention is that local 
authorities set targets in terms of what they feel can be achieved: 
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Authorities should aim to compare their current and prospective 
performance against other public sector bodies, and those in the 
private and voluntary sectors. This will rarely be a process of exact 
comparison, rather the intelligent exploration of how analogous 
services or elements of such services perform. (DETR 1999b, s. 29) 
An additional requirement is that overall local authority expenditure reduces 
annually by two percent and local authorities should 'aspire' to the upper quartile 
performers in order to achieve: 
... cost and efficiency targets over 5 years that, as a minimum, are 
consistent with the performance of the top 25% of authorities of the 
type to which they belong and which are consistent with the overall 
target of 2% per annurn efficiency improvement set for local 
government spending as a whole. (DETR 1999b, s. 29) 
While this criterion appears unequivocal four points require further explanation. 
Firstly, the two per cent figure is a reference to national local government 
spending and is binding on local authorities only to the point of being an 
aspiration, insofar as each Best Value Review is not "expected to identify 
efficiency improvements of 2% a year. Some Reviews may identify much greater 
opportunities for improved efficiency, others less so. " (DETR 1999b, s. 30). A 
related issue concerns whether efficiency relates to outputs or outcomes. The 
overall thrust of Best Value and continuous improvement is that progress is seen 
in terms of outcomes, although output measures are considered valuable for 
assessing "the scope for greater efficiency consistent with the Government's 
overall target of 2% p. a. " (DETR 1999c, s. 29). Further clarification of this issue 
is provided below, in the discussion of the Audit Commission's inspection and 
the Best Value performance Plan. 
Secondly the general 'top 25 percent' cost and efficiency target is described in 
the 2001/2 performance indicator guidance as one that will be set by local 
authorities subject to national priorities and factors listed within the guidance 
(DETR 2000a, p. 18). An example of a national priority is the Public Service 
Agreement, which, in a housing context requires reclaiming brown field land for 
development, and reducing the number of households in low quality social 
housing by one third between 2001 and 2004 (DETR 2000a, p. 123). These are 
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broad capital-based initiatives that do not relate directly to the nationally set 
housing management indicators listed in Appendix B. 
Thirdly, it is certain that local authorities should set targets in line with 
improvement. As to whether these targets should be within the upper quartile, 
slightly later housing-specific guidance issued by the Audit Commission stated 
that "The Government expects Best Value authorities (and, by extension, Arms 
Length Management Organisations) to set targets that are consistent with 
reaching, by the financial year ending 31 March 2005, the performance level of 
the top 25 per cent of authorities" (Audit Commission 2001, s. 50). So, the 
general expectation from the Audit Commission reflects a need for councils to 
set top 25 per cent targets. 
Fourthly, an exception to the setting of general targets concerns certain indicators 
that have been specifically classified 'upper quartile target'. The 2001/2 
performance indicator guidance relaxed the requirement for services to 
necessarily meet this standard: 
Top quartile targets are intended to be fair but challenging. As a rule, 
local people should expect comparable service quality to be achieved 
no matter where they live. But national comparisons will not always 
be appropriate, particularly where there are good reasons for cost 
variations between types of authority. The Government has therefore 
grouped local authorities according to type (e. g. district council, 
metropolitan borough) for the purpose of setting top quartile targets 
for cost and eff iciency indicators. (DETR 2000a, p. 19) 
This suggests some local sensitivity in the application of the upper quartile 
perforinance requirement. Only one housing BVPI is listed as top quartile for 
2001/2 indicators: average relet times for local authority dwellings let in the 
financial year. In this case: 
The Government expects best value authorities to set targets for these 
(upper quartile) BVPIs, which are consistent with reaching the top 
quartile of current performers, over five years (i. e. by 31 March 
2005). (DETR 2000a, p. 113) 
' Discussed below in s. 2.6; in essence a quasi-corporate third party vehicle that takes 
responsibility for long term management and maintenance. 
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What is not clear from these guidelines is where, within the top quarter, 
authorities should set their target to achieve what might be considered an 
'acceptable' standard. The Audit Commission's guidance states that: 
It is crucial that the targets are realistic (not a 'wish list') but 
at the same time challenging for the organisation and its staff. 
Good targets will be SMART: Specific, Measurable, 
Achievable, Relevant and Timed (Audit Commission 2000, 
p. 24). 
Overall, the issues of performance and targets are best summarised by describing 
them as a required aspect of service provision with scope for interpretation. The 
only point of certainty is that services must continuously improve to enable legal 
compliance with Best Value. 
1.4 Best Value and Process 
The discussion of process centres on an explanation of the '3 Es' (economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness) and the '4 Cs' (compare, consult, challenge and 
compete). These are the general concepts that underpin Best Value. 
The Three Es: Economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
The requirement to provide services with economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
is explicit within the Local Government Act 1999. In addition to the general 
statement within section 3 (1) which sets a duty on local authorities to achieve 
the 3 Es, the requirement is repeated in other two contexts within the 'Act. For 
performance, in specifying performance indicators the government "shall aim to 
promote improvement of the way in which the functions of Best Value 
authorities are exercised" (Local Government Act 1999, s. 4, ss. 4[a]) with regard 
to the 3 Es. When reviewing services, improvement will be with regard to the 3 
Es (Local Government Act 1999, s. 5, ss. 3 [a]). 
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There is little further clarification of the 3 Es. The DETR circular states that the 3 
Es are "a broad remit, and one that provides local government with a 
considerable challenge and a major opportunity" (DETR 1999b, para. 4). 
The Audit Commission, in their document The Role of the 4 udit Commission in 
Best Value published in December 1999, provided practical guidance equating 
the 3 Es as 'value for money' across a range of functions, including related and 
cross-cutting issues, together with a robust system of performance measurement. 
Further clarification from the Audit Commission is provided in their 
management paper, On Target: Yhe Practice of Performance Indicators 
published in June 2000. Here, four basic measures when constructing the 3 Es 
are identified: the cost of the service, the input required in terms of resources 
(buildings and staff, for example), the output (the service provided) and the 
outcome, or "actual impact and value of the service delivery" (Audit 
Commission 2000, p. 9). The On Target' document proceeds to define the 3 Es as 
follows: 
Economy: 'acquiring human and material resources of the 
appropriate quality and quantity at the lowest cost' (staff, materials, 
premises). An example is the cost of buying new books for a library. 
Efficiency: 'producing the maximum output for any given set of 
resource inputs or using the minimum inputs for the required quantity 
and quality of service provided'. An example is the cost per visit to 
public libraries. 
Effectiveness: 'having the organisation meet the citizens' 
requirements and having a programme or activity achieve its 
established goals or intended aims'. An example is 'the percentage of 
library users who found the book/information they wanted, or 
reserved it, and were satisfied with the outcome'. Effectiveness is 
about assessing whether the service is actually achieving what it set 
out to do (Audit Commission 2000, p. 9). 
A significant point, and to underline the 'and' aspect. of the 3 Es, performance 
measurement is carried out with regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
For example a housing benefit indicator could include cost, time taken, and 
accuracy (Audit Commission 2000, p. 9). Overall, the 3 Es link cost and outcome. 
The relationship is illustrated in figure one below. The 3 Es can include a wide 
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range of factors depending on the context. The outcome or 'actual impact' may 
have dimensions that require the inclusion of equalities issues and strategic 
importance. For example, allocating vacant homes may take into consideration 
ethnic minority representation in terms of access to and satisfaction with the 
service, standard of void preparation and pre-tenancy counselling. An output 
could be considered in terms of time taken from notification to relet. 
Figure One: The 3 Es 
Economy 
/11ý 
Efficiency Effectiveness 
-Co- 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes 
oC 
Cost Effectiveness 
Source: Audit Commission 2000, p. 8 
The important feature is that economy, efficiency and effectiveness must be 
measured, and therefore measurable, to ensure that continuous improvement can 
be assessed. 
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The Four Cs 
The requirement to compare, consult, compete and challenge is relevant 
primarily to the Best Value 'fundamental performance review'. Services for 
review are designated according to areas of expenditure, by service or 
neighbourhood area of delivery for example, "with a presumption that it will 
look first at areas where performance is worst" (DETR 1999, p. 3). The review is 
applied to each service every five years and within which the four Cs are 
described as "common considerations [that] apply to the way in which the review 
process should be conducted" (DETR 2000, s. 6.12). 
'Challenge' is effectively a detailed self-examination where the council will 
consider "why, how and by whom a service is being provided" (DETR 2000, 
s. 6.14). For example, the council will 'ask itself' why it, rather than another 
organisation, carries out repairs to properties, the method it uses, and why the 
current provider is used. 
'Compare' is a requirement to measure performance relative to other providers 
64across a range of relevant indicators, taking into account the vie w's of service 
users and potential suppliers" (DETR 2000, Para 2.16). The intention is that local 
authorities choose from a range of suitable comparisons and make "an intelligent 
exploration of how analogous services perform" (DETR 2000, s. 6.18). 
'Compete' requires the use of "fair and open competition wherever practicable as 
a means of securing efficient and effective services" (DETR 2000, s. 2.16). 
'Consult' covers the individuals and organisations expected to be relevant to a 
council's Best Value performance targets, including "local taxpayers, service 
users, partners, the wider business community and internally" (DETR 2000, 
s. 2.16). 
'Compare', 'compete' and 'challenge' are related largely to matters of relative 
performance and costs, and are relevant to the discussion of performance 
measurement and monitoring and costs in the next section of the thesis. The 
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consultation requirement has been given a unique relevance within the Best 
Value in housing guidance and legislation through the introduction of Tenant 
Participation Compacts: 
Compacts will help local authorities and tenants establish 
mechanisms for tenants to take part effectively in consultation and 
local housing decisions. This goes to the heart of Best Value and 
compacts need to be seen as an integral part of Best Value as it 
relates to housing (DETR 2000, s. 5.13). 
The first Compacts were required to be in place by Ist April 2000. They are a 
written agreement between the landlord and local residents drawn predominantly 
from local authority managed housing. The word 'tenant' is taken to have a wide 
definition in the context of Compacts and should include "secure tenants and 
council leaseholders and also cover tenants with introductory tenancies, tenants 
living in sheltered or supported housing, or tenants living in temporary housing" 
(DETR 1999c, s. 2). 
The Tenant Participation Compact is defined as a tool to ensure that "people 
know who exactly will be responsible for decisions and who will be actively 
involved in helping councils to reach those decisions" and enabling tenants to 
plan, improve and take remedial action (DETR 1999c, s. 2). 
It is clear that residents have a role in the future shape of housing services. This 
marks a shift from the situation under Compulsory Competitive Tendering, 
where tenants had a right to be informed of change but no right to play any part 
in influencing that change (Stewart 1996, p. 177). The new provisions under Best 
Value include a move from the word 'consult' to more active language, where 
tenants will be 'involved' and 'take action'. However, with this increased 
involvement some degree of responsibility is suggested, in that those tenant 
representatives who "wish to be consulted or have the opportunity to influence or 
make decisions, [they] may be required to study and comment on papers and 
background information" (DETR 1999c, s. 2). In addition, the tenant groups that 
wish to engage in participation must "meet the council's agreed and published 
criteria for formal recognition", such as a written constitution, regular meetings 
and a policy on equality issues (DETR 1999c, s. 4). An appreciation of the 
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practicalities of involving and training tenants is given through the listing of the 
support that should be available to them, such as finance, premises, and tailored 
training (DETR 1999c, s. 4). 
While a measure of prescription is apparent in the structure of Compacts, the 
guidance underlines that "there are no magic universal formulae for effective 
participation" (DETR 1999d, s. 1). This is a reference to diverse local 
circumstances, and while there is a national framework, there cannot be a 
gnational compact'. Local sensitivity is extended to the matter of measuring the 
effectiveness of tenant inclusion. The Compacts are expected to conform, where 
local circumstances allow, to certain core standards listed as involvement in 
housing service provision, resources and training, standards of meetings (such as 
a clear agenda, active publicity, and child care costs), standards of information 
(easily understood texts in a wide range of media and relevant subject areas), and 
the organisation of tenants' groups (DETR 1999c, s. 4). 
Clearly local authorities and residents have a number of preparatory matters to 
organise before active involvement will arise. 
Summary of the 3 Es and the 4 Cs 
Economy, efficiency and effectiveness are the framework for defining the 
process by which Best Value will be delivered. The emphasis that the Audit 
Commission places on these aspects of service suggest that they are a major part 
of evaluating Best Value. Consult, challenge, compare and compete are the way 
in which this is to be achieved according to the requirement of continuous 
improvement. Best Value, described in this way, is about required processes and 
a broad framework with which to achieve them. 
1.5 Monitoring Best Value 
There are two main ways in which an authority's performance in respect of Best 
Value in housing is monitored. The first is through the Best Value Performance 
Plan, and the second is the Best Value Inspection. 
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Performance Plans 
The most frequent and locally accessible means by which local authorities' 
performance will be monitored and reported is through the Best Value 
Performance Plan. The notion of accountability and the publication of a Best 
Value plan has been a key feature of the policy from the outset (appendix A, 
principle one). The requirement to produce a plan is set out in the Local 
Government Act 1999 where councils "must prepare a best value performance 
plan for each financial year" (s. 6, ss. 1). The required content of the plan is 
detailed in Government guidance and includes summaries of the authority's 
objectives, current and recent performance, progress with Best Value Reviews, 
response to Best Value Inspection (if undertaken), and a 'consultation statement' 
"explaining how participation requirements have been met" (DETR 2000, 
s. 6.58). These provisions apply to all local authority services. 
The Plan is published in two forms. The first comprises the complete range of 
details listed. The second is a summarised form presented to "engage local 
people and local interests fully in Best Value and in the outcomes" (DETR 2000, 
s. 6.62). This summary should provide "a fair and accurate reflection of 
information" of the full version of the Plan, and while councils will select this 
information it should "have regard to key national and local priorities and any 
action in hand to tackle performance weaknesses" (DETR 2000, s. 6.63). 
Best Value Inspections 
The second method of monitoring is the Best Value Inspection. Inspections of 
housing services are undertaken by the Housing Inspectorate, a subsidiary of the 
Audit Commission. The Local Government Act 1999 (sections 10-14) sets out 
the general procedure for a Best Value Inspection. Once the inspection has been 
carried out the Audit Commission will publish a report detailing any failure in 
compliance; and may, with reference to that failure, recommend direct 
intervention by the Secretary of State. In any event, a failure in compliance 
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identified within the report must be reflected within the next performance plan, 
together with any action taken by the council as a result. 
The Audit Commission considered the legislation and accompanying guidance to 
produce details of the range of considerations they will use in their inspections 
including relevant government policies, the needs of vulnerable groups, local 
context, the Best Value performance data and service standards (Audit 
Commission 200 1 a). 
Best Value Inspections in Practice 
The first inspection took place in September 2000 and almost 200 housing- 
related inspections had been completed by February 2002. Some authorities were 
subject to a limited inspection where, for example, they have transferred all of 
their housing stock. Others, with larger housing departments, required several 
inspections covering a various aspects of the service. For housing departments 
individual inspection reports have covered building maintenance, caretaking, 
allocations, housing services, housing strategy, supported housing, repairs, 
homelessness and rent collection. 
The inspections follow a council's publication of their Best Value Review "so 
that authorities themselves will determine when most inspections will take place" 
(Audit Commission 2000a, p. 26). The inspectors "reach their judgements by 
asking two key questions: how good are the services being inspected? (and) will 
those services improve? " (Audit Commission 2001, p. 6). 
In overall terms the Best Value Inspection is a means of "assessing excellence in 
housing management" (Audit Commission 2001, s. 1). A number of 
considerations are used in drawing conclusions about the extent to which local 
authorities are achieving Best Value, and the combination of the Best Value 
Performance Plan and the Housing Inspection form the basis of such 
conclusions. 
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The result of an inspection is relayed in a number of ways. For example, the full 
inspection report for housing management services runs to around 50 pages on 
average. As a prdcis of the report, the Inspectorate has developed a system of 
scoring council services according to a 'star' rating to convey its overall 
judgement: no star - poor service; one star - fair service; two stars - good 
service; three stars - excellent service. The service rating is pegged to a 
4prospects for improvement' star rating with a similar scale: no star - poor; one 
star - fair; two stars - promising; three stars - excellent. 
1.6 Best Value Summary 
Two areas have been covered in this section: a description of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, and a description of Best Value. This introduction to the 
two policies highlights certain differences and similarities. 
The most obvious reference to the research question (concerning the redefinition 
of relationships) in this section has been the role of residents, and the active 
manner in which they will be involved in Best Value processes. This is the 
clearest distinction between Best Value and Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
in addition, it is clear that all members involved in the delivery and receipt of 
local services will potentially become involved in 'planning' service 
improvements. 
Other distinctions can be identified such as systems of measurement, 
accountability and monitoring. Best value involves the use of these new 
processes and measures with the implicit assumption that they will lead to 
improved services and is "tantamount to a belief that rational planning leads to 
better organisational performance" (Boyne 1999, p. 9, emphasis original). This 
planning cycle - from review of current services, to targets for future services, to 
action necessary, to monitoring the impact of the course taken - involves a 
locally determined process far removed from the rigid requirements of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
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This notion of autonomy and flexibility carries certain complications. While the 
aim of Best Value is to ensure continuous service improvement it is not 
immediately clear how this will be achieved. Certainly, there are performance 
indicators, inspections, audits and so forth. Fundamentally Best Value is 'about' 
reducing costs and improving quality of service provision - the 'outcome', with 
the mechanisms set out within the legislation and guidance - the 'process' 
(Boyne 2000, p. 7). The issue is to understand what this means in practical terms: 
whose process and outcome is considered, and which prevails? 
An additional aspect of change introduced with Best Value is the scope of the 
policy. Best Value affects all services across all local authority departments. 
Different and complementary departments involved in producing Best Value 
outcomes could produce an interesting range of possibilities as each vie for, on 
the one hand, departmental compliance and on the other maintain services in line 
with broader organisation goals. 
The path to understanding the "muddled and complex affair" (Jacobs 1999, p. 60) 
that is policy involves an appreciation of what Best Value is and the changes it 
will introduce, the nature of any complexity, and the way Best Value is managed 
at the local level. These issues are considered in greater depth in part two of the 
thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Research Framework 
Chapter one provided an outline of Best Value and the policy environment into 
which it was introduced. Key openings for resident inclusion characterise Best 
Value, together with a number of performance and procedural aspects of 
implementation. This chapter sets out the research framework in three stages. 
Firstly, the research questions are set out. This serves to highlight the focus of 
the dissertation. Secondly, the methodology that underpins the research approach 
is explained. Finally, and with a view to the research focus and the 
methodological basis of the thesis, a range of applicable theoretical ideas are 
discussed. 
2.1 Research Questions 
The central research question is: In what ways were local relationships redefined 
following the introduction ofBest Value?. This question is considered from three 
perspectives. 
Firstly, in considering Best Value a significant element of the discussion 
involves the forerunner, Compulsory Competitive Tendering. The policies differ 
in a number of respects, although the ostensible aim of both involve improved 
performance. Local authorities had worked with Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering in housing departments for almost five years prior to Best Value, yet 
the objective of the policy - the outsourcing of services and the assumed 
efficiency that would follow - did not materialise to a significant extent. 
The question that requires interrogation in this context is the situation before 
Best Value and the change that arises. It is possible that, for example, the 
aversion to tendering (although by no means universal) may continue with Best 
Value and negate the effectiveness of the' compete' requirement. The first 
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research sub-question is therefore: How is current implementation dependent on 
past practice and circumstance? 
A second research sub-question is required to identify how those associated with 
Best Value interpret the policy. The straightforward reason for this inquiry is to 
ascertain how, amidst the various interpretations that could arise given the wide 
scope of Best Value, and the intention of local determination in any event, Best 
Value is being interpreted by local actors. This does not explain how Best Value 
is being implemented; rather, how local actors would like to see housing services 
provided within the boundaries of Best Value. To this end the second research 
question is: to what extent is the implementation of Best Value in line with the 
expectations of those associated with Best Value processes? This question is 
raised in the light of the emphasis on resident influence within Best Value, and 
the extent to which Best Value process allows expression of their preferences. 
Therefore, it might be expected that residents will have an impact on Best Value 
implementation. 
The final stage in estimating the way in which local actors impact upon Best 
Value implementation involves the identification 'significant actors'. The 
underpinning contention in this work is that Best Value will cause the local 
context to shift: relationships will be renegotiated. This line of reasoning is 
largely deductive, developed from an analysis of Best Value, previous research 
and consideration of theoretical ideas. The two relatively open initial research 
questions also allow affirmation or refutation of the notion of shifting 
relationships to arise inductively. They are a consideration of what happened 
during Compulsory Competitive Tendering and the expectations of Best Value. 
This relatively open frame of investigation has been adopted because little is 
known of 'relationship' events during Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
Similarly, Best Value is a new policy: it cannot be predicted how, or indeed if, 
relationships will change. It is thus the intention to identify key themes that have 
arisen during Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and are likely to arise during 
Best Value. 
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The final research sub-question seeks to establish who steers change under Best 
Value: is any group or individual associated with Best Value processes able to 
influence implementation? This research focuses on the specific involvement of 
local actors: front line staff, councillors, residents and senior management. The 
specific hypothesis that flows from this question - senior officials are most likely 
to control the agenda of change under Best Value - is the focused application of 
certain theoretical ideas and methodological direction discussed in the next 
section. 
To summarise, the reasoning of this work is that current implementation is partly 
dependent on past patterns of delivery; different interpretations of Best Value 
will arise from local actors; and certain groups or individuals will steer Best 
Value implementation so that their interpretation of Best Value is realised. 
2.2 Research Methodology 
The methodology is an explanation of the logic underlying the research processes 
as a whole: the foundation of assumptions, arguments, and range of 
consideration. The aim of this section is to present a persuasive starting point that 
considers competing and complementary views of research approaches, 
acknowledges strengths and limitations, and provides a clear and consistent 
ontological, epistemological and methodological position from which an 
appropriate research method can be articulated. 
Ontology 
The object of this study is local housing policy implementation. The ontology 
that has driven urban researchers to explain this object can be sourced from 
structuralist and individualist or agency traditions (Jacobs 1999, p. 17). This work 
falls within these ontological identifiers. It is argued throughout that both the 
action of specific agents and social structure have a part to play when arriving at 
explanations for outcomes. In the context of Best Value, and outcomes that arise 
ostensibly because of Best Value, it is contended that the form of outcome is 
rooted in social structure. Best value, as a policy with legitimacy and legal force, 
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is part of social structure, and it has arisen as the result of a myriad of factors. In 
the context of housing (although Best Value affects a wide range of other local 
authority activities) some of these factors could be listed as tenure, public 
finance, and housing markets. 
It is posited as a founding assumption that interpretations of Best Value will arise 
from individual experiences that have been influenced by structural 
characteristics. This is therefore a realist ontology -a belief that adequate 
explanations are found in part through the observation of certain phenomena, and 
in part through recognition of certain causal underlying mechanisms. 
Epistemology 
A problem that arises from this assumption is the definition of what 'structures' 
are - where are these 'causal underlying mechanisms'? Positivists for example 
would argue that to 'imagine' such forces is to avoid dealing with directly 
testable hypotheses and verifiable evidence. One answer to this criticism is to 
return to the ontological assumption that all that exists to be explained is not 
necessarily observable, at least in terms of empirical research. An example of this 
apparent evasion could be organisations. Perhaps it is not what they are, or what 
they do, that engenders a response from those within them; perhaps it is what 
they are seen to represent that evokes an emotional response. Ellison and Martin 
(2000), in applying the theoretical ideas of Melucci (1996), try to answer two 
questions - why is it that only certain members of a group, with the same 
problems, become mobilised; and how can the degrees of mobilisation be 
explained? While the answers to these questions were founded in individuals and 
the extent to which they recognised themselves as part of a collectivity, there had 
to be reasons for the need to mobilise in the first place and, crucially, what they 
found to mobilise towards. The test area for Ellison and Martin was the 
mobilisation towards the mass support for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). 
Their social constructivist approach could explain how social movements arise, 
but not why - "Of course Melucci is still concerned with why social movements 
emerge; that is with the structural precondition for collective action" (Ellison and 
Martin 2000, p. 689). In this example the IRA provided the precondition in what 
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it represented -a relatively (at least when compared to other aspects of the Civil 
Rights Movement) coherent set of policies and ideas. It was not what it was, but 
what it represented that held appeal and subsequently popular support - "Thus, a 
collective actor cannot construct its identity in a vacuum" (Ellison and Martin 
2000, p. 690). 
Best value, of course, is not about the repression of Irish people. However it is 
suggested that the theme from this example can be drawn out to inforrn the 
epistemological position of this work - that causal structures and individual 
volition are together crucial aspects of social enquiry. Further, theory that is used 
to test this notion, and to develop the hypotheses of this work, should reflect this 
understanding. 
'Contingent Necessity': Method, Methodology and Compromise in the 
Research Process 
The ontological and epistemological ideas adopted are fundamentally (and 
respectively) that meaning is formed by socio-historical context and identity of 
an individual ('where you come from, who you are'), and that people constitute 
knowledge ('rneaning') in their practical everyday activity. This 'stance' is not 
presented as a dogmatic reality; simply a starting point from which the context 
and reasoning of the thesis can be understood. The reality to be observed is a 
virtually infinite array of factors, and to group them and present an algebraic 
formula would (were such a thing possible) be meaningless as a basis of analysis. 
Marx's approach to encapsulating the 'concrete' is expressed in Grundrisse: 
Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic 
conception (Vorstellung) of the whole, and I would then, by means of 
further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple 
concepts (Begrifj), from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner 
abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From 
there the journey would have to be retraced until I had arrived at the 
population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a 
whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations 
(Marx 1973, p. 100). 
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Marx's reconstruction of the chaotic revolved around a focus on economic 
factors relating to the aspect of his analysis -a 'rich totality' is therefore perhaps 
an exaggeration. But the point is this: If the construction of reality is to be taken 
as a complex notion then some form of reduction is necessary for meaningful 
investigation. Jessop (1999) describes this as a 'contingent necessity' that leads 
to an epistemology that combines "concepts, assumptions, and principles of 
analysis from different theoretical domains and (then) to link them to a given, 
theoretically defined explanendum". Consideration of this reasoning is 
expounded in the discussion of theory where, particularly, the volition of 
individuals and the nature of power within society's structures are explained. For 
example, exponents of New Right and Marxist theory place too great an 
emphasis on individual and state-centred bases, respectively, from the 
perspective of this work. 
An additional point that arises from what is essentially a selective focus is that 
any explanation "is only more or less satisfactory relative to a given 
explanendum that has been isolated (and thus 'constructed') by an observer out 
of that infinite complexity" (Jessop 1999). This selectivity extends to method, 
which must acknowledge other 'planes of observation', yet encompass sufficient 
depth to stand as a substantial approach in its own right. 
The theories to be examined for this dissertation must be capable of explaining 
the processes and dynamics of local bureaucracies and shades of influence within 
them. Additionally, the examination of theory must include a discussion of the 
extent to which the complexities of the situation have been reduced, both in 
terms of the focus of theory and the application of it. The considerable body of 
'accepted' housing research has either been "undertheorised" (Kemeny 1992, 
p. 19) or positivist, adopting a linear perspective of the political and policy arena. 
It is considered appropriate to respond to Kemeny's (1992, p. 21) suggestions 
concerning housing research - to be reflexive (that is, to think about what is 
being researched and why) and critical (to challenge the orthodox). In this sense 
Best Value is a new policy demanding new modes of local authority provision. 
The basis of the policy and the outcomes that are expected to arise should be 
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scrutinised and tested. The theoretical aspect of the thesis is discussed in the next 
section. 
2.3 Theory 
In order to explore the issues raised and answer the questions set it has been 
necessary to develop a method of investigation which is appropriate. This section 
starts with a relatively general discussion of theoretical perspectives that could 
guide this research, and concludes with a summary of the theoretically informed 
research method adopted. Further explanation of the method and associated 
theory is provided in Part Three 'Theory and Best Value'. 
Theoretical development in local government policy research has traditionally 
found root in structural or agency explanations of outcomes. Recent 
developments have highlighted the shortcomings of drawing 'hard' dichotomies, 
with explanations drawing in concepts such as 'governance', rational planning' 
and 'urban regimes'. By the mid-80s it was clear that two major social scientific 
traditions concerned with power relations were being used to address questions 
related to changes in the institutional framework of government: structuralism 
and pluralism. 
Structuralism 
Structuralist theory offers a determinist view of the relationship between the 
individual and society. Society's structures determine agents' actions. 
Housing is relatively well served by structural analysis, the "exemplar" (Jacobs 
1999, p. 46) of which is Cockburn's study of Lambeth. Hers is an account of the 
local state locked in struggle against a capitalist state, and reflects a certain 
sympathy with the plight of local officials: "Stronger management in the town 
hall could not, in the brightest economic circumstances, let alone crisis, respond 
to the needs of an urban working class whose distress was caused mainly by 
factors well beyond the council's control" (1977, p. 158). Cockburn's analysis 
refers to corporatist methods of local management which "should by all accounts 
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have been deftly despatching the poverty with one hand while reining back the 
charger of public spending with the other ... the new management in the council 
was no match for trends whose cause lay largely outside" (1977, p. 67). The 
'trend' is a reference to reproduction of the labour force, necessary for the 
continuation of the capitalist system, and as Cockburn illustrates, under pressure 
to provide reproduction at least cost to that system. There is an assumption 
within her analysis that places all causes of inequality in housing within a pro- 
capitalist central-state power. Whether this is true or not, the capacity for 
complicity of senior management, or any other actor, is missed when the focus is 
so firmly fixed on the central state. 
Following the broadly Marxist-sympathetic line Jargen Haben-nas's theories 
relating to 'legitimation crisis' (1976) through to 'communicative action' (1996) 
resolutely acknowledge the importance of the motivational and rational activity 
below the central state, although the nature of his exploration means that 
"administration is itself assumed to take a unified, bureaucratic form" (Black 
2000, p. 614). 
Most of what actually 'happens' during Best Value takes place at the local level, 
within the spatial boundary of the local authority. Mark Page sought to deal with 
the 'derived' nature of what he considered to be a structuralist approach, 
"reducing the state to a simple concretisation and spatialisation of the abstract 
categories of the capitalist mode of production" (1990, p. 45). He showed that 
local government is far more complicated than an extension of central 
government, with many interests often vying for particular programmes of 
interest. He followed the reductions in capital budgets, and noted that authorities 
would respond in a variety of ways, sometimes at odds with the intention of 
policy: "just reducing the HIP [Housing Investment Programme] allocations was 
not enough to ensure that what councils did was what central government wanted 
... government ministers 
have had to learn on the job that reducing this 
autonomy is no easy matter" (1990, p. 287). He looked at processes often ignored, 
and sought: 
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a way of understanding both agency and social structures within 
which agency is articulated ... it has been our intention that the study 
should make a contribution towards bringing an understanding of the 
structures and agents of housing production and the state into 
mainstream of current discussions around urban change and urban 
politics (1990, p. 297). 
The problem with Marxist-derived analysis epitomised in Page's observations is 
that it does not uncover why local variation occurs; it lacks the sensitivity to 
embrace actor volition in the way required by this thesis. An agnostic 
appreciation of Marxism is carried forward in this sense: structures in society 
involve an imperative. While it may well be that the economic imperative is the 
prime driving force, some space exists for actors to work within, to test society's 
structures. And this need not, always, produce outcomes consistent with the 
shackles capitalist society seems to impose from a neo-Marxist standpoint. 
Kleinman expresses this point in the following terms: 
I reject the view that policies are always, and must always be in the 
objective interests of the capitalist class, and that apparent gains for 
the working class, for minority groups, for the poor and 
disadvantaged generally are always and necessarily illusory. (1996, 
p. 14-15) 
To assume that Best Value is a policy so tightly formed, so contrived to serve the 
needs of capitalism and nothing else, is to miss the possibility that it may be 
interpreted in different ways. Sometimes, as Kleinman suggests, this may result 
in real and 'uncapitalist' benefits for certain groups. Of course, within 
structuralist analysis these benefits may be seen as placatory rather than illusory, 
but the essence of Kleinman's argument should be acknowledged as a research 
possibility. Policies are ambiguous, and outputs are the result of a vast array of 
actor involvement. Similarly, there is no single structure of determinism; society 
comprises a vast array of 'sub-structures' and agents within - each competing, 
cooperating, interacting, and crucially interpreting the overall social context. 
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Pluralism 
Pluralism arose as a critique of the theory of representative government and 
considers a wider range of influences on governments, with a particular focus on 
interest groups and the ways in which they operate to balance excesses in either 
economic and political power: 
The political process remains one in which there are multiple (plural) 
centres of power, and one in which the ordinary citizen can intervene 
relatively easily and effectively (Dunleavy 1981, p. 202). 
From this view pluralist explanations are relevant to the thesis as a view of all 
actors as potentially powerful. Opportunities exist for individuals to express 
disquiet and preference through democratic structures, and pluralists would argue 
that the existence of the welfare state and council housing is evidence of this. 
Taking the line of thinking a stage further, pluralists would interpret Best Value 
as an example of evolved democracy with loose central government control and 
enhanced local means of involvement for those involved with service provision. 
It is the diversity of society, with its varied represented interests, which is of 
value to pluralists, and the "rejection of absolute, unified and uncontrolled state 
power remains the hallmark of pluralism" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, p. 13). 
The rejection of state or any form of overarching centre of control is reflected in 
methodological individualism - 
The possibility that individuals have interests which they have not 
expressed as preferences is ruled out of order. Effectively it becomes 
impossible for people to be mistaken about their interests. Marxist 
and radical claims about the possibility of 'false consciousness' are 
dismissed as unscientific or value-laden. (Dunleavy and O'Leary 
1987, p. 19-20) 
This work could therefore proceed to test the pluralist advocacy of any 'free and 
real' expression that Best Value brings. Should this line be adopted three 
problems are apparent. 
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The first is reliance on the notion that an opinion expressed is an opinion 
counted. Dearlove (1973) found in his study of Kensington and Chelsea that 
councillors effectively manipulated the input of individuals and interest groups to 
fit their agenda, which created a situation where those wishing to be heard had to 
either face exclusion or adapt their input to become more councillor compliant 
(Stoker 1988, pp. 111-112). Dearlove's interpretation is one of 'elitism', where 
one group is able to exert control over others. The influence can extend to 
another local authority group: 
As Weber (1947) notes, bureaucracies have both positive and 
negative aspects: positive in that they offer an efficient way of 
organising administration; and negative because they open up the 
possibility of power being a vested in officials who are accountable 
to neither the public nor to politicians (Hill 1997, p. 44) 
Dunleavy (1977,1980), Pahl (1975), Saunders (1980,1983) and Newton (1976) 
have undertaken research in urban local authorities suggesting that officers and 
politicians effectively creating a decision making 'cocoon', isolating groups such 
as ethnic minorities, trade unions and lower grade workers "where dogs may 
bark themselves hoarse in the night but nobody listens" (Saunders 1979, p. 29). 
The second problem relates to the assumption that power can be distributed fairly 
equally given open and accountable systems of democracy; it is 'within us all' to 
actively participate and effect change. Barriers that exist and obstruct this process 
can be identified and eliminated. The issue here is the extent to which such 
barriers can be identified. When considering what Best Value 'is', the discussion 
concerning the way in which it arose and connects to policy outcomes, 
explanations cannot be pinned down entirely to observable phenomena. For 
example, Longhurst considers a positivist approach "relatively fruitless" (1995, 
p. 13 0) when trying to decide what 'black music' is. Not only does the perception 
of 'music' and 'black' have to be considered, but also the basis of that 
understanding, such as genetic, cultural, evolutionary, class and race accounts 
(127-133). Porter (1993) considered diverse social situations and ideological 
'baggage' as important variables when defining 'race'. Ideology, class, race and 
culture are not visible as regular and objective entities; they are not consistently 
tangible aspects of the social world. The dilemma, therefore; is trying to seek an 
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explanation from a picture with significant ideational elements. The 
Government's Best Value policy contains many explicit and implicit criticisms 
of unresponsive local authorities and poor service delivery. It is suggested that an 
incomplete picture will arise from the reliance on a theory that evaluates policy 
through the use of observable phenomena, such as performance data, alone. An 
important issue is the consideration of how measures become defined, and the 
meaning to actors involved in their definition. The enduring and practical point 
here is that explanations for social events are not necessarily observable. Simple 
animal traits such as comfort, belonging and security clearly arise from time to 
time, and in turn affect our view of the world, and the way we act within it. The 
task this presents is to 'fill the gaps' as much as possible without the assumptions 
of pluralist and positivist logic, which leads to the third point on pluralism. 
The third problem relates to these explanatory gaps left by pluralist accounts; 
what they are and how to articulate them in policy research. In essence the 
critical realist position of this work states that factors that influence actors' 
behaviour exist whether we can see them or not, and this has been covered in part 
with the explanation above of the second problem of pluralism. Little explains 
that pluralist accounts are: 
... entirely unpersuasive ... What 
determines the adequacy of a 
system of concepts in science is its ultimate utility in analyzing and 
explaining the range of phenomena to which it is applied - not its 
'foundations' in a supposedly rock-bottom level of ontology (1991, 
p. 186). 
Little's discomfort with pluralist logic stems from the rigid adoption of the 
ontological notion that social phenomena comprise individual activity, which in 
turn must be explained through individual activity. The former point is the 
ontological position of this work, but it cannot be accepted that afull explanation 
flows from individual accounts. However, in the sense that individual activity 
and individuals' perceptions of it are a vital part of the explanation sought, a 
pluralist-based approach can yield valuable insights: its "theoretical merit is its 
concentration on the minutiae of everyday life" (Jacobs 1999, p. 50). This 
observation brings the discussion on pluralism and structuralism full-circle; both 
are of value, yet neither offer a wholly satisfactory basis of inquiry. 
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2.4 Theory and Best Value: Bridging Pluralism and Structuralism 
Anthony Giddens (1979) developed the concept of structuration whereby the 
relationship between agency and structure is expressed in terms of mutual 
dependency. The structural traits of society (demographic, social or economic for 
example) provide the means for action and consequently opportunities for 
outcomes. Giddens argues that modernity has empowered the individual as 
democratic systems, communication and networks have evolved: 
Everyone still continues to live a local life, and the constraints of the 
body ensure that all individuals, at every moment, are contextually 
situated in time and space. Yet the transformations of place, and the 
intrusion of distance into local activities, combined with , 
the 
centrality of mediated experience, radically change what 'the world' 
actually is (199 1, p. 187). 
While on the one hand Giddens is drawing attention to the volition of individuals 
and adding force to pluralist accounts, on the other he is drawing the reader into 
an appreciation of the pervasive nature of non-local, even global, 'intrusions' to 
shape action. Customs, traditions, laws and language can be changed as actors 
recursively renegotiate structure. An example of Giddens' ideas applied is 
Healey and Barrett's (1990) urban property research: 
They outline an explicit approach to the relation between structure, in 
terms of what drives the development process and produces 
distinctive patterns in particular periods, and agency, in terms of the 
way individual agents develop and pursue their strategy (Jacobs 
1999, p. 21). 
However, structuration can only inform an approach. It is not a method; "rather it 
is a way of informing methods and providing concepts to enhance research" 
(Jacobs 1999, p. 20). In this work, as a starting point, it can be useful to consider 
the underpinning ideas of structuration theory to reconcile the structure-agency 
viewpoints and develop a method to investigate local change. 
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Application of urban regime theory provides some interesting perspectives in this 
context, suggesting the formation of coalitions within and between public and 
private organisations to achieve a certain policy direction (Stone 1989, Elkin 
1987): a form of "'governing coalition' ... [that] recognizes both the relative 
human agencies of politicians, bureaucrats, capitalists and activists, as well as the 
structural constraints and contradictions of capitalism and liberal democracy" 
(Brown 1999). Urban regime theory does not 'rank and divide' in the way 
pluralist and structuralist-inspired accounts can. A limitation of the theory is the 
suggestion of a situation where structural components can become subsumed in 
the 'local regime', and thus "downplay the extent to which actors can influence 
the system in which they operate", and obscuring the reasons for change 
(Brandsen 2001). Urban regime theory also neglects consideration of the impact 
of economic factors on political processes which "weakens the ability of regime 
theorists to explain city politics" (Davies 2002, p. 13). 
Rhodes' neo-pluralist analysis of British government policy-making noted 
"function specific networks comprising central departments, professions and 
other key interests" (Rhodes 1992, in Jacobs 1999, p. 5 1). 'Agencies in league' is 
an interesting explanation of action, although identifying actual networks is 
complicated. Networks are not neat and replicable aspects of society: 
Networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures 
and particular forms of behaviour. They are organizations which 
shape attitudes and behaviour. Networks result from repeated 
behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decision makers of taking 
difficult decisions; they help routinize behaviour. They simplify the 
policy process by limiting actions, problems and solutions. Networks 
define roles and responses. (Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 6) 
This extract reveals a number of characteristics of networks which lead to three 
investigative possibilities (Marsh and Smith 2000, pp. 5-9): 
1. Policy outcomes are the product of a network and the actors within it; 
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2. Networks themselves are related to the broader context in which they are 
located (other networks; structural issues such as race, class and gender) which 
influence the composition and interests of the network; 
3. Network responses could simplify process and outcome and motivate actors 
to adopt particular strategies depending on how they were affected by the 
outcome and the part they played in its arrival. 
Linking these three aspects of networks Marsh and Smith developed an 
illustration of the flow between the structure/agency parameters, through to the 
skills and resources available to an actor, the subsequent 'filtering' effects of the 
network, and on to policy outcomes (2000, p. 12). This is illustrated in figure two. 
The frame, adopting Marsh and Smith's dialeCtiC2 approach, provides a useful 
method of conceptualising Best Value and the behaviour of actors within this 
policy arena. 
A network model as espoused by Marsh and Smith bridges the agency-structure 
extremes through 'meso-level' analysis: 
Macro-level theories are often too abstract and frequently applied to 
concrete situations with little attention to mediating processes, while 
micro-level theories tend to ignore the impact of broader structural 
factors on micro-level decision-making settings. It is thus argued that 
operating at the meso-level acts as a corrective device for ensuring 
that policy scientists don't lose sight of important macro- or micro- 
level questions. (Evans 2001, p. 542) 
Evans' observation echoes the methodological basis of this work and the 
comments related to structuration: a situation where structure-agent aspects are 
considered together. As to the usefulness of Marsh and Smith's consideration of 
interrelationships and policy networks as a meso-level approach, Evans states: 
"Novel hypotheses may be extracted from the policy network approach which 
2 The term 'dialectic' is adopted to mean "an interactive relationship between two variables in 
which each affects the other in a continuing iterative process" (Marsh and Smith 2000, p. 5). This 
differs from the conflict model of thesis-antithesis-synthesis found in classical dialectical 
Marxism, in that the interaction is one of process, rather than necessary conflict. 
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must themselves be articulated in a systematic fashion and subject to empirical 
test" (Evans 2001, p. 549). 
Figure Two: Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes (Marsh and Smith 2000, 
P. 10) 
Structural 
Context 
Innate Skill 
Actor's 
Leaming 
Network 
Structure 
Actor's 
Resources 
Network 
Interaction 
Actor's Skills 
Policy Outcome 
A 
Feedback Route .4..................... ......... ..... 
Causal Relationship 4 10 
Note to Figure Two 
Marsh and Smith's diagram demonstrates the interaction between three aspects of the 
policy network: the structure of the network and the agents operating within it; the 
network and the context within which it operates; and the network and policy outcome 
(2000, p. 20). Every aspect of the policy process thereby links to each other through the 
network lattice. For example, an actor's learning is informed by the policy outcome, 
which in turn is a result of the network structure and interaction within the network, which 
in turn is a reflection of actors' resources and skills. 
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The field work in this dissertation is a meso-level analysis, using local authorities 
as the research site because most 'Best Value activity' takes place within the 
local authority boundary. For example services are delivered, residents are 
consulted, performance plans are produced and the four Cs and three Es are 
delivered. In other words, the best opportunity to assess a policy lies at the point 
of delivery where it is 'interpreted most'. It may be that auditors or new 
providers shape outcomes to a greater extent. If this is the case that eventuality 
should surface from research focused on the local authority arena surrounding 
Best Value. This reason is bound to related research: "A local authority 
represents a formidable force which has the intellectual resources to sabotage or, 
at least delay, those central government policies that lacked local government 
consent" (Seal 1999, p. 324). 
Within the Best Value and housing network the local authority sphere appears to 
be the most important single determinant of Best Value implementation, and the 
extent to which relationships change within it is an issue of importance. 
What remains is a theoretically informed method which covers the useful aspects 
of the 'basket' of theories considered: the pluralist attention to agent action; 
structuralist notions of determinism; structuration's synergistic approach to the 
agency-structure divide; urban regime theory's structured viewpoint of urban 
outcomes; and network approaches defining the policy realm. The method must 
also be applicable to the research focus: public policy, change in relationships 
and processes, and policy implementation. 
To this end, the 'bureau shaping' thesis advanced by Patrick Dunleavy is detailed 
in Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (1991) is of use. The 
fundamental premise of Dunleavy's thesis is that senior bureaucrats in public 
agencies do not, as public choice theorists predict, budget maximise and 
overstate the preferences of their organisation resulting in inefficient allocation 
of resources. Dunleavy's theory predicts that senior managers, rather than expand 
a bureaucracy, shape it to "small, elite staff organizations devoid of direct line 
responsibilities" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 8). One reason for adopting Dunleavy's 
thesis, and the model he proposes, is because "although not yet subject to 
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rigorous testing, the bureau-shaping account seems strongly consistent with 
existing knowledge" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 8). Specifically bureau shaping is 
relevant to this study in two ways: a theory to explain the behaviour of 
bureaucrats within a structural context; and an explanation of the way in which 
government policy can be interpreted. The introduction of Best Value is therefore 
an ideal opportunity to apply Dunleavy's notion and gauge the extent to which 
4shaping' takes place during Best Value. 
The full explanation of Dunleavy's reasoning is set out in Part Three. At this 
point an important aspect of bureau shaping requires explanation. Managers do 
not seek a particular organisation form at any cost. Certain aspects of inertia exist 
such as agency type, collective action tendencies and budgets affected. In overall 
terms managers will seek a 'safe' environment to enact strategies to achieve 
bureau shaping ends. It is argued that Best Value creates the space for such an 
environment to thrive in terms of tangible processual aspects outlined above (the 
3 Es and the 4 Cs), and the less precise arena of political legitimacy. Dunleavy 
thereby explains agent action in a structured context, which is of methodological 
significance in this work. 
Having clarified the theoretical emphasis and research focus the following 
chapter outlines the thesis plan. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Thesis Plan 
This research started in January 1999, and the main interviews took place 
between March 2001 and February 2002. All detail contained within this thesis 
directly related to Best Value is information applicable to the period prior to 
February 2002. 
The aim of the dissertation, to investigate the way in which relationships between 
local actors change and impact upon the implementation of Best Value, is 
addressed through a five part structure. 
Part one, this part, serves to set the research topic, aims, focus, methodological 
characteristics, theoretical considerations, and the plan adopted. 
Part two is a consideration of the changes likely to arise with the introduction of 
Best Value, and the link between these changes and the research focus. Chapter 
four draws on research undertaken during Compulsory Competitive Tendering to 
explain changes that took place immediately before Best Value. Chapter five 
explains the options open to local authorities as they work towards meeting the 
requirements of Best Value. Chapter six summarises the discussion and relates it 
to three issues: contest interpretation and influence. 
Part three is a theoretical consideration of implementation and Best Value. The 
shift in the role of the public sector is discussed in chapter seven. This change is 
explained alongside the development of an influential strand of theoretical 
development: public choice. Chapter eight sets out Dunleavy's theory of bureau 
shaping. Dunleavy states that managers will pursue certain strategies, under 
certain circumstances, to improve their occupational welfare. The strategies and 
the circumstances under which the strategies might be implemented are the key 
parts to test in a challenge to notions that bureaucrats 'empire build' intrinsic in 
public choice accounts. Chapter nine links the methodological, theoretical and 
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descriptive sections of the thesis to the field research. Examining the complexity 
of the 'housing network', intra-agency variables and recent research 
developments lead to the development of an approximate frame of analysis, and 
an explanation of the extent to which the choice of senior managers as the object 
of focus can be considered worthwhile. The chapter provides an account of the 
study logistics together with an explanation of the approach used in ternis of 
meeting the thesis aims. The field study is based on interviews with 40 
respondents. Chapter ten, 'From Theory to Practice', bridges the theoretical and 
descriptive sections to the field study. 
Part four is a practical test of the policy and theoretical analysis that sought to 
explain how Best Value could be interpreted. It is an account of how Best Value 
is being interpreted by councillors, managers, front line workers and residents 
from two London boroughs, Westminster and Newham. 
Chapter eleven sets the study in context with an explanation of the 
documentation published to accompany the Best Value initiative. This serves to 
contextualise the interview material and to consider, from the organisations' 
point of view, what activity will lead to what ends. This chapter also contains an 
analysis of the quantitative data compiled by the subject authorities during the 
field study period. 
Chapters twelve, thirteen and fourteen set out the views of respondents on 
context, interpretation and appropriation of Best Value respectively. These 
chapters contain a consideration of what actors would like to see happen under 
Best Value, the extent to which they see Best Value as a part in achieving this, 
and whether they feel their role, or that of others, is significant in policy 
realisation. Chapter fifteen maps the responses between and within groups to 
establish what actors thought about the issues Best Value has to address, the 
efficacy of Best Value process, and what or who drove events under Best Value. 
An answer to the central research question is presented through an analysis of the 
data focusing on changes that have arisen, and the key forces of that change. 
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Part five is the thesis conclusion. The first section is the thesis review where the 
approach used, analyses, and the case research findings are summarised. The 
second section presents an answer to the research question drawn from the field 
study findings. The third section is an appraisal of the theoretical ideas used in 
this work, and final section sets out the limitations of the thesis and suggestions 
for future research. 
The thesis closes with an epilogue. Several changes to Best Value were 
announced after the field research ended, and events such as inspections 
transpired. The epilogue summarises these changes in the context of the research. 
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PART TWO 
BEST VALUE PERSPECTIVES 
This part contains an analysis of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Best 
Value. The aim is to identify specific themes to guide the empirical research. 
Chapter four is an account of research carried out during Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering. The aim is to highlight the opinions of local actors 
during the regime, and present an overall view of the pre-Best Value climate. 
Chapter five explains how Best Value could be interpreted. Three general themes 
are covered. The first explores the notion that 'context matters', in the sense that 
authorities which followed Compulsory Competitive Tendering with a certain 
determination are more likely to embrace aspects of Best Value. The second 
theme is a consideration of the 'tools' of Best Value, such as performance 
indicators and benchmarking, and the general approaches that could be used to 
achieve Best Value. The third theme is the place of residents in Best Value 
implementation. It is intended that residents play a part in deciding how Best 
Value is put into practice through the Tenants' Participation Compact and 
general consultation requirements. 
Chapter six summarises the discussion by relating the commentary about what 
Best Value is, the situation during Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and Best 
Value possible outcomes, to the focus on changing relationships. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Best Value Context 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the policy environment immediately prior 
to Best Value, during Compulsory Competitive Tendering. The objective is to 
consider the findings in the context of change following the introduction of Best 
Value. 
At the outset it should be underlined that research into Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering in general, and housing in particular, is limited: 
Studies which evaluate the effects of competitive tendering in 
local government are few in number, cover a limited range of 
services, and are methodologically flawed (Boyne 1998, 
p. 695). 
Due to the availability of data some of the sources used in this chapter refer to 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering implementation prior to the requirement to 
include housing functions. These general sources are used to underline 
organisation-wide views of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and are 
supplemented by housing specific research within the text. 
52 
4.1 Local Authorities and Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
General research not specifically linked to housing departments indicated that 
chief executives considered Compulsory Competitive Tendering had produced 
changes in process and culture throughout their organisations (Table One). 
Table One: Chief executives' views on the impact of compulsory competition 
on management (%) 
Strongly 
agree/agree 
Neither Disagree/strongly disagree Base 
Responding to competition has 
changed management 93 4 4 (285) 
processes across the authority 
Responding to competition has 
changed the culture of the 80 12 7 
authority 
Source: Rao and Young 1995, p. 37 
In one authority an aspect of this cultural change involved the need for 
heightened awareness of cost considerations, and this was expressed by a 
Director of Housing: 
People need to improve their awareness of finance throughout 
the housing department ... wages are by far the largest 
component of a housing department's outgoings and so are a 
prime target for reducing costs (Rao and Young 1995, p. 22). 
Concerning the costs of Compulsory Competitive Tendering implementation, 
managers commented: 
The benefits were that we saved money and the services were 
no worse. Broadly it is the same service at less cost. We would 
never have done it without compulsion. It was done with a lot 
of pain and human cost (Rao and Young 1995, p. 30). 
'A tragedy for women' is how one manager described the 
results of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in local 
government. 'They have taken the brunt of government 
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legislation and it has hit the poorest paid from day one' (LRD 
1995). 
The latter comment reflects the findings of research into gender inequalities 
during Compulsory Competitive Tendering (EOC 2002). In general the impact of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering on lower grade employees involved cutting 
staff numbers and removing contractual rights, rather than by reducing pay. A 
study of the impact of CCT on blue collar workers found: 
... reductions in staff in 56% of cases, changes in hours in 51% 
of cases and changes in (or abolition oo bonus systems in 47% 
of cases, although basic wages were not generally reduced ... Casualisation of the workforce grew and overall staffing levels 
fell by about 12% (Wood 1999, p. 8-9). 
A similar pattern had emerged in housing departments. In Baldry and White's 
study they found that a "major emphasis was placed on worsening conditions of 
service, shortening tenure and a loss of privileges and flexibility (1997, p. 10). 
Baldry and White's field work was in some cases obstructed by Chief Officers 
denying access to front line staff (1997, p. 5) although from the data they were 
able to collect, their conclusion of staff perception was: 
Many staff saw the drive for efficiency and cost cutting as a 
very flimsy cloak for wholesale privatisation and doubted that 
the provision of a social function in providing well managed 
housing at affordable rent could ever be fully cost effective. 
The loss of the social aspects of the service was causing a high 
level of concern with almost all the interviewees (1997, p. 10). 
The view that Compulsory Competitive Tendering had resulted in worse 
conditions for front line staff was confirmed in research eliciting the views of 
256 chief executives, with the additional finding that "no clear adverse effects on 
staff morale" were apparent as a consequence (Rao and Young 1995, p. 28). The 
conclusion drawn on morale is difficult to reconcile with the findings elsewhere 
relating the views of managers and staff of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
Managers' roles changed within the terms Of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
which "redefined managerial responsibilities and provided a separation between 
those who provide managerial functions and those who represent the client 
54 
demand function" (Baldry and White 1997, p. 1). Ingarfield considered the 
creation of a business plan under Compulsory Competitive Tendering as "an 
opportunity for managers to take a blank sheet approach", and the plan was 
"essentially about senior management responding to CCT" (1996, pp. 23-4). 
Ingarfield's research indicated that the business plan was of senior management 
creation, and that it in turn provided "justification for managers to promote the 
kind of changes that will produce welfare gains for them" (1996, p. 25). The 
creation of a business plan did not necessarily result in smooth implementation. 
Davis and Walker highlight the issue of trust, reported by a local government 
respondent, that arose between the client and contract departments: 
'The problems were based on fear on the client side that the 
specification was open to exploitation and that you could find 
costs increasing. The fear from the DSO was that control would 
be too tight and they wouldn't make the rate of return. Both 
sides thought the other would "stitch them up... (1997, p. 48) 
Managers were therefore cast in a new role during Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, and they reflected on this in two ways: a shift in organisation process 
and culture, and diminution of conditions for front line staff. 
The involvement of councillors during Compulsory Competitive Tendering is 
illustrated in table two. 
Table Two: Members' overall involvement in competition issues (%) 
Closely 
involved/in 
direct 
control 
Not very in 
involved 
Not 
involved/ 
left to 
officers 
N/A 
Developing policy 43 39 17 2 
Setting standards 47 42 10 1 
Specifying contracts 15 45 39 1 
Evaluating tender bids 26 39 33 2 
Letting contracts 43 35 20 2 
Monitoring contracts 14 48 1 37 2 
Management of DSOs 38 25 3 
Source: Rao and Young 1995, p. 37 
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The contents of table two suggest that comparatively few councillors became 
involved in Compulsory Competitive Tendering processes. Particularly, 
monitoring and specifying contracts were not significant aspects of councillor 
involvement. Their involvement was greatest in matters of overall policy such as 
setting standards, developing policy and awarding contracts. That councillors are 
unlikely to become involved in the detail of policy implementation is reflected in 
Cole and Furbey's suggestion that: 
- councillors' 
judgements about the localised housing service 
were coloured less by statistics than by the complaints and 
comments of tenants at surgeries about the response and 
helpfulness of front-line staff in dealing with their problems 
(1994, p. 221). 
Councillors' interpretation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering could be 
considered in the form of general support or opposition to a Conservative 
government initiative, implying that Conservative councils might support itý and 
others would oppose it. Camaghan and Bracewell-Milnes point out that "It 
would be a mistake, however, to credit socialists with all the opposition to 
competitive tendering and contracting out" (1993, p. 33) Many local politicians, 
they argue, "... take a pride in being ultimately in charge of large undertakings, 
and they see contracting out as taking away the power and control which they 
have hitherto enjoyed" (1993, p. 32). It is not clear how, or if, councillors 
defended in-house provision because of the lack of indicated involvement in 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Jacobs' study of Hackney Council found 
that "There was little enthusiasm for openly criticising government, knowing that 
such protestations would jeopardise their [councillors] chances of increasing 
borrowing allocations" (1999, p. 70). In addition to this point of powerlessness, 
the 'pride' in politically managing council housing is not obvious. 
Residualisation of council housing and an emphasis on owner occupation were 
reinforced during the 1979-97 Conservative government (Malpass and Murie 
1999, p. 104), and this could have led to an unfavourable view of stock in 
management. Council housing for politicians may have become a problem, and 
not an aspect of pride. 
56 
No specific studies have been published that reveal the feelings of residents 
towards Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Rao and Young's research aimed 
to consider the "knock-on effects" (1995, p. 5) of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering without any views from clients or client groups. Perceived views were 
extrapolated from other sources, broadly along the lines of a correlation between 
good services and resident satisfaction. Boyne researched the impact of 
Voluntary Competitive Tendering and Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and 
found overall that costs had gone down and services had at least been 
maintained: "Thus the empirical evidence appears to provide strong support for 
classical public choice hypotheses on the effect of competition on public 
services" (1998, p. 703). However, he concludes that it is impossible to tell 
whether these effects arose because of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and 
quality had become a statistic, rather than any proven reflection on what people 
wanted or what they got (1998, p. 705). 
The overall point here is that the financial costs of provision did decrease during 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and a crude illustration of this can be seen 
in the comparison of the 1996 to 1999 figures for housing revenue CoStS3. 
However, the key assumptions of a valid base figure for provision, and that one 
organisation will provide housing management in much the same way as any 
other, potentially undermine this 'audited' cost saving. 
Another perspective of the effect of administrative structure is given by Harries 
and Vincent-Jones' study of three housing departments in the late 1990s. Their 
research revealed a positive correlation between resident input on contract 
decisions and satisfaction with services (2001, pp. 75-6). The existence of 
contracts provided the structure with which residents could engage: lines of 
accountability were clear, required standards were known, and roles were defined 
(2001, pp. 78-9) 
While a formal contract environment could yield benefits, some resident 
representatives did point to possible adverse consequences of the Compulsory 
3 England figures 1996/7 E12.028m; 1997/8 f 11.8236m; 1998/9 fl, 1.5789m (Wilcox 1998, 
p. 159) 
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Competitive Tendering environment. Louis Julienne, then head of the Federation 
of Black Housing Organisations, considered the new 'entrepreneurial' approach 
to Tower Hamlets' methods of restricting access to their housing which, he 
maintained, denied homes to many non-white households (Black Housing 
November/January 1996/97, p. 14). On introductory tenancieS4 Marianne Hood, a 
former director of the Tenants' Participation and Advisory Service, felt that 
certain groups who did not 'conform to type' "just don't bother to look for a 
council house" because of discrimination not only at the point of access, but also 
during management of the homes (Black Housing November/January 1996/97, 
p. 14). Hood's rationale is that certain tenants may cost more to manage, so they 
will either beturned away or despatched from council housing with the help of 
this type of tenancy. 
Aside from the difficulties in deciding whether tenants benefited from 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering or not, it would be difficult for an 'average' 
resident - that is, one not conversant with or aware of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering - to form an opinion, given the complexity of the process involved: 
"Contracts for most services will stand several inches in height" (Davis and 
Walker 1997, p. 48). Also, the method may not be of any importance: 
Independent research has suggested that tenants are in fact less 
concerned with comparative statistics than with their own 
recent experience of treatment by housing staff, or the outcome 
of their last repairs request ... There is rarely a 'tenant view' on 
service quality (Cole and Furbey 1994, p. 225). 
It is therefore difficult to disentangle the interpretation of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering from the many other factors that determine service 
provision - trained staff, levels of funding for services, and policies that prioritise 
effectively, for example. No firm conclusion can be drawn from the discussion 
here, although it does appear that the service tenants received from local 
authority providers was delivered by a despondent staff, and this is unlikely to 
have enhanced standards. 
4 Introduced under the Housing Act 1996, introductory tenancies provide a form of probation for 
new tenants, whereby security of tenure is reduced pending one year's 'satisfactory' occupation. 
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4.2 Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Legacy 
Three main points can be drawn from the discussion in this chapter. 
The first is that a shift in the conditions of local government workers took place 
following the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. This was 
referred to by senior staff as a change in process and culture. Front line staff 
endured poorer conditions of employment, and in this context the advent of Best 
Value presented a hope of change: 
Unions have welcomed the government's announcement that it 
is to replace compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) for local 
authority services with a new system to ensure "best value". 
They do so in the knowledge that in many cases CCT has had 
disastrous effects on the pay, hours and conditions of their 
members (LRD 1997). 
Related to the experiences of employees, councillors and residents experienced 
change. For councillors Jacobs notes that: 
Legislation has reduced the power of councillors to intervene 
effectively at an organisational level ... the future role of 
councillors is to establish links with different agencies, engage 
in policy networks and operate at the level of strategy rather 
than day-to-day management (1999, p. 20 1). 
Councillors might have been expected to have been involved in, or at least 
consulted on, the Compulsory Competitive Tendering process as part of their 
remit. Involvement in provision, such as repairs and caretaking, may have been 
displaced by greater involvement in broader strategic matters. In addition, 
services 'lost' to contract would give "elected members even less control over 
the services for which they are ultimately held responsible by their constituents" 
(Rao and Young 1995, p. 35). These trends were reflected in Rao and Young's 
research (table two), although the inspecificity of the data limits its usefulness 
when assessing the changes councillors experienced. 
Residents' experiences were obscured by a lack of research centred on their 
opinions of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 'What matters' had been 
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inferred from measured service standards and a suggestion (Harries and Vincent- 
Jones' contribution excepted) that process was largely unimportant. Two 
problems arise with this approach. The first is that measured standards may lack 
sensitivity and range, and it is possible that this issue will continue with Best 
Value: 
The problems of measuring improvement will, in practice, 
drive the regime towards an increasing focus on processes and 
procedures rather than outcomes, addressing what can be 
measured most easily rather than the actual improvements that 
matter most to service users and citizens (Davis and Martin 
2002, p. 67). 
The second problem is the assumption that residents have little interest in who 
provides services and the manner of their selection. Harries and Vincent-Jones' 
(2001) research illustrates that this matter can be of prime importance. In 
addition, Baldry and White's (1997) research reveals the concerns of front line 
staff with non-local authority providers, partly on the basis of the loss of the 
'social aspect' of provision. It is possible that the same issue is of importance to 
some residents. 
This leads to the second point to have arisen in this chapter: the local negotiation 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering implementation. A representation of the 
relationships is given in figure three. The six primary relationships are marked on 
the figure, although the combinations of a group lobby effect extends the 
permutational field of influence further. For example, research has highlighted 
the partnership of management and councillors during policy implementation, 
and the extent to which legal rigidities constrain change (Hambleton 1998). Also, 
productive relationships were more likely to arise if change was managed in a 
sympathetic and synergistic manner: 
The key to co-operative and largely satisfactory new 
relationships h, as been the seamless manner in which the new 
contractual mechanism was incorporated within existing 
management and participatory structures (Harries and Vincent- 
Jones 200 1, p-8 I). 
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Figure Three: Actor Relationships 
I 
2 
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The key observed primary relationship to have arisen during Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering was between front line staff and management. Baldry and 
White's study revealed that while management did in general support staff 
during change "it was not seen as being too productive in terms of boosting 
confidence or morale" (1997, p. 9). Other relationships are more difflcult to map. 
The implication may be that senior managers were the main force of change, yet 
little is known of the impact of councillors: 
In accepting the point that 'the agenda for economic 
governance research is increasingly becoming descriptive', we 
would note also that such 'descriptions' tend towards stylized 
characterizations of local governance and urban politics which 
often smooth over the complexities and contradictions of 
political practice (Valler et al. 2000, p. 425). 
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'Political practice' during Compulsory Competitive Tendering also involved 
residents as actors formally involved in the tendering process. Local Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering was clearly a product of negotiated settlement yet it is 
not clear what role staff, front line workers, councillors and senior management 
had in the overall mediation. Vincent-Jones considers this local dynamic to be of 
importance when considering Best Value: 
The new regime may be surprisingly like the old in the 
competitive behaviour it produces. The difference will lie in 
how competitive outcomes are encouraged (1999, p. 288). 
The final issue related to this point of relationships between actors concerns 
organisation culture. As noted in this chapter, managers considered the 
implementation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering as a cultural shift in their 
organisations. What actually arose was a change in behaviour and practice, and 
not necessarily culture: 
For a culture to be operative within an organisation actors 
must, to some extent, adopt the values and beliefs of that 
culture: for a discourse to be operative however actors simply 
need to participate in it (Hogget 1994, in Ingarfield 1996, p. 25). 
It is not clear that the 'values and beliefs' of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, 
centred on financial management and competition, were unanimously supported 
throughout local authorities. Jacobs and Manzi (1999) examined the 
4performance culture' developing in housing practice, and the use of 
performance indicators: their "privileged status in practice results in an 
oppositional culture whereby staff adopt strategies of resistance" (1999, p. 1). To 
describe the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering as initiating 
cultural change is therefore misleading on the evidence available. 
The third point to have arisen is the general aspect of change in the domain in 
which strategic and operational ('day-to-day') decisions were taken. Political 
involvement appears to have shifted towards strategic decisions, with added 
potential participation of residents. Limited conclusions can be drawn on 
managers and front line staff. Front line staff endured considerable change to 
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their role, and it could be reasonably deduced that their influence over the 
strategic decisions concerning workloads was not of their making. Research 
surnmarised in this chapter suggests 'steering' by management, with Ingarfield's 
research pointing to a strong managerial influence, and a "recognition that policy 
decisions constitute a setting where different groups compete to establish a 
particular version of 'reality' in order to pursue their objectives" (Jacobs 1999, 
p. 203). 
This chapter has served to provide an overall setting into which Best Value was 
introduced, and concluded that three points arose during Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering: a shift in the roles of actors; a recast field of negotiating 
policy outcomes; and actors' involvement in strategic and operational decisions . 
it has also highlighted the lattice of relationships that accompanied the 
implementation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (figure three, p. 61). The 
issues raised are revisited in part three. In the interim the thesis turns to practical 
impact of Best Value, considered in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
interpretation Of Best Value 
An issue raised in part one is that there is scope for local authority discretion 
within a centrally defined Best Value process. It was considered that flexibility 
could be exercised by local authorities through the adoption of a number of 
approaches to, for example, local performance indicators and cost targets: the 
technical strategy of Best Value. Certain points were raised in chapter two that 
suggested how such a strategy might arise. These were based on the legacy and 
nature of Compulsory Competitive Tendering in terms of contracting 
arrangements in place and orientation towards competition for example, and - 
the focus of this dissertation - on relationships between, and the influence of, key 
actors. 
This chapter sets out certain possible routes that local authorities may follow in 
their application of Best Value to their localities. The chapter is organised in 
three sections, each of which examines certain technical approaches to service 
delivery in accordance with Best Value: reconciling cost and effectiveness, 
possible approaches (in-house provision, stock transfer, Arms Length 
Management and the Private Finance Initiative), and consultation. 
The aim of this chapter is to consider approaches to Best Value implementation 
in terms of the process and cost aspects of Best Value, routes to achieving both, 
and the matter of consultation with local residents. The objective is to begin to 
appraise the avenues available with a view to informing the field research. 
5.1 Best Value Process 
Effectiveness of Best Value 
The three Es - economy, efficiency and effectiveness - receive little mention in 
the Government's Best Value in housing guidance, yet the phrase is used to 
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define Best Value in law, and is a major point of discussion in the Audit 
Commission's literature. There has been, therefore, little direct political 
engagement with this aspect of Best Value process beyond Best Value 'principle 
two': 
Achieving Best Value is not just about economy and efficiency, but 
also about effectiveness and the quality of local services - the setting 
of targets and performance against these should therefore underpin 
the new regime. (DETR 1998a, s. 2.1) 
The notion of 'and effectiveness' is of particular interest when examining the 
Best Value process in detail. Effectiveness is, in Best Value terms defined by the 
Audit Commission, "assessing whether the service is actually achieving what it 
set out to do" (Audit Commission 2000, p. 9). Effectiveness is a matter related to 
an outcome - the satisfaction of the end user with a process - and not an output. 
The problem here is that all except one of the national performance indicators are 
linked to outputs, such as costs of management, time for repairs and number of 
voids. This form of measurement would be less of a problem if combined with 
local qualitative indictors that gauged local satisfaction. Peter Chowney, a former 
manager of the Audit Commission's performance indicator team, commented: 
... the use of local performance indicators has not become as 
widespread as some might have expected. Most councils still have 
little more than a smattering of them ... more councils (are) setting 
up systems to measure the achievement of local objectives (but) for 
most authorities, the BVPls still form the bulk of their performance 
indicator set and will do so for some years to come. And the BVPls, 
of course, will be the principal means of making national or regional 
comparisons (2000, pp. 25-6). 
Why this should be so and whether these general comments about Best Value 
performance indicators apply to housing services, are not clear. Any of a number 
of reasons could be offered - cost, need, suitability, reliability, validity or, 
possibly, concealment. Which indicators are chosen, why and by who is a point 
of importance when trying to understand how Best Value is operating in practice. 
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Costs and Best Value 
Key indicators for cost reduction in the 2001/2 national indicators was based on 
two indicators - the average weekly costs per local authority dwelling of 
management, and repairs. The remaining indicators relating to costs concern 
savings (or income increases) - for example rent collection and void times. 
However, local authorities must decide where, and if, cost savings are to be made 
and this is based on one of two criteria set out for the performance indictors: 
local targets or national upper-quartile targets. 
only one housing national housing indicator is listed as top quartile - average 
relet times for local authority dwellings let in the financial year. The remaining 
eleven indicators require a locally set statistic, and a number of options are 
available to determine what the cost reduction target will be. 
What this means in terms of (say) a percentage change in costs is difficult to 
determine. Councils have five points of reference - self, national and local 
comparison, two per cent each year (the 'global' target set by government), or 
some kind of independently derived formula. This latter figure could be the result 
of tenant consultation, a combination of the other four points of reference, or a 
reflection of disproportionate costs in a particular service area, for example. in 
theory it would seem that areas targeted for cuts are inefficient, that is, their 
performance can at least be sustained with a reduction in costs. 
There is no specific guidance on cost reduction beyond the requirement that local 
authorities aim to reduce their expenditure by two per cent across all functions 
(DETR 1999b). This gives a number of openings for housing expenditure, in that 
it could increase, remain the same or decrease depending on the local case made. 
The possibility of static or increased expenditure is tempered by the requirement 
that every service should be exposed to the cost reduction equation, so at least at 
the outset the main aim will be to decrease costs of provision for individual 
services. 
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in broad terms, a local authority has three approaches to cost reduction - 
decrease in-house costs, transfer services and/or stock to other less expensive 
providers, or consider an alternative solution, including Arms Length 
Management and the Private Finance Initiative. These options are explored 
below. 
5.2 Costs, Effectiveness and Best Value: Possible Effects 
This section sets out the key broad strategies that local authorities can consider 
under Best Value: in-house cost reduction, stock transfer and Anns Length 
Management. 
in-house Cost Reduction 
A number of methods are available to reduce the costs of council provided 
services - economies of scale, staff and/or salary cuts, use of information 
technology, service restriction and centralisation, for example. Most local 
authorities will be familiar with these and other methods of reducing costs from 
their experience with the Compulsory Competitive Tendering regime. There are 
three key differences between the approach taken to in-house provision under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and Best Value. 
The first is the adherence to a rigorous performance and monitoring regime 
which ensures that cost is not a sole consideration. 
Secondly the 'competition' requirement has been relaxed by the new requirement 
to consider 'fair and open competition' (DETR 2000, paras. 6.25-6.26). This has 
been taken to mean by some observers that local authority staff conditions will 
be protected to a greater extent than under Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(Boyne 1999, p. 7; Geddes and Martin 2000, p. 382). This, on the one hand, 
protects services from exposure to private providers that might ensure their cost 
advantage through the use of low pay and poor conditions. It may also preclude 
the consideration of alternative providers who offer quality services at a lower 
cost through more efficient methods, for example. The notion - of 'fair' 
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competition may therefore reinforce the legitimacy of in-house services. It 
remains the case, however, that piecemeal service outsourcing is an aspect of 
Best Value that could characterise council owned housing portfolios. 
Thirdly while Best Value has at its core a quality/performance element to cost 
considerations, it is also underpinned by a need to observe the four Cs. In 
addition to competition the method of reducing costs will also need to 
accommodate the practices of other providers, particularly those with low costs 
(compare), take in the views of tenants, non-council residents and local 
businesses (consult), and involve a critical appreciation of the past and current 
systems of delivery (challenge). 
Continued in-house provision would also need to take stock of the deteriorating 
physical condition of council housing. The issue of building conditions, a capital 
matter not necessarily related to the revenue-oriented basis of Best Value and 
services, would be addressed by a Major Repairs Allowance (MRA) available 
from April 2000, providing extra funding for major building works. The 
available finance would most likely be spent on capital projects partly because 
extra spending on day-to-day repairs would be reflected in the Best Value 
indicators, and partly because the Major Repairs Allowance simply replaced 
credit approvals, previously available for capital projects (CIH 2002). However, 
this did not remove all uncertainty for councils. John Perry, policy director at the 
Chartered Institute of Housing, commented: 
I don't know of any authority who has said that they can (hold on to 
their stock) yet. I don't know if there are any who believe that they 
will, although there are some that might, if the amount they get from 
the MRA combines sufficiently with capital expenditure. It's too 
soon to see whether this will be borne out (Housing Today, 2 nd 
November 2000). 
The Major Repairs Allowance, therefore, provided some hope of managing stock 
of a reasonable standard. However, an important point to be highlighted is that 
the Major Repairs Allowance is an example of 'resource accounting and 
budgeting' designed to "promote more efficient use of housing assets" (DETR 
2000c, p. 6). This method of accounting involves the consideration of future 
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returns and liabilities of an asset through "measurable output targets" (DETR 
2000c, p. 9). This requires the consideration of future income and cost flows and 
investment opportunities as a basis for current decisions on the future of the 
asset. The issue of importance is how 'returns' are estimated, in the sense that the 
housing stock of the future can be viewed in terms of a financial liability or a 
social asset, or both. Some difficulty may be encountered when trying to 
reconcile financial costs with social benefits, which could skew decisions about 
the future of an authority's housing stock. 
An additional pressure was added in July 2000, shortly after the enactment of 
Best Value, with the introduction of the 'Decent Homes Standard': "to bring all 
social housing up to a decent standard by 2010". The decency standard covers 
statutory minimum standards, thermal comfort, state of repair and modem 
facilities and services (DETR 2000d). 
The wide range of pressures to reduce costs and sustain an in-house system of 
delivery presents a formidable test of an authority's ability to work out how this 
can be done. In addition, following from the strong ideological message of 
opposition to externalisation of housing management services from Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, is the question of why council housing services should 
be provided by anybody other than the local authority. These are the important 
points of focus. If an authority is producing Best Value outcomes and sustaining 
in-house delivery, how is this being done? 
The discussion now moves to the consideration of other approaches open in the 
search for a service that delivers Best Value. 
Stock Transfer 
Almost half a million homes had been transferred to non-local authority 
landlords over a sixteen year period. 252,233 homes transferred between 1985 
and 1997, and 238,654 between 1998 and 2001 (ODPM 2002). The trend is 
illustrated in figure four. This rapid growth in transfers had not originally been 
part of Labour's mandate: 
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When the Conservatives proposed transferring one million homes in 
10 years, Raynsford, in opposition, dismissed the idea as "the last 
desperate convulsion of a dying government. " But Raynsford is now 
proposing to transfer a million in half that time - five years - or 
200,000 homes a year (Housing Today, Oh April 2000). 
Despite some initial criticism of the notion of transfer, it is clear that the 
programme is accelerating under Labour. 
Arguments can be made for local authorities considering stock transfer in the 
context of Best Value. Requirements based on quality can be 'contracted in' to 
the conditions of transfer, and include standards and targets that meet or exceed 
those currently provided or projected. The main arguments, however, hinge on 
cost and resolving with a degree of certainty doubts about the Major Repairs 
Allowance and the prospects of continuous improvements with in-house 
provision. Under current legislation if the option of transfer is prepared and 
tabled, it will be tenants who decide whether to accept a new landlord through a 
formal ballot. Significantly, of course, as a Best Value option such proposals 
must only arise with the agreement of tenants. 
In suggesting that asset transfer can be considered a product of Best Value, it is 
useful to see what the implications are for landlord and resident. The local 
authority will still have to provide Best Value in housing, although this role will 
shift from accountability for delivery to a duty to: 
... retain important strategic and enabling responsibilities in relation 
to housing as well as responsibility towards prospective tenants in 
prioritising need for housing and they will be subject to the duty to 
achieve Best Value in their housing functions and also subject to 
inspection by the Housing Inspectorate (DETR 2000, para. 6.75). 
The authority's 'housing functions' will, from the moment of transfer, be limited 
to general and strategic matters, rather than meeting physical housing and 
tenancy-related matters. Residents may profit from a choice of landlord, with 
associated benefits - rent guarantees, development works and more participation 
in decision making. However, some opposition has surfaced. Several local and 
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national lobby organisations have formed to oppose stock transfer, one of which 
states in its campaign literature: 
[stock transfer] reduces accountability, leads to increased rents, more 
public money being siphoned off into consultant and management 
fees, telephone number salaries and profits for the, so called, 
4partners' and is 'Bad Value' ... In its desperation to pursue 
privatisation the government is now bribing councils with a budget of 
E12 billion to write off capital debts if they agree to transfer homes 
(Defend Council Housing 2002). 
The issue at this moment is whether stock transfer is likely to deliver Best Value 
or 'bad value', and this again centres on questions relating to 'for whom' and 
'why'. 
Figure Four: English Local Authority Housing Transfers, 1988-2001 
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If local authorities do not choose existing methods of provision or partial or 
whole transfer of their stock to reduce their costs, further options are available. 
The key alternatives to have arisen since the implementation of Best Value have 
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been Arms Length Management (ALM) and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
and are discussed below. 
Arms Length Management 
Arms Length Management involves the transfer of management responsibility to 
a local authority created company, and the housing remains in local government 
ownership. That company will be able to borrow from private sources (that is, 
outside the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement), with the capacity to borrow 
enhanced by increased revenue of E500 per dwelling per year for two years 
(DETR 2001, para. 5.1). The Government required the fulfilment of two criteria 
before a local authority can compete for Anns Length Management resources - 
the separation of strategic and operational matters by legal deed, and an 
6excellent' service rating which is 'likely to improve' or 'will improve' (DETR 
2001, paras. 5.3-5.4). No authorities met these criteria at February 2002, and the 
requirement for an 'excellent' service was relaxed to 'good' for 2002/3, although 
in this case only 50 per cent of the resource allocation would be made available 
(DETR 2001, para. 5-6). 
Three reasons can be given for a move to Arrns Length Management 
Organisations. 
Firstly, the separation of strategic and operational functions is cited as a distinct 
advantage by government (DETR 200 1, para. 1.2, emphasis original): 
Ministers recognise that there are strategic housing functions which 
are clearly appropriate to a multi-functional body with direct 
democratic accountability to the community which it serves. But the 
housing management function is different, and can be carried out by 
a separate body. Close links between the strategic and management 
roles are essential, but the benefits of separation include: 
a clear focus on the management role as a result of an 
organisational framework for housing management which is 
distinct from that required to deliver an authority's strategic 
functions; 
the involvement of a more diverse range of people (including 
tenants) in decision making, 
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helping to encourage innovative and radical thinking; 
a more business-like and modem management of the stock, 
concentrating on delivering high-quality services which 
represent value for money and meet the aspirations of tenants. 
It is clear from this extract that the Government supports this split because 
positive results will flow from it such as 'radical thought', 'clear focus', 'modem 
management' and 'diverse involvement'. 
Secondly the additional finance available directly associated with Arms Length 
Management would contribute towards the 'renovation' BVPI (Appendix B), and 
help ensure that stock in need of redevelopment received attention. It is also 
possible that private sector funds could contribute to resolving long-standing 
issues of repair and maintenance. 
Thirdly, direct user engagement is a requirement. Arms Length Management 
organisations should have elected tenants on the board of directors, along with 
other interested and qualified people (DETR 2001, para. 2.5). The guidance does 
require that constitutional matters can only be changed with council acquiescence 
and this serves to emphasise, in plain terms, that the council sets the overall 
terms of reference and the Arms Length Management Organisation is free to 
work within them. While the requirement exists for formal tenant representation 
within an Arms Length Management Organisation, there is no requirement for a 
ballot of tenants in order to form it - "[local authorities] will be expected to give 
details of the steps they have taken to consult tenants and of the response they 
have received" (DETR 200 1, para. 2.12). 
It is not immediately clear why a strategic/operational split and enhanced tenant 
participation could not arise in any case, had the authority retained management 
functions, particularly in view of the fact that they would have to be a 
6 good/excel lent' provider to be considered for Arms Length Management. The 
answer to this is likely to lie within the 'prospects for improvement' side of the 
equation, in that a council would make the case that Best Value 'headway' was 
only possible through just such an arrangement. It is, therefore, difficult to state 
with certainty that the choice of Arms Length Management is cost-oriented, 
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although it is safe to assume that its popularity would be unden-nined without the 
financial advantages presented by the injection of private and public funding 
highlighted in reason two. 
Private Finance Initiative 
The Private Finance Initiative was launched in 1992 and presented to local 
authorities as an opportunity to transfer risks inherent in service provision, obtain 
finance not otherwise available, and benefit from private sector acumen. The 
Private Finance Initiative is described as "an alternative to stock transfer, through 
which private finance can be used to improve the condition and management of 
local authority homes" (DETR 2000d, s. 7.42). 
Those in favour point to the cost savings possible through the Private Finance 
Initiative. North East Derbyshire found 40 per cent savings and a fifteen pounds 
per week rent saving on a Private Finance Initiative led scheme (Housing Today 
Yd September 98), and their housing manager commented that the Council's 
experience "has all the benefits of stock transfer, without actually having to 
transfer the homes themselves. " (Housing Today, 15th April 1999). 
Those against point to the lack of openness and the possible impact on certain 
sections of workers: 
One of our chief objections is the lack of openness in the PFI process 
and the failure of local authorities to inform and involve trade unions 
and the workforce of their intention to initiate a PFI project. We are 
also extremely concerned at the possible impact on jobs. Most of 
those affected by PH projects are women in cleaning, catering and 
support work who have already suffered badly under CCT (UNISON 
1998). 
Research has indicated that the larger companies are more likely to win Private 
Finance Initiative contracts despite the lack of appropriate skills, high 
participation costs, high project values, high risk, lack of credibility and contacts, 
and demands on management time of smaller and medium sized companies 
(Ezulike et al, 1997). 
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Finally, there are those who believe that there is a place for Private Finance 
initiative, although it should not be considered a panacea. Peter Fanning, chief 
executive of the Four Ps5 commented in Housing Today, "It is just another tool 
which has a specific purpose and it is yet to be demonstrated whether it can be 
applied generally" (3d September 1998). 
This chapter now turns to the final C, consultation, and the matter of resident 
influence. 
5.3 Consultation and Influence 
The arrangements for resident inclusion under Best Value include a written 
agreement relating to services and involvement: the Tenant Participation 
Compact. The guidance documents emphasise resident 'influence' and 'control' 
in matters of decision making, discussed in chapter one. 
Some concern has been expressed relating to the prominence of the tenants' 
voice under Best Value, and quite whose voice is being referred to. Higgins notes 
that such involvement is supposed to be "the control of the expert by the amateur 
representing his fellow citizens" (2000, pp. 11-12, emphasis original). The 
capacity to achieve such a 'one voice' approach is problematic, Higgins suggests, 
given that: 
... a range of interest groups within local government will have their 
own definitions of 'quality' and views about how public services 
should be provided in the public interest. It leaves one to wonder 
whose best value is being progressed by Best Value? (2000, p. 12) 
For housing departments the range can be pronounced. Within the local authority 
many housing functions are headed by different sections - for example lettings, 
management, repairs, advice and rents. Each section could have different views 
on, say, letting empty properties - who they should be let to, the standard of 
preparation and tenancy advice for example. Residents are a diverse group, and 
5 The Public Private Partnership Programme, a local government consultancy company. 
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'who they are' can affect 'what they want' - leaseholders and tenants, 
satisfactorily and poorly housed, pro- and anti-transfer (and transferred), and the 
multitude of interests and needs reflected by gender, age and ethnicity for 
example. These are crude and broad categories, and are mentioned simply to 
highlight a potential conflict within the compact and local authority organisation 
structure, in addition to problems that may arise between the residents and 
competing voices. 
Others have drawn attention to the difficulty in legislating for inclusion of this 
kind: 
The special problem of post-bureaucratic organisation is to enlist 
participation, to encourage initiative and responsibility, to create 
cooperative systems tapping the contributions of multiple 
constituents ... authority must 
be open and participatory: 
consultation is encouraged; reasons for decisions are explained; 
criticism is welcome; consent is taken as a test of rationality (Nonet 
and Selznick 1978, in Vincent-Jones 1999, p. 284). 
The difficulty lies in the need for a 'form of culture' for organisations moving 
from a 'traditional' bureaucracy to an accountable and open system of 
administration. The extent to which this reorientation is achieved, or indeed 
requires achieving, is an important aspect of Best Value implementation: where 
authority to enact change is accountable and legitimate. 
5.4 Summary: Providing Best Value 
The focus in this chapter has been the use and creation of performance indicators, 
broad service options available to achieving the Best Value cost-quality equation 
and resident influence in determining housing management services. The focus 
was chosen with the aim of approximating how Best Value might be measured, 
enacted and determined. 
This chapter has served to illustrate that a variety of approaches can be 
considered in the bid to reduce costs. This is, however, only one element of Best 
Value. Councils have to consider how they will deliver a quality service and take 
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on board the views of tenants and residents. Certain arguments set out within the 
4cost options' above can be made for quality results. Additionally, the four Cs 
provide a 'check' for service provision and performance. 
However, in considering choices it is apparent that certain routes, particularly 
those that attract additional funding such as Arms Length Management, could 
prove attractive in a bid to achieve Best Value. As discussed, each of these 
options carry a level of uncertainty and controversy. At the time of this research 
local authorities are at an important crossroads where the route to Best Value 
must be assured, combined with wider considerations concerning the future 
management and ownership of stock. Local choices will have to me made. The 
extent to which local actors, and particularly residents, are involved in that 
choice is a crucial aspect of this research. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
From Compulsory Competitive Tendering to Best Value 
This part has served to illustrate the Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
environment and the range of options open to local authorities during the 
implementation of Best Value. To address the point of how councils are likely to 
implement Best Value, three issues are highlighted below. 
The first is that Best Value implementation could be a product of past patterns of 
service delivery. Chapter four examined events prior to Best Value from the 
perspectives of local groups involved in the Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
process. Certain patterns had, it seemed, been established. Councillors' and 
managers' involvement in local matters had shifted to become more strategic, 
front line staff had endured worse conditions of employment, and residents were 
given the opportunity to become involved in service changes. Local outcomes 
were the product of a mediated settlement around the issues of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering. The discussion of Best Value in chapter one involved a 
consideration of issues such as competition, performance measurement, 
approaches to inspection and consultation. It is possible that those authorities 
most aligned to Compulsory Competitive Tendering might actively pursue a 
route of competition, high performance achievement, 'robust' engagement with 
audit and inspection and minimal consultation. With the exception of 
consultation, which itself may be problematic, and negotiating the requirements 
of a Best Value outcome, these 'modes' are consistent with Best Value. This 
suggests a particular interpretation by certain authorities. Conversely authorities 
engaged with inclusive decision making processes, locally sensitive and 
qualitative methods of measurement, and an ideological commitment to public 
ownership would also be compatible with Best Value. In either case past patterns 
of delivery should be significant, and here it is salient to ask: 'How is current 
implementation dependent on past practice and circumstance? '. 
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The second issue relates to outcomes under Best Value. It was established in 
chapter one, albeit with some qualification, that costs should decrease under Best 
Value. Simultaneously outcomes should improve in line with local expectations. 
Chapter five contained an explanation of difficulties that might arise in 
reconciling national Best Value Performance Indicators and local measures of 
performance to produce the rounded picture of outcome defined in chapter one. 
The complexity here is compounded by the variety of methods that might arise to 
deliver Best Value. It appears likely that a change in the mode of provision will 
arise, whether in-house, or partially or fully externalised. Factors shaping the 
choice include local influence, and while no hard conclusions could be drawn it 
is appropriate to surmise that resident influence in the implementation of Best 
Value will be a significant factor. This leads to a need to understand whether 
Best Value implementation meets the requirements of residents and those 
charged with organising services. In other words: 'To what extent is the 
implementation of Best Value in line with the expectations of those associated 
with Best Value processes? '. 
The third issue rests with the matter of local influence and policy determination. 
Given certain policy expectations there is clearly, within Best Value, concern 
that wishes of residents might be undermined. Evidence here includes the Tenant 
Participation Compact and a conscious shift from the passive role experienced 
under Compulsory Competitive Tendering, to an active place of influence. The 
extent to which resident influence can and will be achieved was discussed in 
chapter three, where it was underlined that, at the very least, residents would face 
competition in the realisation of influence. It is therefore logical to ask: 'Is any 
group or individual associated with Best Value processes able to influence 
implementationT. 
The line of reasoning at this point is that the ways in which councils will 
implement Best Value will be a combination of context, expectation and 
influence. These assertions are tested in two ways. The first is in the part that 
follows with a review of theoretical work, and the second is in part four, with 
two field studies. 
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PART THREE 
THEORY AND METHOD 
Introduction 
Part two closed with three questions relating to context policy expectations and 
influence. This part of the dissertation explains how these questions can be 
placed in the context of field-based research examining shifting relationships 
following the introduction of a new policy. 
The characteristics of Best Value in general, and when compared to Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, have been discussed in parts one and two. Chapter five 
opens with a description of the broad political change in British society over the 
last 25 years. Alongside this change a public choice theory critique of public 
sector bureaucracy is considered. This theory highlights certain largely negative 
aspects of local authority service provision centred on the rationality of 
employees. 
Chapter six presents a counter to the ideas of public choice theory through the 
consideration of Patrick Dunleavy's account of bureau shaping: in essence the 
dutility gains' that public choice advocates feel that bureaucrats derive from large 
and well-funded organisations are misplaced. The chapter is surnmarised with an 
account of how Dunleavy's ideas relate to Best Value. 
Chapter seven is an explanation of how Dunleavy's ideas can be used to explain 
changes in relationships under Best Value. The main premise of bureau shaping 
is that managers will, when conditions allow, enact strategies to achieve a certain 
type of organisation. The strategies identified by Dunleavy involve renegotiating 
the connections managers have with other individuals, groups and organisations. 
These links are presented in two ways: the primary links between groups within a 
local authority; and the broader organisational links local authorities are likely to 
encounter under Best Value. 
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Chapter eight sets out the field research approach in light of the discussion in the 
preceding chapters of this part. Two London boroughs are identified as sites for 
the research. The field research focuses on the views of the main actors within 
the local authorities: managers, residents, front line workers and politicians. 
Relatively open questions are presented relating to the experiences of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, interpretations of Best Value, and 
influences apparent during implementation of Best Value. 
overall, this part provides a theorised exposition of method to test the notion that 
relationships will shift during Best Value. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
Theoretical Context 
7.1 Political Programmes and Modernisation 
In the mid-1970s the political culture epitomised by "organized and 
institutionalized welfare" (Offe 1984, p. 211) in Western Europe faced 
reappraisal. This situation has been described by Habermas (1976) as a 
'legitimation crisis'; by O'Connor (1973) as a 'fiscal crisis'; by Offle (1984) as a 
'democratic dilemma'; as post-Fordist (Giddens 1990, Jessop 1993); as neo- 
Schumpeterian (Freeman and Perez 1988); and in Gramscian terms, changes to 
the 'hegemony armoured by coercion' (Jessop 2000, p. 3). Each theoretical 
account can be related to a change in the role of the state where: 
... the new discursive reality traversing the state can be described as 
a pervasive 'managerial isation' discourse, which aims to make 
marketisation the driving force of an enterprising and competitively 
successful public sector (Deakin 1998, p. 19). 
In the United Kingdom this transition coincided with the election of the 
Conservative Government in 1979, which introduced policies to diversify 
provision at a local and nationa16 level. The general trend in government activity 
was a move towards an emphasis on local governance: "a new style of service 
delivery based on complex relationships, coalitions and networks spanning the 
public, private and voluntary sectore' (Malpass and Mullins 2001, p. 7). The 
financial capacity of local government was curtailed in the overall drive to 
reduce public expenditure, with legislation providing restrictions on capital and 
revenue expenditure. In addition local authorities were subject to conduct-related 
guidelines established by the Nolan Committee (1994). 
in housing, the main elements of the Conservative programme moved through 
five phases: privatisation and home ownership; consolidation of the home 
A reference to private sector involvement in the provision of utilities (gas, water, electricity), 
telecommunications, transport, finance, manufacturing and fuel initiated by Conservative 
policies; see Whitfield 2001, pp. 19-36. 
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ownership initiatives and deregulation of the home-buying services; a 
commitment to revive the private rented sector; house price recession in the late 
1980s; and a further and final statement of commitment to home ownership, 
private renting revival, and transfer of council home ownership to tenants or new 
landlords (Malpass and Murie 1999, pp. 80-88). 
These phases marked a twofold drive to change the nature of local authorities: to 
establish their role as an enabler, rather than provider, of services; and to 
introduce other organisations to the local service marketplace. A key element, 
therefore, of public sector reform for the Conservative administration involved 
separating the strategic arm of local government from the direct provision of 
services. 
The impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering was discussed earlier (chapter 
four), where three features of the policy applied to housing were identified: the 
delineation of local strategic control and provision (the 'client-contractor split); 
the failure to engage widespread market provision; and a cause of local authority 
self-examination about the services they provided. 
This attempt to enforce Compulsory Competitive Tendering, itself designed to 
meet the needs of the new policy environment, served as a period of learning for 
central government. 
The Tenants' Charter, spawned from John Major's Citizens' Charter and later 
joined by the Right to Manage, while little more than an explanation of existing 
rights, indicated moves to 'democratise' service provision through the 
requirement to involve residents in the choice of tenderer. This was, however, 
too late as the Labour Party came to power with a commitment to replace 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering with Best Value. In October 1996, eight 
months before the general election, the Labour Party had invited local authorities 
to test their plans for their proposed successor to Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. The replacement method of regulation would keep the competition 
aspect of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, although local authorities would 
"not be automatically forced to tender" their services (Inside Housing, 25h 
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October 1996, p. 1). The Local Government Information Unit, commenting 
before the 1997 election, expressed cautious optimism: 
Indications are being received that new legislation will not be 
prescriptive but will place the onus on local authorities to 
demonstrate that their services are responding to local needs and 
aspirations, and that in doing so they are achieving best value for 
local service users. If that is the case, then the LGIU will welcome it 
(LGIU 1997, p. 1). 
Both political parties had decided to liberalise the rigid approach to local service 
provision. For the new Labour Government their policy direction became aligned 
to Giddens' notion of a 'Third Way': 
Labour's public philosophy at the century's end was expressed in 
terms of a 'third way' -a synthesis of ideas employing market and 
state solutions and a rejection of the paradigms of both free-market 
individualism and collectivism (Peele 1999, p. 80). 
Giddens underlined the intransigence of the 'old left' by stating that the Third 
Way is not about "letting markets rip", but "the rebirth of social democracy ... 
one that is unafraid to shed old leftist dogmas and prejudices" (Giddens 2000, 
p. 45). While some observers read Labour's interpretation as a move towards 
private delivery of public services (Whitfield 2001, pp. 142-3), the Party 
presented matters of delivery with ambivalence stating that, simply, "what 
matters is what works" (DETR 1998, s. 2.1). 
Best Value, the practical framework for this ideological direction, retained the 
Conservative's concerns with developing the strategic capacity of local 
government and the requirement for efficient delivery of services. For 
accountability the general requirement to 'consult locally' applied to all local 
authority services, with council housing residents acquiring the additional 
provisions of the Tenant Participation Compact. 
While the aim of Best Value is to ensure consensual continuous service 
improvement it is not immediately clear how this will be achieved. Certainly, 
there are performance indicators, inspections, audits and so forth. Fundamentally 
Best Value involves reducing costs and improving quality of service provision: 
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the 'outcome'; with the mechanisms set out within the legislation and guidance: 
the 'process' (Boyne 2000, p. 7). The problem is trying to deduce what this 
means in operational terms. At first sight improved services might be expected to 
be more expensive to deliver. There is an assumption within Best Value that 
there is no contradiction in the reduced cost - increased quality equation: 
The BV regime cannot be described or understood adequately in 
terms of simple dichotomies. There is for example no simple choice 
to be made between cost reduction and service improvement. Best 
Value authorities are required to do both (Geddes and Martin 2000, 
p. 382). 
Geddes and Martin's remark highlights the notion that simultaneous cost 
reduction and service improvement is not a paradox within Best Value. It could 
be that Best Value is an example of the overall New Labour discourse "Which 
draws attention to assumed incompatibilities, and denies them" (Fairclough 
2000, p. 10). That is to say, the founding cost-quality premise is not a likely 
notion, and that fact is simply denied. Alternatively, this task set within Best 
Value could be a product of pragmatic consideration; that effliciencies can arise 
through the adoption of any of a number of methods: economies of scale, staff 
training, alternative providers, use of information technology, service restriction 
and centralisation, for example. Best Value is a central government construct that 
has been honed by the processes of consultation and pilot programmes. It seems 
likely that local authorities are reasonably comfortable with task of increasing 
quality and decreasing costs. Local authorities are not, in other words, being 
asked to 'do the impossible', or perform what may at one time have been 
considered an 'incompatibility'. Whatever the perspective it is considered 
important to understand how the 'Best Value outcome equation' will be 
reconciled in terms of measurement and method. This is considered important 
partly because of the flexibility outlined, and partly due to a view that 
government policies such as Best Value will not 'succeed' or 'fail' for reasons of 
local implementation. This view stems from a line of advocacy for New Right 
and managerialist reforms of the past twenty years. Barrett suggests that within 
this paradigm: 
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Managerialism, or new public management, had addressed the key 
problems of 'implementation failure' - lack of clear unambiguous 
policy objectives, resource availability and control over 
implementing agencies. (Barrett 2000, p. 7) 
It would therefore follow that, by this line of managerialist thinking, if policies 
did not deliver according to their mandate the problem was 'at the top', with 
design by central government. 
However, and as Barrett proceeds to explain, certain "unintended consequences 
of the dirigiste model of policy implementation" (2000, p. 8) are emerging from 
audit and evaluation processes in general. For example, priorities can become 
focused on performance measures regardless of their local importance, the means 
to implement change can be underestimated, and the effect of the "dynamics of 
organisational process and the dialectic between structure and agency in the 
process of change" (Barrett 2000, p. 8) ) can be neglected. Best Value is a new 
kind of policy emphasising local mediation of process, amplifying the 'dynamic' 
referred to by Barrett. To place these views in context the following section 
presents a theoretical perspective of the policy environment into which Best 
Value was introduced. 
7.2 Theorising Political Programmes 
Academics reflected on the shift in British politics in 1979 and developed the 
ideas of public choice theory to articulate what they saw as the central elements 
in the programmatic shift. A key problem was identified as the modernisation of 
public sector bureaucracy. The public sector reforms of the 1980s, widely 
referred to as New Public Management (Ferlie et aL, 1996; Dunleavy and Hood 
1994; Pollitt 1993), were driven by a "market based ideology derived from new 
institutional economics and public choice theory" (Walker 2000, p. 285). 
Le Grand and Robinson consider public choice as a paradigm that views all 
actors as motivated by self interest and that bureaucrats will favour any increases 
in government activity, as this permits them to expand their bureaucratic empire, 
increasing their power, status and income. (1984, p. 271). These ideas were a 
reaction to interventionist government and a rejection of the Keynesian 
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assumption that government should correct market failure. Theoretical models 
developed that related the political priority given to efficiency, strategic capacity 
and accountability of bureaucrats in general, and public sector bureaucracy in 
particular. This particular strand of theoretical development is centred on 
improving effectiveness: 
Public Choice scholars have certainly not abandoned the aim of 
finding and recommending optimal government policies. However, 
they pay less attention to specific policies than to the process of 
policy making and policy implementation. Public Choice is a logical 
extension of economists' concern with improving efficiency 
(Gunning 2003, 'p. 2). 
Freidrich Hayek, the founder of contemporary public choice thought, identified 
two fundamental flaws in social science positivism. Firstly, most of the 'facts to 
be observed' of social science are subjective - issues such as poverty, quality and 
performance. Secondly, a social system cannot be divided into a finite number of 
variables nor can variables once identified be ranked in any consistent, and 
therefore meaningful, way. These limitations are dealt with by positivists in 
social science by regarding what can be measured as important and ignoring 
what cannot be quantified (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, p. 88). Hayek writing in 
1945, criticising Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
expressed these limitations: 
To him [Schumpter] these [economic] phenomena accordingly 
appear as objectively given quantities of commodities ... Only to a 
mind to which all these facts were simultaneously known would the 
answer necessarily follow from the facts given to it. The practical 
problem, however, arises precisely because these facts are never so 
given to a single mind. (Hayek 1945, pp. 522-3). 
This observation, that one person cannot possibly accommodate every nuance of 
every view of any situation posed a significant hurdle for any theory (and 
theorist) setting out to achieve 'explanatory proof. Hayek was to revise his 
methodological view significantly (Hayek 1967), and his subsequent ideas 
formed the basis of public choice theory through the work of other academics, 
particularly William Niskanen. As application of public choice theory arose, so 
too did the focus on one group: managers. 
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William Niskanen's book Bureaucracy: Servant or Master? (1973) remains one 
the most cited works in any discussion of public choice ideas. Nicholas Ridley' 
commented in an essay accompanying Niskanen's publication: 
Professor Niskanen has produced a paper of devastating 
importance ... The last quarter-century 
has been an economic 
disaster in our long history. Let us at least give Professor 
Niskanen a chance (in Niskanen 1973, pp. 87,93). 
Ridley's argument, in line with Niskanen's, was that "bureaus which do not have 
to maximise profits have no incentive to achieve efficiency", and bureaucrats 
(perceived as "good and wise") had deflected apparent inefficiency onto 
interference by government ministers, and this was difficult to refute because 
"We have virtually no machinery for checking the perfortnance of bureaus, and 
we have given remarkably little thought to how to improve that perfon-nancell (in 
Niskanen 1973). Bhatta (2003), Dunsire & Hood (1989), Harrison (1989) and 
Self (1993) have related public choice ideas to the 1979-1993 Conservative 
Govemment. 
Niskanen, in ideas tested during his study of the Pentagon in the USA, came to 
three straightforward conclusions. 
Firstly bureaucrats, "the senior official of any bureau with a separate identifiable 
budget" (1973, p. 11), in the public (that is, non-profit) sector seek to maximise 
utility by maximising budgets. Larger budgets provide status, power, and 
organisational rewards such as promotion and 'perks'. This conclusion is reached 
through the appreciation of two aspects of behaviour - rationality and survival. 
For rationality, Niskanen recognises that: 
[The] problems of making changes and the personal burdens of 
managing a bureau are often higher at higher budget levels, but both 
are reduced by increases in budget. This effect creates a treadmill 
phenomenon, inducing bureaucrats to strive for increased budgets 
7 Ridley was a significant cabinet figure in the Thatcher Government, supporting the 'far right' of 
the party on matters such as immigration, race (the abolition of the Commission for Racial 
Equality), and privatisation of all welfare services and nationaliscd industry (Kavanagh 1987, 
p. 94). 
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until they can turn over the management burden of a stable higher 
budget to a new bureaucrat. " (1973, p. 22, emphasis original). 
For survival, Niskanen notes that a bureaucrat is reliant upon the cooperation of 
her subordinates for flows of information and a 'smooth running' agency: "A 
bureaucrat's life is not a happy one (tra la! ), unless he can provide increasing 
budgets for his subordinate bureaucrats to disburse in salaries and contracts" 
(1973, pp. 24-5). Bureaucrats do this because they have no profit motivation, and 
the main way in which they can. maximise their utility, their 'personal 
performance indicator', is to maximise their budgets. 
Secondly budget maximisation is achieved through the control, or ownership, of 
information that forms the rationale of decisions. Public goods cannot be 
quantified using simple cost/benefit appraisal. Bureaucrats far more than voters 
and politicians hold the information about cost, and what people want and get, 
with the result that they will oversupply in a manner consistent with their own 
benefit, rather than society's. There are two aspects to this phenomenon: capacity 
and capability. In general, bureaucrats will have a clearer overview of the needs 
and context of their agency than the 'sponsor' (in the case of Best Value, the 
ODPM). They are best placed to compilc information on their agency and make 
the best case for budget maximisation. Further, the bureaucrat "has a stronger 
incentive and can work full-time to obtain the information", unlike the sponsors 
who would have "little incentive or opportunity to review the activities of the 
sponsored bureaus (which would)... give the bureau the overwhelmingly 
dominant monopoly power" (Niskanen 1973, pp. 16-17). 
Thirdly, in the longer term a sponsor will become familiar with excessive bureau 
requests, and a constraint on budget maximisation will operate in practice. 
Excesses arise when: 
... a short-term 
bureaucrat who is an effective salesman (liar? ) can 
often obtain a larger budget during his tenure by promising (usually, 
only implicitly) more output than the bureau can usually supply 
(Niskanen 1973, p. 27). 
The important point is that bureaucrats will always attempt to budget maximise: 
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... subject to the constraint that the 
budget must be equal to or larger 
than the minimum total costs of supplying the output expected by the 
sponsor (Niskanen 1973, p. 27). 
For these reasons Niskanen's most important conclusion about public 
organisations "is, that they are too large" (Niskanen 1973, p. 31), and the three 
tendencies towards expansion must be checked. 
Downs defined a manager as one who works permanently for an organisation, 
and whose "contribution to organizational effectiveness cannot be directly 
evaluated" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 148). This is a reference to the 'entrepreneurial' 
factor of production used in classical economic analysis: that combination of 
acumen, experience andjudgement which directs an organisation towards growth 
or decline. Downs adds some complexity and sensitivity to Niskanen's approach 
by considering a wider range of reasons for managers' behaviour, such as loyalty 
to public service, a sense of responsibility and pride. A problem with adding 
these motivational aspects of managers' behaviour, at least within a public choice 
frame, is that the 'economic rationality' becomes obscure: "he is clearly not 
putting forward an economic model of bureaucracy at all, but simply some sort 
of mixed public choice/sociological account" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 167-8). 
However, within each of Downs' bureaucratic personality types he identifies 
self-interest 'goals' - "power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty... 
pride in excellent work, and desire to serve the public interest. " (Downs 1967, 
p. 2) - as the main motivators. 
Several variations on the ideas of Niskanen and Downs have surfaced within the 
public choice tradition. For example, the research of Breton and Wintrobe (1982) 
emphasise the importance of trust between co-workers and between managers 
and subordinates. Trust between co-workers can reduce efficiency as they 
"disguise or cover up chiselling and malfeasance" (Borcherding and Besocke 
2002, p. 10). Trust between ranks can improve efficiency where preference is 
given to: 
... certain groups in hiring, attention to education, class, and ideological convictions, care in examining recommendations, 
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encouragement of professional association memberships, are 
predicted to increase the level of trust in an organization 
(Borcherding and Besocke 2002, p. 10). 
Peacock notes bureaucrats' propensity for leisure, rather than necessarily seeking 
expansion of their organisation (1983, in Walsh 1995, p. 19). Olsen, while not an 
4orthodox' public choice theorist in that he favours strong government, posits the 
notion of the 'free riding individual'; that is, one who will take advantage from 
the efforts of others. This is presented by Olsen as a 4rational first principle' of 
bureaucrats' behaviour, and can be solved though the simple expedient of 
disincentivising free riding: the role of government. Olsen considers many 
variables (group size, heterogeneity of groups, and differing costs for example) 
yet this focus remains on the individual and binary choice: action or inaction 
(1971). 
A further strand of public choice theory is the involvement of service users, or 
customers, in monitoring and affecting change in government. Their active 
involvement in deciding the nature of services, and indeed govemment, is 
requisite to efficient distribution of resources. Downs (1957) considers the lack 
of incentives for voters to engage in political process because of feelings of 
powerlessness: a fonn of 'rational ignorance'. 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering could be seen as an example of policy 
designed to dissuade the key public choice projection that: 
... left to their own devices, public sector managers are inefficient, ineffective and pursue their own self-interest at the expense of the 
public interest ... the high-water mark of this [public choice] 
approach to the production of public services was Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering in local government (Boyne et al, 1999, 
p. 23). 
Overall, the public choice account of political behaviour is persuasive: 
Writers such as Mancur Olson, Anthony Downs and William 
Niskanen do not use very complicated first principles reasoning, nor 
describe only the behaviour of abstract algebraic entities. Instead, 
they offer a compelling, applied and relatively detailed account of 
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how the core processes of liberal democratic politics operate 
(Dunleavy 1991, p. 2). 
However, public choice theory has also attracted criticism on a number of counts. 
For example, the focus on individuals' benefit and economic determinants is 
engaged "almost to the exclusion of political ones" (Yager 1999, p. 85). This is a 
reference to the possibility that the process and impact of mediation between 
actors is attenuated within public choice accounts (Orchard and Stretton 1997). 
In addition, the focus on rationality and the particular manifestations of 'what is 
rational' is problematic. The following chapter presents an alternative view to the 
public choice account. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Recasting Public Choice: Bureau Shaping 
Dunleavy's ideas developed as a reaction to what he sees as the inadequacy of 
aspects, particularly those highlighted in chapter seven, of public choice theory. 
Dunleavy identified aspects of public choice theory that he feels should be 
acknowledged if a critique of it is to proceed successfully. He aims to: 
... criticise these models 
by exposing their unspoken and 
contestable assumptions and right-wing leanings... [and] to 
reconstruct key public choice models so as to demonstrate that 
a properly grounded instrumental account need not produce 
these sorts of conclusions (199 1, p. 2). 
Dunleavy feels that public choice advocates commonly defend the assumption 
that bureaucrats' decisions are based on self-serving, personal utility 
maximisation, motivated by factors such as "salary, prerequisites of the office, 
public reputation, power, patronage ... and the ease of managing the bureau" 
(Niskanen 1973, p. 22) as uncontroversial and without substantive value 
judgment. The outcome of such behaviour as predicted by public choice theory is 
budget maximisation. Dunleavy identifies "four reasons why rational bureaucrats 
should not budget maximise" (199 1, p. 174): 
The collective action problems that exist in bureaucracies influence the 
overall bureau behaviour; 
2. Insofar as bureaucrats can benefit from budget increases, any effect will 
depend on the budget and agency type; 
3. While it is possible that some bureaucrats do attempt to budget maximise, 
such activity is only likely to occur up to an 'internal optimum level' 
4. Senior bureaucrats are "much more likely" (1991, p. 174) to pursue work 
related than financial preferences, which involve the need for collective 
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strategies. An increased budget is likely to benefit the lower-grade staff in terms 
of job security, and they have least opportunity to lobby for it. Senior officials 
are best placed to secure budget increases and they will have least to gain. They 
will have to maintain, reorganise, legitimise, manage and ensure high 
performance of a complicated department - utility is realised not through 
expanding but shaping their bureaux. 
These reasons why bureaucrats will not budget maximise are now discussed in 
greater detail. 
8.1 Collective Action 
Dunleavy identifies specific collective action problems inside bureaucracies. 
These arose from the idea that collective action is more likely to succeed in the 
'grander' schemes of organisational restructuring than individual strategies 
followed in pursuit of personal career-oriented strategies (1991, p. 174-181). The 
directional nature of the strategies applies to managers. For other staff- 
... we might expect that within a government agency the 
opportunities for individual welfare maximization will be fewest in 
the bottom ranks of bureaucrats: here collective strategies for 
improving officials' welfare may be resorted to more readily 
(Dunleavy 199 1, p. 176). 
This is a commonsense application of the 'free rider' principle highlighted by 
Olsen's public choice account above. Dunleavy suggests that growth is only 
likely to happen as a result of collaborative action, which is unlikely to happen 
d6unless they [managers] have exhausted individual welfare-boosting strategies" 
(1991, p. 208). It is therefore more probable from Dunleavy's reasoning that 
managers will seek individual career-related goals in the first instance and 
enhance certain budgets within their department. If individually-inclined options 
are not available the bureaucrat has to consider the more 'troublesome$ options to 
maximise their utility. It is at this point that Dunleavy argues that budgets can 
remain the same or even fall and bureaucrats, far from losing potency as public 
choice theorists would maintain, direct their energies towards shaping their 
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bureaus. To explain how this happens the significance and definitions of 'budget 
types' and 'bureau shapes' need to be explained. 
8.2 Budget and Agency Type 
It is the interrelation of budgets that is in turn dictated by the agency type, which 
will lead to 'shaping' outcomes. The analysis is characterised by the nature of 
budget and the nature of agency. 
Core budgets are associated with direct provision of services; bureau budgets 
finance departmental administration; and programme budgets constitute the 
entire organisation expenditure. 
Housing departments can be considered in terms of four agency types: delivery, 
contract, and control8. 
Delivery agencies "directly produce outputs or deliver services to citizens or 
enterprises, using their own personnel to carry out most policy implementation" 
(Dunleavy 1991, p. 183). In this instance, core and bureau budgets rise and fall in 
direct proportion to the programme budget. 
Contract agencies "are concerned with developing service specifications or 
capital projects for tendering, and then letting contracts to private sector firms" 
(Dunleavy 1991, p. 185). Here, as the programme budget increases the core 
budget will remain static and the bureau budget will increase by the amount of 
the programme budget. The contracting out of specific services, such as housing 
benefit administration and repairs services, is an example of contract agency 
activity. 
The task of the control agency is to "channel funding to other public sector 
bureaus in the form of grants or inter-government transfers, and to supervise how 
8 Dunleavy identifies other agency types - regulatory, control, taxing, trading, and servicing 
agencies - largely associated with functions of central government departments (Dunleavy 1991, 
p. 183-6). The discussion here is confined to agency types relevant to English local authority 
housing departments. 
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these other state organizations spend the money and implement policy" 
(Dunleavy 1991, p. 186). Dunleavy uses the example of national-state agencies in 
this context, where an agency with relatively few staff coordinate the provision 
of services through state providers (bureau budget), which accounts for virtually 
all the agency's programme budget. Direct provision (core budget) accounts for a 
small proportion of expenditure. For control agencies, if the programme budget 
increases, core and bureau budgets increase by a relatively small proportion 
because the 'delivery infrastructure' of core budgets is already in place, and 
grants paid to delivery agencies are part of the programme rather than the bureau 
budget, which accounts for payments to service providers. 
The control agency has similarities to the situation of a local authority that has 
established new whole service providers, such as Arms Length Management 
companies or stock transfer landlords: "A key benefit of setting up an ALMO is 
the separation of the local authority's housing management role from its strategic 
housing function ... In particular, the local authority must allocate adequate 
resources to continue and enhance its strategic role" (ODPM 2003, p. 27). 
In the case of Arms Length Management budget activity arises from the 
'incentive' payments from central government designed to provide finance for 
stock rehabilitation. Departmental activity shifts from the operational 'core' 
budget of the delivery agency, to the administration and strategic management of 
the service transfer. This overlaps with Dunleavy's notion of a regulatory agency 
whose "key tasks are to limit or control the behaviour of individuals, enterprises 
or other bodies, using licensing systems, reporting controls, performance 
standards or some similar system" (199 1, p. 184). 
The key point relating to discussion on budget and agency type is that even 
during times of falling or static global budgets rearranging the organisation 
structure can benefit certain groups. Contract, control and control organisation 
4shapes' with proportionally higher programme and bureau budgets will tend to 
benefit policy level staff, and a delivery organisation with a high core budget will 
benefit lower level staff through salaries and job creation (Ingarf ield 1996, p. 23). 
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An example of Dunleavy's representation applied to housing departments, and 
particularly the discussion in chapter three, is shown in table three. 
Table Three: Housing Agency Types and Budget Emphasis 
Ageng lype Budget Emphasis Housing Organisation 
Delivery Core In-house Provision 
Contract Bureau Contracted Services 
Control-Regulatory Programme ALMO and Stock Transfer 
Dunleavy's thesis is that a form of 'strategic cost management' could arise, 
whereby actors steer organisations toward shapes that confer benefits to 
themselves. This will result in flux as power shifts between groups as they vie for 
particular organisation forms. 
A final point is that Best Value policy does not involve budget increases. Indeed, 
and explicitly, budgets are required to decrease over the five year review period. 
The revenue reduction could, extrapolating from Dunleavy, impact upon core 
rather than bureau budgets and functions, and will in turn start to reshape the 
organisation in two possible ways. Firstly, toward a contract agency, where the 
core budget of the agency represents a small proportion of the bureau and 
programme budgets - most of the costs incurred are core-contractor in nature. 
Secondly, toward a control agency, where the budget pattern resembles that of 
the contract agency, but the organisation controls other public sector delivery 
agents. Crucially, it is senior managers who determine whichever shape arises. 
Dunleavy has developed what is essentially a critical framework with which to 
view budget activity and organisation change. Instead of considering a budget cut 
(say) in terms of pressure to produce 'more for less' Dunleavy takes the situation 
and considers how interested parties will respond. For senior managers he argues 
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that a budget cut, far from being a threat to senior managers, actually provides an 
opportunity to maximise their utility. 
An additional strand of Dunleavy's thesis is the notion of optimal budget 
changes discussed in the next section. 
8.3 Budget Maximum and Beneficiaries: The 'Internal Optimum Level' 
The extent to which budgets 'peak' in terms of bureaucrats' utility is an 
important aspect of bureau shaping, given Niskanen's "picture of bureaucrats as 
open-ended budget-maximizers" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 197). Dunleavy explains the 
concept of optimal budget levels in tenns of three factors: rank within the 
organisation, type of agency, and advocacy-utility correlation. For example, an 
officer will press for core budget increases in a delivery agency until such time as 
their advocacy is reasonably decisive, and individual utility is likely to rise. 
Decisive advocacy and utility varies according to rank, and will vary across 
agency types. 
For a delivery agency, top-level bureaucrats' marginal utility declines relatively 
slowly as programme budgets increase (Dunleavy 199 1, p. 198). This is because a 
delivery agency's core and bureau budgets rise in direct proportion to the 
programme budget, so senior (and lower-ranking) officials stand to benefit. The 
marginal utility declines as the costs in terms of advocacy, or the amount of work 
needed to justify the budget increase and the attendant risks, particularly when 
other utility maximising alternatives are available, outweigh the benefits. 
For a control agency a relatively swift decline in marginal utility arises because 
programme budget increases do not have a significant impact on the bureau (and 
core) budgets. For lower-level bureaucrats, the same general process applies 
except that utility and cost are lower at all times: "Rank conditions the ... 
benefits that officials receive from the program budget increments, their 
individual influence assessments and their costs of advocating budgetary growth" 
(Dunleavy 1991, p. 197). In essence, lower levels of influence and higher costs of 
engagement offset the benefits of advocating budget increases. 
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Where budget maximisation is no longer a viable goal, Dunleavy argues that 
"officials do nothing, switching attention instead to other individual or collective 
strategies for improving their welfare" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 198). The important 
phrase here is 'do nothing' in terms of agency budgets - press for neither 
expansion nor reduction, but concentrate on individual or collective welfare 
boosting strategies. 
Dunleavy examined the impact of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and the 
acceptance by managers in local government that policy is located in four areas: 
response to central government policy, the client/contractor split, the business 
plan and the budget process. Within this agency-centred perspective he argues 
that managers bureau shape to achieve particular outcomes. Ingarfield and 
Smith-Bowers (1996) used this theory, concentrating on the use of the business 
plan and the development of market-orientated methods, to partially explain the 
response of bureaucrats. Central to their application of Dunleavy's argument is 
that managers do not necessarily seek to maximise departmental spending, and 
this is understood by breaking down the budgets of local authorities into core 
(spending on self-administration), bureau (core budget plus financing of private 
contractors), program (bureau budget plus financing of other public sector 
bodies) and super-program budget (program budget plus resources from other 
public sector bodies) (Dunleavy 1991, pp. 181-182). By analysing the budgets in 
this way, it is possible to see who will benefit from the maximisation of a 
particular budget. Lower and middle-ranking workers will benefit from core 
budget expansion, through increased salary, pensions and job security; higher 
level workers benefit from an increase in bureau and program budgets. These 
latter benefits, while "complex and less quantifiable" (Ingarfield and Smith- 
Bowers 1996, p. 25) can be identified as those which "ensure that their careers are 
protected and enhanced, in terms of status and prestige; interesting and rewarding 
work; congenial work environments; influence and discretion over policy" 
(Ingarfield and Smith-Bowers 1996, p. 3 1). 
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Bureau and program budget maximisation will lead to an organisation 
characterised by a 'strategic core', where the operational dimension of activity is 
contracted outý and not provided directly by the local authority. 
This leads to a consideration of the success with which managers present their 
business plan - how and why is such a self-serving strategy able to thrive? 
Dunleavy explains this through 'ideological corporatism', where the power is 
located with those able: 
... to win a rational argument, to undermine a policy 
'paradigm' 
intellectually, to solve specific 'technical' problems, to demonstrate a 
shift in the 'intellectual technology' of the policy area (Dunleavy 
198 1, in Cole and Furbey 1993, p. 13 1). 
overall, the argument is that bureaucrats will seek budget maximisation up to a 
point. That point is reached when the personal costs of promoting increases are 
greater than the benefit that will arise, and these factors will vary according to 
rank and agency type. 
8.4 Bureau Shaping and Best Value 
Contract agency development accelerated considerably under Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, as local authorities developed client ('contract') units to 
provide ('deliver') services from in-house providers. This process is readily 
observable, and a correlation between this process and bureau shaping has been 
demonstrated during Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Ingarfield 1996). The 
question at this stage is 'Why should a contract agency change to a regulatory- 
control agency? '. The pressure that the organisation is under is similar under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering and Best Value, and has similar budget 
characteristics -that is, both types are beneficial to senior officials. Four reasons 
for a movement from delivery through contract to regulatory-control can be 
proffered: 
1. The Best Value frame imposes, and this is both implicit and explicit, rigorous 
consideration of non-council providers in council housing management. It is 
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suggested that the climate for non-local authority provision is more conducive to 
contract provision now than five years ago, under Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. The main factor here is the changed political context for contracting 
out services - it is now politically 'safer' within to consider provision by 
alternative providers. Furhter, this is now seen as a local choice rather than a 
centrally imposed requirement. 
2. The pool of organisations willing to engage in the business of council 
housing management has matured to broaden the nature and type of provider, 
and the conditions under which they provide housing management services, and 
includes a number of non-local authority organisations. 
3. Delivery agencies must still engage in a range of employer duties such as 
salary negotiations, employee welfare, equal opportunities and health and safety 
for example. These duties add complexity and potential conflict. It may be 
stretching the point to suggest that senior officials seek the 'glamour of 
regulatory-control agency'. At least, benefits consistent with Dunleavy's general 
explanation for bureau shaping where activity is isolated from line functions 
would be apparent. 
4. Best Value process involves more than budgets. The 4 Cs and the 3Es, in 
particular, require a specific focus on performance expressed in outputs and 
outcomes. The public choice argument is that bureaucrats will budget maximise 
whenever they can. However, that opportunity appears to have been removed 
under Best Value in general. At the same time, opportunities to manoeuvre and 
shape organisations remain a possibility that can be investigated. In terms of the 
performance requirement the situation is more complex. Will the necessity to 
adhere to a process, which while 'tight' in requirements still permits potentially 
wide-ranging interpretation, create a situation where opportunities to bureau 
shape are enhanced? This is a key question and relates to the first reason given 
above for changing intra-organisation form. Will Best Value provide the opening 
rationale - the safety - for managers to lead change that suits their aspirations? 
The Best Value process, and the way it is enacted, is a critical aspect of 
Dunleavy's ideas. 
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To this point two elements have been explained: what bureau shaping is and why 
it might arise under Best Value. A final point remains: how will managers bureau 
shape under Best Value? This question is considered in the next section. 
8.5 Application of the Bureau Shaping Thesis 
The aim of this section is to explain the way in which bureau shaping is enacted 
in the day-to-day housing management of local authority owned housing. This 
aim is addressed initially through an explanation of the strategies of bureau 
shaping identified by Dunleavy. The discussion is broadened later in the chapter 
to consider the context of housing departments, and concludes with an 
explanation of the focus on local authorities when investigating change during 
Best Value. 
8.6 The Strategies of Bureau Shaping 
Dunleavy identifies five key bureau shaping strategies "to bring their bureau into 
a progressively closer approximation to 'staff' (rather than 'line') functions, a 
collegial atmosphere and a central location" (1991, pp. 202-3). These strategies 
are what Dunleavy puts in place of Niskanen's budget maximising thesis to 
explain what bureaucrats do and why they do it: to challenge Niskanen's 
assumptions and present a verifiable frame. To this point an explanation has been 
given of the motion of bureau shaping, or the 'what' to be observed. The five 
strategies explain how this can be achieved. 
Major internal reorganisation 
Reorganisation will tend to isolate the routine organisation of functions, and 
ensure that they are "shunted into well-defined enclaves which need to be 
involved as little as possible with senior managemenf' (Dunleavy 1991, p. 203). 
This could also be viewed as decentralisation of housing management, a 
generally well-received form of practice bringing services closer to the client, 
provided that the local service was comprehensively resourced with 
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knowledgeable staff, repairs were coordinated effectively from the point of 
contact, and the local office also provided services that overlap housing, and 
include wider community and environmental aspects of service delivery (Cole 
and Furbey 1994, p. 222). These are extensive and expensive provisos and could 
relate to budget maximisation. According to Dunleavy's theory decentralisation 
confers benefits to all staff through job creation, and opportunities for varied 
work and promotion. This is therefore a bureau shaping strategy that managers 
might pursue. However, as the costs of organisation change face challenge 
decentralisation is important because operational activities are geographically 
separate from strategic functions; there is no suggestion that the satellites are 
involved with policy-critical aspects of the service, or staffed by senior 
management. This creates a situation where: 
Power and control thus becomes consolidated for the managers, and 
decreased and fragmented for other workers and individualised 
customers. Reductions in services, quality, and customer control are 
borne by the service users, or 'customers', not the senior managers 
(Ingarfield 1991, p. 81). 
When the cost challenge is upon the local authority, as in the case of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, change in line with Dunleavy's bureaus start to arise: 
CCT facilitates bureau shaping, as an opportunity for managers to 
reshape their organisations in their own interests. it enables them to 
take on and defeat the trade unions in terms ofjob security, contracts 
of employment, health and safety; to impose their own working 
methods; to reduce their accountability; to cut services to the public, 
and to separate themselves from the consequences (Ingarfield 1991, 
p. 79). 
The separation of core and bureau budget activities through decentralisation 
helps realise this opportunity. The pressure on budgets in general explained why 
it happens. 
2. Transformation of internal work practices 
Dunleavy suggests that policy-level officials will seek a number of changes that 
impact upon their own and others' workloads. For themselves, sophisticated 
management and analysis practice, high skill and high status tasks are sought. 
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For lower-tier management responsible for routine aspects of service delivery, 
high levels of accountability are imposed, but equally an involvement in 
decision-making. In this way the location of responsibility is dispersed 
(Dunleavy 1991, pp-2034). 
3. Redefinition of relationships with external partners 
The emphasis in this relationship is to externalise routine work and maximise the 
extent to which the agency retains policy and operational control. This control 
should be prescribed, and allow little opportunity for interpretation to avoid 
conflict. Dunleavy describes the need for control to be "robust and insulating" 
(199 1, p. 204) - robust in the sense that control can be maintained, and insulating 
in the sense that managers do not become entwined in operational matters. 
4. Competition with other bureaus 
Bureaus within an organisation often overlap in terms of their rcmit. In line with 
the hypothesis that managers will seek the prestigious aspects of the 
organisation's operations, they will endeavour to include the policy intensive, 
strategic functions within their bureau, and export or exchange the problematic 
tasks: "Bureaus may want to export troublesome and costly low-grade tasks to 
rivals, especially where doing so carries no major implications for a reduced 
programme budget" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 204). 
5. Load-shedding, hiving-off and contracting out 
This is the extreme aspect of bureau shaping. Where aspects of an agency's 
operations are inconsistent with the bureau shaping preferences of senior and 
policy-level staff, the final option is to devolve the task to another body - 
externalise the service. Compulsory Competitive Tendering can be seen as an 
attempt by central government to force local authority managers to adopt this 
strategy. 
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Dunleavy identifies certain general 'push' factors that could explain why some 
services did move to outside contractors. Firstly, load shedding is particularly 
attractive for aspects of a service that are "particularly complex and 
troublesome". Dunleavy's example is the way central government shifted the 
administration of housing benefit to local authorities in 1985 (Dunleavy 1991, 
p. 204). Secondly, load-shedding can arise can arise from a combination of 
central government policy direction and senior-policy level administration 
complicity. The most obvious example of this has been the development of non- 
departmental spending bodies formed out of parts of the civil service throughout 
the 1990s. While the Treasury voiced opposition to the delegation of budgets 
caused by hiving-off, "most senior officials in other Whitehall ministries have 
endorsed the government's strategy, many enthusiastically" (Hencke 1988, cited 
in Dunleavy 1991, p. 234). Thirdly, many of the costs of labour intensive direct 
public contact agencies, such as employee centred terms and conditions, equal 
opportunities practice, trade union involvement, and extensive consultation, are 
not taken into account when costs of provision are compared between internal 
and external providers (Dunleavy 1991, pp. 241-247). If such costs are partly 
ignored the case for externalisation is stronger. 
In terms of 'pull' factors - those that deter extemalisation - Dunleavy considers 
the New Right arguments, which seek to explain why staff in general are averse 
to hiving-off. The reasoning is that lower-level staff lose through cuts in the core 
budget, requiring them to work harder, and senior staff lose through a reduction 
in their influence, status and salaries. Also, the underlying legitimation of social 
welfare agencies, which protects them from criticisms of oversupply, is largely 
removed once a private agency controls provision (Dunleavy 1991, p. 231). 
Dunleavy's argument, and indeed his entire thesis, is that such assumptions, 
particularly as they relate to senior staff, are misplaced. As discussed above his 
reasoning is that senior managers stand to benefit from the maintenance of 
particular aspects - bureau and programme - of the budgetary whole, which 
survive relatively intact following privatisation. The strategies associated with 
hiving-off can be inhibited by disutilities, where, for example, the moves to 
privatise services remove any semblance of regard for social welfare factors with 
which the bureau still wishes to be associated: 
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Contracting out or competitive tendering may be introduced in 
conditions where they reduce the social welfare. Such 
inappropriate privatization becomes a general risk in the 
bureau-shaping account (Dunleavy 1991, p. 241; emphasis 
original). 
This notion of 'inappropriate privatisation' was a part-theme of Dunleavy's 
earlier work, where the issue was explained in more depth. His argument rests on 
two factors. Firstly, it could be partially explained by senior bureaucrats pursuing 
their class interests "even when its by-product effects in immiserizing state 
workers or reducing services to consumers mean that the strategy is at odds with 
the 'public interest"' (Dunleavy 1993, p. 143). Secondly, "and completely 
neglected in public choice accounts of bureaucracy ... there may be quite large 
differences between the 'internal' and the 'social' costs of public service 
provision" (Dunleavy 1993, p. 143). The key to this factor lies in the 
consideration of cost and benefit externalities. If a government, in producing 
legislation such as Best Value, does not appreciate the socially beneficial 
externalities of certain functions, then internal costs will be assumed to be at 
market levels, where the "agency's internal costs are higher than those of private 
sector firms with comparable kinds of activity and function" (Dunleavy 1993, 
p. 149). In such cases, inappropriate privatisation is more likely. Such 
externalities are a 'risk' for those taking decisions. Positive and negative 
externalities, where capable of identification (and this cannot be assumed) need 
to be disregarded as either irrelevant non-existent, or arising elsewhere if 
inappropriate privatisation is to proceed. This is a risk because, should negative 
externalities arise as an issue, the decision maker stands exposed. Such risks will 
therefore need to be accommodated before moves to a contract, control or 
regulatory agency are considered viable. 
Dunleavy's model is in large part informed by a reaction to the public choice 
rationale, and is fundamentally an argument centred on two premises. Firstly, 
managers will not seek whole bureau expansion in line with public choice 
prediction. They will enact strategies to achieve a bureau shape that coincides 
with their utility. Secondly, Dunleavy's thesis is dependent on opportunity - 
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when managers can apply these strategies with least risk they will. It is suggested 
that Best Value policy could create the type of opening Dunleavy alludes to. 
Having detailed the extent to which managers might manoeuvre during policy 
implementation, the full application of Dunleavy's ideas need to be firmly 
located within the context of relationships that might arise during Best Value. 
8.7 Bureau Shaping, Networks and Best Value 
A notable element of Dunleavy's analysis is the bargaining process that arises 
between, in the main, managers and front line staff, and managers and other 
agencies. These are the focal points in an examination of bureau shaping. It is 
significant that Best Value does involve an active engagement with residents 
through the Tenant Participation Compact and implicitly a place for local 
politicians as a conduit for local democracy. The inter-relationship was described 
earlier (p. 61) in the context of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, with six 
primary relationships 
To clarify the policy context further it is necessary to establish the boundaries of 
the network for housing and Best Value. For council housing the agencies 
involved in the policy process are illustrated in figure five. This is a 
representation of the council housing network. 
Figure five illustrates the 'organisational field' identified by Seal in his study of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. It: 
... recognizes a process of structuration in which the dynamic interaction between agency (such as the authorities' attitude to 
marketisation) and coercive, normative and competitive forces 
influences outcomes (Seal 1999, p. 315). 
107 
Figure Five: Council housing and agencies involved in the policy process 
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Source: Seal 1999, p. 314 
Two issues arise with Seal's interpretation. 
4 
16 
Professional 
Bodies 
The first is that council home residents must be distinguished as a separate and 
additional group under Best Value. The introduction of the Tenants' Participation 
Compact creates a route in terms of communication and resources. In addition 
the place of 'contractors' needs refinement. The alternative providers of housing 
services include housing associations, which are controlled through registration 
with, and part-funded by, the Housing Corporation. 
The second issue concerns the relationships Seal identifies. In essence the 
relationships mapped are not as straightforward as Seal's diagram implies. For 
example, the resource relationships all involve an element of information 
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exchange. Local taxpayers part-resource local authorities on the basis of 
manifesto pledges and service performance. Contractors only receive income and 
incur expenditure after contracts have been produced and signed. The impact of 
either of these interpretive relationships is overlooked in this model. In addition 
flows are more multifarious than relationships indicated by Seal: for example 
professional bodies have a relationship with central government, and local 
taxpayers and councillors deal with contractors. 
Figure six adds the Housing Corporation, tenants and residents of council 
housing and 'new' providers to Seal's representation. In addition, local 
politicians and local taxpayers have been separated. The diagram is useful as a 
housing-specific version of the network structure and the interaction aspects of 
Marsh and Smith's network diagram discussed earlier (figure two). It differs 
from figure five significantly through the absence of 'flows', replaced by 
trelationships' in the management of social housing. In short, the notion of 
information flows in Seal's diagram is replaced by a notion of reciprocal 
communication between actors. 
Those groups that overlap have a direct and probably daily relationship. These 
are operational relationships. Council tenants are continuously 'using' their 
homes and the management services associated such as rent payments, repairs 
and caretaking for example. Those groups that do not overlap are considered to 
have potential or actual relationships of a more ad hoc nature. The suggestion is 
that they can be influenced by each other, and they can influence local authority 
activity in a strategic rather than operational sense. The Audit Commission is an 
obvious example of this strategic communication through monitoring annual 
performance and five-yearly inspections. The reason for this operational-strategic 
distinction stems from the discussion in chapter one relating to the importance 
given by Government to the issue, combined with Dunleavy's discussion of 
bureau shaping. The entire local policy arena has been enclosed by 'central 
government', the nominal originator of Best Value policy. 
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Figure Six: Policy Relationships 
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This description of the complex set of relationships illustrates that any one 
agency can link to others either through their operational contact, or along the 
Grails' of the authority's policy boundary, or through the overall central 
govemment policy discourse. 
To this point the 'policy field' has been explained in general terms. One 
important aspect remains: the significance of what happens wilhin an agency. 
8.8 Housing Networks and the Intra-Agency Effect 
Having outlined the diverse range of agencies likely to be involved in Best Value 
a further issue remains: intra-agency relationships. A thread running through the 
thesis to this point has been the suggestion of imbalance within local authority 
decision making processes. It is certain that any of the agencies identified in 
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figure five may have an impact on what happens locally under Best Value. What 
is of specific interest in this work is how and why local activity is generated and 
the impact it has. The activity of an actor within an agency is crucial to forming 
network relationships and policy outcomes. Each actor explicitly plays a part. 
What is not clear is the impact on the relationship an actor has. Marsh and Smith 
acknowledge this difficulty in 'proving' causality: "We would never envisage a 
simple causal model which predicted that a certain network structure ... would 
lead to a particular policy outcome" (2000, p. 1 1). Their model is about 
relationships and the social construction of networks. In other words networks 
can explain outcomes through the bargaining of agents (Marsh and Smith 2000, 
p. 5). 
This leads back to the frequent mention of managers, and less frequently local 
politicians, as dominant players in the local authority arena. Do they influence 
policy outcomes to any significant effect? Or will Best Value placed the pivot of 
causality elsewhere? In essence the argument is that power imbalance is likely to 
remain in the local authority domain, and this is a possibility worth exploring. 
8.9 Summary: Best Value and Local Authorities 
This chapter has explained how Dunleavy has recast public choice theory, and 
presented strategies that managers could adopt to shape organisations. The key 
relationship referred to by Dunleavy is that which arises between front line staff 
and senior managers: it is their welfare that is affected most by changes in budget 
and agency type. Several additional relationships with agencies, groups and 
individuals have been highlighted in this chapter, yet most 'Best Value activity' 
takes place within the local authority boundary. For example services are 
delivered, residents are consulted, performance plans are produced and the four 
Cs and three Es are delivered. In other words, the best opportunity to assess a 
policy lies at the point of delivery where it is 'interpreted most'. It may well be 
that auditors or new providers will also begin to shape outcomes to a greater 
extent, but in the end: 
III 
A local authority represents a formidable force which has the 
intellectual resources to sabotage or, at least delay, those central 
government policies that lacked local government consent. (Seal 
1999, p. 324) 
Within the Best Value and housing network, the local authority policy arena 
appears to be an important determinant of outcomes. 
At this point the importance of local authorities as 'policy shapers' is evident 
from many parts of the theoretical spectrum, and hence justifies their choice as a 
subject of research focus. The next chapter examines the issue of research 
method in light of the discussion to this point. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Public Choice, Bureau Shaping And Best Value: Research 
Approach 
This selected focus on local authorities discussed in chapter seven leads to one 
further issue: how best to investigate influences within? Aside from influence 
from the network structure, learning input and structural context local authorities 
are themselves a network with identifiable sub-groups. Earlier discussion of Best 
Value policy highlighted the importance given towards residents, front line 
workers, councillors and managers. They all 'have a place' although the 
implication has been that managers are able to influence policy implementation 
more than other groups. This question of research approach is discussed in this 
chapter. 
It is appropriate to locate the chapter by returning to the original aim of this 
work: to identify the ways in which local relationships will be redefined during 
Best Value. In essence the reasons put forward are: policy context, expectations 
and interpretations of Best Value, and the influence of senior officials. The 
preceding chapters of this part have served to sharpen these postulates, and in 
this chapter they are rephrased as hypotheses accompanied by questions to be 
answered in the field research. 
The way the research was designed to answer the questions arising from 
hypotheses, and to take account of the recent introduction of Best Value, is 
discussed in the second half of the chapter, after the field study questions have 
been restated. 
9.1 Field Study Questions 
The field research was carried out between March 2001 and February 2002, the 
year following the passage of the legislation, but before local authority systems 
were fully operational. The research focused on the housing departments in two 
London boroughs, Westminster City Council and the London Borough of 
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Newham, and for both boroughs this was a time of acute acclimatisation to the 
new policy environment. This section provides the detail, and substantiation, of 
the three questions posed to respondents during the field research. 
Local Context 
The issue of context remains an important aspect of policy implementation 
following the discussion in chapters two (the legacy of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering) and five (political programmes). The specific aspect of 'safe 
environment' has been highlighted (chapter eight): a situation where options can 
be explored and implemented which might otherwise not have been entertained. 
The original sub-question: 'How is current implementation dependent on past 
practice and circurnstanceT can be rephrased to: 
Hypothesis One: current implementation depends on past practice and 
circumstance 
The questions that lead from and test this hypothesis here must focus on the 
changes that have arisen between Best Value and Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, and cover the main theoretical and processual themes covered. The 
main question to be answered is: 
What was the experience of those involved in housing management to 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering? 
Several areas of interest could be covered in this question. For example some 
could have felt 'restricted' by central government control and process 
requirements, the client-contractor split, or averse to marketisation. If an 
authority didn't 'do' Compulsory Competitive Tendering, that is they did not 
successfully contract services, why was this? Might this situation continue with 
Best Value? Would the problems that existed under Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering remain under Best Value? The meaning of 'problem' is important: is it 
associated with Compulsory Competitive Tendering process, ideology, external 
factors such as attitudes and availability of contractors, or the authority's 
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administration? To add perspective to these questions it would also be useful to 
estimate, basically, were those involved generally happy with Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering? 
These questions can also illuminate a key point raised earlier in the thesis: 
influence during the implementation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. To 
test the hypothesis it would be necessary to add: 'Will this* influence continue 
under Best ValueT. 
This line of enquiry helps to establish what the authorities were moving from and 
towards, and the questions concerning context are salient because each local 
authority had adopted a markedly different approach to service provision at the 
time of this research. Westminster had a largely externalised system of housing 
management organised as 'trading wings' of the City. During the interview 
period this situation was due to change with the intention of moving direct 
provision of a significant part of housing management to independent companies. 
Newham's housing service was almost entirely in-house. This would suggest that 
Westminster's emphasis was on strategic management of their housing stock, 
and a situation similar to that found by Deakin (1998, p. 4) was in place: 
From the interviews, it has become clear that the main concern of 
local authorities rests with the basic issue of infortnation systems and 
computerised databases for the (strategic) management of property. 
Although the context for Deakin's research was property asset management, a 
finding of this 'strategic' kind would be significant when gauging change arising 
during Best Value. 
Interpretation of Best Value 
The second research sub-question, 'To what extent is the implementation of Best 
Value in line with the expectations of those associated with Best Value 
processesT, has to this point highlighted that any of a number of interpretations 
could arise in the approach to Best Value. It is appropriate now to set the 
following: 
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Hypothesis Two: Best value can be interpreted in a variety of ways. 
The hypothesis has been deliberately phrased in an open and non-specific 
manner simply because of the varieties of interpretations and expectations that 
could arise. It also serves to challenge any assumptions that Best Value will 
produce a relatively objective and ordered manner of implementation. The key 
concern has related to the interpretations of process and outcomes. 
Fundamentally process is of importance if it is devised to meet the needs of 
certain groups (such as empire building or bureau shaping); outcome is of 
importance depending upon its interpretation. To consider which course is 
adopted (or is likely to be adopted) it is logical to ask the question: 
How is Best Value being interpreted? 
From this question several others flow: is there a distinction between outputs and 
outcomes?; what arrangements have been made for participation?; is the prospect 
of inspection influencing implementation?; what targets have been set and how 
will they be achieved? In fact questions can be directed at any aspect of the 
process. Each is 'to be a product of local determination' with one end: Best 
Value in the delivery of services. An important aspect of the Best Value process 
is the application and use of the 3 Es, the 4 Cs and Best Value performance data. 
Who decides how these phenomena will be measured, defined and delineated? 
Who is responsible for this 'field of application'? 
While 'what matters is what works' is a line of logic for New Labour the means 
to the end is important for this work. This leads to the theoretical perspective 
concerning the interpretation of Best Value process. Dunleavy suggested certain 
organisation 'shapes' and budget characteristics held significance for particular 
groups, and tasks could become organised according to these characteristics. 
Some members of staff may benefit and others could be disadvantaged. This 
notion of 'benefit focus' through process also extends to the client group: how do 
residents reflect on changes introduced during Best Value? 
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The issue of 'shape' is of importance when considering the two Boroughs. 
Newharn had a 'delivery' form of agency, with Westminster bridged between 
delivery and contract. 
Whether services, and the conditions under which they are delivered, are 
improving or not the question of 'WhyT arises. Of course the answer could be 
the policy of Best Value and the processes prescribed within it. This was not 
considered to be likely as a full explanation for reasons related to Barrett's views 
on policy implementation explained in chapter one, and subsequent discussions 
to this point. General answers to the 'why' question could give insight into 
factors influencing implementation, and whether what is happening under Best 
Value is of benefit to certain groups or individuals. The 'who' beneficiaries of 
what might happen under Best Value was a persistent theme through part three, 
from two theoretical schools, and the analysis led to the conclusion that senior 
officials, rather than any other particular group or individual, were best placed 
and most likely to influence change. The third research sub-question, 'Is any 
group or individual associated with Best Value processes able to influence 
implementationT, is developed to a third hypothesis. 
Appropriation of Best Value 
Hypothesis Three: Senior officials are most likely to control the agenda of 
change under Best Value. 
Testing the relevance and usefulness of Dunleavy's bureau shaping model of 
change in local government is consistent with the main thesis aim: to explain the 
way in which councils implement Best Value. In connection with this hypothesis 
it might be appropriate to ask the simple question: is bureau shaping in 
evidence?. Further, are managers controlling the agenda of change under Best 
Value and employing the strategies identified by Dunleavy? Certainly the 
answers to these questions are required. 
However, it is not proposed to test this hypothesis using direct questions about 
managers and whatever strategies they might pursue or be seen to pursue. There 
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are two reasons for this indirect approach. The first is related to method and the 
wish to avoid a prescribed research frame as much as possible. This is explained 
fully in the next chapter. The second reason is that the research should test 
Dunleavy's ideas in order to develop a better (if possible) tool of investigation. 
Dunleavy's main hypothesis is that the main cause of change can be managers 
successfully adopting bureau shaping strategies. However, other factors could 
influence policy implementation. 
What is proposed for the field research is a meso-level analysis that allows 
possibilities beyond the ideas of Dunleavy to surface during a practical test. 
The question that is proposed to test the 'managers' influence' hypothesis is: 
Who or what is most likely to control the agenda of change under Best 
Value? 
Interrogating the hypothesis in this way allows an initial investigation of 
Dunleavy's ideas. Several possibilities are implicit alongside the broad focus 
adopted. For example use of a network model might justify focus on central 
government and generate the 'central government is most likely to control the 
agenda of change under Best Value' hypothesis. Some confidence has been 
placed in Dunleavy's ideas. To avoid reliance on these ideas the research 
question has to allow other possibilities to surface. 
Within this hypothesis and the questions generated to test it there exists the 
possibility that no individual, group or 'force' is at work promoting change 
because no prospect of change is evident. This eventuality will be apparent from 
the test of the first two hypotheses. The prospect of change leads to the final 
question relating to actual change: What organisation changes are happening, or 
are likely to happen, under Best Value? This question is necessary to anchor the 
test of Dunleavy's bureau shaping ideas. If certain changes are taking place, and 
they appear to be happening for the reasons Dunleavy puts forward, the bureau 
shaping thesis has value as a policy analysis tool. 
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The possibility exists that something other than bureau shaping takes place in 
organisations when budgetary and performance pressures arise. This does not 
necessarily nullify Dunleavy's hypothesis. It may be that the time is not 
cappropriate' for managers to bureau shape, or individual welfare-boosting 
strategies are available. In this case changes will be more subtle, although it is 
expected that when considering Best Value as a process that allows internal 
arrangement some change will occur. The questions here is: What are these 
6arrangements' and how and why might organisations change? 
Returning to the main thesis aim of identifying the way relationships are 
changing under Best Value the test of this hypothesis should reveal these 
4particular outcomes'. As discussed in chapter two the concept of 'outcome' is an 
important part of Best Value and this thesis. Outcomes are the whole impact of a 
policy including service quality and efficiency, resident and staff satisfaction, 
political legitimacy, and prospects for the future of housing management 
services. Questions relating to organisation changes, and the extent to which 
change takes place in similar or different ways, should therefore encompass all 
manner of change rather than only matters of 'shape'. 
9.2 Research Sites 
Two London boroughs were chosen as sites for the research, the London 
Borough of Newharn and Westminster City Council. Two boroughs were chosen 
to allow an in-depth comparative analysis of process rather than the wide-ranging 
description of practice a multi-site study would allow. Newham, which piloted 
Best Value two years prior to its formal adoption, presented a relatively evolved 
form of Best Value in use. Westminster, along with the majority of English 
councils, implemented Best Value according to statutory direction in April 2000. 
The way in which each reacted and adapted to Best Value was therefore an 
interesting aspect of choice. 
In terms of similarities they have a similar stock of council housing, a high 
demand for it and they are both, of course, London authorities. The choice of 
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London as opposed to any of the other English or Welsh authorities affected by 
Best Value was a choice governed in the main by research logistics; that is, they 
were accessible to the researcher throughout the interview period. The limits this 
choice places on interpreting the results is discussed in part five. 
The main point to be made here is that if a similar pattern of interpretation and 
influence on Best Value processes can be observed in both, some degree of 
universality can be extrapolated. 
9.3 Field Study Sources 
Three sources were used for the'study: interviews, non-participatory observation 
and published material 
Interviews 
The material collected during the research interviews comprises the main part of 
the study. The interviews took place between March 2001 and February 2002 
and all were 'face to face', recorded on tape and transcribed verbatim. The 
choice of venue was left to the respondent with privacy as the sole requisite. All 
employees were interviewed at their place of work, which had particular 
advantages noted by Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 364): 
In all cases interviews were conducted with managers in their ofilices, 
which gave the researchers opportunities to observe the work setting, 
become more familiar with the company and its employees, and 
engender the high level of trust between manager and researcher that 
is so vital in this style of research (Buchanan el al., 1988). 
For councillors and residents the interviews took place in either the respondent's 
home, office or a local park. The final sample is shown in table three. The choice 
of respondents was determined through a process of random selection within 
each team. The large sample size of front line workers reflected the wish to gain 
a representative cross-section of views from this largest group. 
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A stratified random sample was adopted in preference to other variants to avoid 
the prospect of the research being led by a particular type of respondent. For 
example, non-probability samples were avoided mainly because of the emotive 
nature of the subject area, which could lead to particularly strong (and therefore 
unrepresentative) views being put forward by 'interested' respondents. 
Table Four: Field Study Sample 
Respondent (Reference) City of stminster LB Newham 
_ Councillors (WC, NC) 4 4 
_ Senior Management (NM, WM) 4 4 
Front Line Workers (NW, WW) 8 8 
_ 1 Tenant Representatives (NR, WR) 1 4 4 
1 Total 1 20 20 
Each respondent was advised that their anonymity would be protected, with the 
assurance that the no names or gender references would be made in the final 
written work. The only note of caution conveyed was that their responses would 
be recorded within one of the four interviewee categories, so some possibility of 
identification remained. 
The interviews were unstructured in the sense that respondents were invited to 
offer responses to the three hypothetical areas of interest - opinions about before 
Best Value, interpretations of Best Value, and views on groups or individuals 
leading the Best Value process. The interviews were not led, by asking a series of 
direct questions for example, and respondents were only encouraged to expand 
upon areas they wished to pursue. The interviews varied considerably in length, 
from a few minutes to over two hours, with an average time of thirty minutes. 
Each interview was taped and transcribed. 
The temptation to use a structured interview frame, which could have led to the 
possibility of a larger sample using postal questionnaires, was resisted. The 
reasons for avoiding a set of closed data have been implied throughout the thesis. 
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The method used for the field study was focused individual interviews, "allowing 
interviewees to talk about the subject in terms of their own frames of reference" 
(May 1997, p. 112). This approach was used to help evaluate the perception of 
Best Value; to find out what matters to providers and clients. 
In essence, the intention was to use qualitative and interpretative techniques to 
reveal what has been described as a complex, dynamic and potentially 
unpredictable arena of activity. A paradox may seem apparent here, in that the 
study relies to an extent on the use of Dunleavy's bureau shaping model, and it 
may therefore seem logical that enquiry should centre firmly on those factors 
identified within his theory. The three general questions listed above used to 
structure the interviews generate an approximate frame. There exists the 
possibility that respondents could stray from the point at issue and this was not 
considered to be a problem. The crucial aspect is that free opinions were sought 
and the study benefited from the array of influences actors held important. The 
approach, as stressed earlier, allowed a certain use of bureau shaping ideas, 
without being bound to them. 
Another reason for an unstructured approach was the wish to move away from a 
study that implied some form of numerical measurement underpinning the 
analysis; for example, '30 per cent of management respondents felt that their 
interpretation of Best Value reflected tenants' views'. The three main problems 
with this approach were firstly a specific question seeking a direct, explicit and 
probably affirmative/negative response is an overt signal from the researcher 
about what is important in the research - in the example, tenants' views. This 
approach is not the point of the research. The aim was to establish matters of 
importance to actors in the process, and not the researcher. 
Secondly it was thought highly unlikely that any respondent would have 
volunteered damaging accounts relevant to themselves, the organisation, or both. 
In the event, this reason was on occasions not evident, with some actors 
producing quite scathing testimonies. Equally, however, others were quite 
guarded in their opinions, expressing discomfort or reticence through body 
language and intonation for example. 
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Thirdly it was not clear how a structured form of interview should be arranged, 
what questions should be asked of whom, and how valuable statistical analysis of 
that data would be. Saunders, in his study of power relationships in the London 
Borough of Croydon, found that "Power ... was inherently immeasurable in 
statistical terms" (1980, p. 336). He discarded the structured interview because it 
was "too cumbersome and obstructive; it was not entirely clear what questions I 
should be asking, and it had soon become apparent that a string of prearranged 
and perhaps somewhat banal questions was eliciting little more than a string of 
prearranged and certainly banal answers" (Saunders 1980, p. 336). The prospect 
of 'Prearranged banality' has therefore been minimised by this aspect of method. 
A further issue that required clarification was who, by definition, was a manager. 
Four characteristics were used: 
1. Staff Management 
Management is "Generally held now to be achieving business objectives by 
mobilizing other people" (Grayson 1995, p. 1129). The notion that senior 
managers direct the activity of others is considered apposite, although this 
characteristic does apply to many workers in an organisation. The remaining 
three aspects were therefore adopted in addition to this broad feature. 
2. Indirect responsibility for Service Outcomes 
Downs defined a manager as one who worked permanently for an organisation, 
and whose "contribution to organizational effectiveness cannot be directly 
evaluated" (Dunleavy 1991, p. 148). This is a reference to the 'entrepreneurial, 
factor of production used in classical economic analysis - that combination of 
acumen, experience andjudgement which directs an organisation towards growth 
or decline. For this work Downs' definition is a useful starting point, particularly 
as concerns the managers' direct impact on services. Some care is needed here. 
A director of housing would probably argue that they are responsible for rent 
arrears levels. However, this is an indirect responsibility over which they have 
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strategic control rather than day-to-day contact. Directors do not, as' a rule, 
engage in housing management tasks, although they do prescribe methods and 
strategies for others to carry out. 
3. Responsibility for Setting Budgets 
Niskanen feels that a senior manager, or 'bureaucrat' in his terminology, can be 
defined as one who holds a "separate identifiable budget" (Dunleavy 1991, 
p. 164). Problems arise with this definition because many workers in a local 
authority 'hold a budget'; that is they have authority to spend within certain 
limits. The distinction used here is the authority to set a budget, as opposed to 
spend within one. Even this definition can become vague as the factors that 
determine budget levels - internal and external - clearly extend beyond an 
individual manager9. The main issue here is how the budget is spent and not, 
necessarily, the level that is negotiated. 
4. Rank Within the Organisation 
By definition within local authorities certain officers hold a particular rank, or 
level of seniority. This can be identified in a number of ways - salary, staff 
management, or budget size for example. To enable some consistency when 
looking between organisations, those identified as 'divisional' managers and 
above were considered senior management. A divisional manager has 
responsibility for a particular service area and accounts for that activity directly 
to either the director of housing or councillors. 
Other employees that fell outside this categorisation are referred to as 'front line 
workers'. The resident representatives interviewed were currently elected to 
landlord-recognised organisations, and the councillors randomly selected from 
housing committee attendees. 
9A particular point here is the extent to which finance, as opposed to housing, professionals 
influence budget levels; for example Jacobs' research in this area "highlights the professional 
tensions that exist between finance officers and housing staff" (2000, p. 19). 
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Non-participatory Observation 
During the course of the interview period four open council housing committee 
meetings for each authority were visited. These meetings were open in the sense 
that any member of the public could attend and ask questions related to the 
published agenda. On average six members of the public attended. The setting of 
these meetings differed considerably. 
In Newham a relatively open forum existed with members of the public sitting 
almost with the councillors and officers'and asking questions from the floor via 
the meeting chair. Debate would often become lively between councillors, 
officers and observers. At the meeting close, all were invited to share sandwiches 
and discuss the events informally. None of the meetings attended finished on 
time. 
In Westminster the public sat about 25 metres from the meeting with proceedings 
relayed via a public address system. Any questions were tabled and approved 
prior to the meeting. Very few questions were asked by members of the public, 
and the meetings progressed in a structured manner. At the meeting close the 
officers and councillors retired to refreshments, set out in a room marshalled by 
security guards, and to which the public were not openly invited. 
Handwritten notes were taken during these meetings and despite the frequently 
interesting range of debate material was used on only two occasions within the 
study and drawn into the wider findings from the interview data. 
Published Material 
The perception of Best Value from the organisations' documentation published 
to accompany the Best Value initiative is set out at the beginning of the chapter 
eight. The summary of the documentation provides the frame with which to 
contextualise the interview material and to consider the published context of 
implementation. There is also some investigation concerning who established the 
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initial footing for Best Value in general, and housing management in particular. 
This analysis enables a consideration of what 'quality' and 'cost-effectiveness', 
for example, mean locally. There is no assumption that local policy and publicity 
has arisen from any particular individual or group, although where a source can 
be suggested, this is expanded upon. 
Overall, the aim of the field research is to ascertain how Best Value is being 
implemented, and relationships become redefined through this process, in two 
localities through interviews, non-participatory observation and published 
accounts. A relatively open frame of investigation was adopted to allow free 
expression and test the theoretical idea discussed. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
From Theory to Practice: Investigating Best Value 
This part of the thesis has explained the general shift in British politics and 
policy since the mid-1970s. The move to change local authorities from relatively 
monopolistic suppliers to a new form of enabling and democratised organisation 
has continued with the election of the 1997 Labour Government. 
From the perspective of public choice advocates a key problem facing local 
government during this transition was senior management and their 'rationality'. 
They will, given the opportunity, intrinsically inflate budgets, guard information 
and overstate supply. These traits are not productive for the efficient supply of 
services and must be checked. 
Drawing from discussion earlier in the thesis it is possible that Best Value could 
limit these tendencies. Services will be subject to new scrutiny with the 
requirement to be economic, effective and efficient. Costs in any event should 
decrease, and an important parameter here is the 'compare' requirement: local 
authorities must now specifically account for their expenditure relative to other 
providers through national performance indicators. The requirement to publish 
annual performance plans and five-yearly reviews opens accountability to a 
greater extent than that witnessed under Compulsory Competitive Tendering. In 
addition, the Audit Commission's Best Value Inspections will provide further 
exposure using a national template assessing process and performance. Aside 
from accountability in general, central government will be able to compare with 
relative ease the production and consumption patterns of local authorities, and 
tailor funding and priorities accordingly. 
Wider observations of public choice theorists that include notions of trust, leisure 
maximising, and free riding as behavioural characteristics can implicitly be 
linked with Best Value as a policy that involves scrutiny of all aspects of activity, 
and increased accountability. 
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The problem for public choice theorists in general is the tendency of local 
authorities to oversupply for reasons largely unassociated with demand. They are 
characterised as a monopolistic supplier and a poor surrogate for free markets. 
Substantively they are accused of inefficient service delivery. This point of view 
may have credence. If it has, however, the argument set out here is that the 
conclusion has been drawn for the wrong reasons. Network effects, misplaced 
pluralist assumptions and structural context are all factors that must be drawn in 
to explain local authority activity. Public choice theorists would dispute the 
significance of the structural context and replace it with the concept of the 
political market place, driven by plural demands. Policy outcomes drive that 
process, and narrow public choice approaches advocate a government that 
marshals self-interest in provision and little else. This particular version of the 
principle of rationality is embedded in narrow public choice theory. 
Dunleavy's theory of bureau shaping takes a different perspective. He considers 
sections of budget, type of agency, and the beneficiaries of particular budget 
change and agency by rank. He also considers strategies that senior officials 
could adopt to maximise their utility, and each can be linked to Best Value. 
Internal reorganisation and the transformation of internal work practices are a 
possible consequence of the strategic role of local authorities and technical 
requirements of Best Value. Relationships could become redefined within 
housing departments as managers distance themselves from operational matters 
and achieve the high status work practices that Dunleavy predicts. Concerning 
other local authority partners, the importance of housing departments has been 
highlighted by Government where they co-ordinate the activity of other agencies 
and "stimulate action by others" (ODPM 1999, p. 6). There also exists space 
within Best Value to contract services to other providers. 
The opportunity to enact these strategies and achieve the results suggested will 
increase the utility of managers. It may also result in a change, and not 
necessarily an improvement, in service provision. Herein lies the crux of 
Dunleavy's argument: applying pressure to public sector organisations in such a 
way that spending is restricted and information is liberalised can benefit senior 
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managers and service improvements become coincidental. This is far removed 
from certain public choice ideas centred on the advantages of large and insulated 
bureaucracies. 
Realising this utility gain is not a straightforward process and certain objects of 
inertia have been identified. Other agents within the organisation will have 
perspectives not necessarily aligned to those of managers, and local authorities as 
a whole are open to pressure from other organisations and individuals. Finally, 
while it has been suggested that marketising public services in general, and 
housing in particular, may now be seen as more acceptable than times past, it is 
by no means assured that certain routes (such as Arrns Length Management) will 
appeal to senior officials: the risk could offset the anticipated benefit. 
It has been proposed to use the main thrust of Dunleavy's argument as the basis 
of a field study, and investigate the extent to which the shaping processes he 
identifies arise under Best Value. The discussion in chapter eight highlighted the 
need to consider the local context, interpretations of Best Value, and actor 
influence. From this discussion the explanation of a particular approach to the 
field research was detailed, and is applied in the next part of the dissertation. 
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PARTFOUR 
FIELD STUDIES 
This part of the thesis is the practical test of the hypotheses. The research 
proceeds to consider the views of those closest to Best Value in practice - the 
local politicians, residents, managers and front line workers. These are the people 
charged with, and affected by, the implementation of Best Value. 
The field research cover four chapters. Chapter eleven provides an account of 
local published material; chapter twelve contains actors' views on the pre-Best 
Value environment; chapter thirteen sets out the ways in which Best Value is 
being interpreted; and chapter fourteen establishes the respondents' views on 
who, if anyone, is dominant in the interpretation and implementation of Best 
Value. 
The final chapter of this part, chapter fifteen, provides a summary of the research 
findings and sets out two aspects of the date: the changes that arose as the two 
authorities moved from Compulsory Competitive Tendering to Best Value; and 
the nature of the shift in relationships following the introduction of Best Value. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Best Value and Housing Services - Background and Published 
Accounts 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains an outline of the organisations and their Best Value- 
associated literature. This serves as a reference and locator of what the sub ect j 
authorities hope to achieve under Best Value: their stated aims, methods and 
rationale. 
11.2 London Borough of Newham 
Newham Council has undergone a transfort-nation over the last three 
years. The borough had a history of doing nothing very badly and 
nothing very well. Poverty in the area was always used as an excuse 
for providing poor services. Newham paraded its deprivation, rather 
than its potential (LBN 1999, p. 2). 
Newham has a population of 227,800 (86,300 households). Approximately one- 
third of the housing is council owned, with 25,000 tenanted and 2,600 leasehold 
properties. The council estimates that there are L200m of outstanding repairs, and 
the stock has a negative value of E156m, or E6250 per dwelling (LBN 1998). 
Of the Authority's 60 council seats 59 are held by Labour, with one held by the 
Christian Alliance. 
In May 1997 the authority published Our Vision, and distributed the document to 
every household in Newham. Its theme centred on economic regeneration in the 
Borough within selected 'showcase' areas, and an underpinning rationale that: 
This vision is a belief that we need to persuade people to see 
Newham as a place of opportunity rather than poverty and neglect. 
To persuade people to live in Newham, we must change perceptions. 
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Consequently, we recognise that the messages we send must be 
positive ones and that therefore the old messages sent by Newham 
Needs are no longer appropriate to the kind of Newham we want to 
create. (LBN 1997) 
To enable this persuasion and shift the perception, regeneration was put forward 
as the key, and Newham's leader Councillor (later Sir) Robin Wales and Chief 
Executive Wendy Thompson (later to head the Audit Commission Housing 
Inspectorate) "saw best value as a chance to look afresh at everything the council 
did, as a vehicle for extending, deepening and hastening change" (Open 
University Business School 1998, p. 2). 
In anticipation of the formal announcement of Best Value on 27 th July 1997, 
Newham prepared and launched its Best Value Core Team. The authority applied 
to become a Best Value pilot authority, reflecting that "Best value is a means to 
lever real change in real people's lives and to show that public service works for 
people and not for itself' within the bid document (Open University Business 
School 1998, p. 2). It successfully secured pilot status in December 1997, one of 
seven out of 391 English local authorities to become an all-services pilot. The bid 
was set in the context of 'The Vision' - "At its simplest, the message was that: 
'by 2010 Newham will be a major business location and a place where people 
will choose to live and work"' (LBN 2001, p. 17). 
The council aimed to achieve three council-wide targets as a Best Value pilot: to 
decrease costs by five percent and to increase quality by ten percent over three 
years, and to move from ten percent to 35 percent externally provided services 
within five years. A notable part of these targets is the externalisation of services, 
and marked a significant shift from the Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
experience: 
Newham Council and its workforce have traditionally been opposed 
to the CCT of Council services, and, by extension, to the 
externalisation of service provision. Almost all services were kept in- 
house through the various CCT rounds. Knowledge of this deterred 
would-be suppliers from competing for services, as they would have 
felt that there would have been little point in investing time and 
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money into constructing a bid, which would be rejected (LBN 1999, 
p. 3) 
This traditional opposition to alternative providers, evidenced by an entirely in- 
house mode of provision, would change. Best Value meant that the "blinkers of 
slavish in-house provision were replaced with the opportunity to do some clear 
blue sky thinking about service delivery mechanisms" (LBN 1999, p. 3). This 
change was placed in the context Newham's strategic capability and performance 
before Best Value, described as "Crap! " by Robin Wales (LBN 1999a). 
The Council was clear that Best Value would not necessarily be embraced by the 
workforce: "the unions were originally hostile to what they saw as CCT by the 
back door and the consequent loss of in-house jobs" (1999, pp. 3-4). 'Hostility' 
extended to some councillors that did not accept the Best Value-externalisation 
link with the Council noting that there were some "who were traditionally hostile 
to externalisation and those who warmly embrace the best value principles" 
(LBN 1999, p. 1). The Best Value Core Team was given the task of reaching an 
agreement with the unions and staff. This agreement comprised a joint statement 
between unions and management accepting the principles of Best Value and 
recognition of the rights of individuals' terms and conditions of employment, and 
a meeting between 500 staff members and national representatives of UNISON 
and the TGWU, and the leader of the council. Through this process, the Council 
had: 
... persuaded potential outside partners that there is a sea change in Newham and that we are serious about outsourcing some service 
provision [and] effected a significant attitudinal change; from: 
opposition to externalisation at all costs; to a more pragmatic: lets 
(sic) look at the merits, from the workforce. (LBN 1999, p. 4). 
The 2000/01 performance plan Looking to the Future (LBN 2000) contains 
references to the vision as the underpinning rationale which, in turn, depends on 
Best Value - "We believe that we will only be able to deliver our vision if we are 
committed to best value and to using all our resources - people, money, property 
and information - effectively" (LBN 2000, Chapter 1). 
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The overall setting for Newham's performance in the context of Best Value 
Performance Indicators is illustrated in table five, with a detailed breakdown 
contained in Appendix C. Overall Newham was aiming to improve key aspects 
of housing service performance, and while no improvement in letting time was 
projected for the year ahead, the target set for 2005/6 had been set at 26 days 
(LBN 2000, p. 15 1). 
Table Five: London Borough of Newham Performance 
BVPI description 1999/2000 2000/2001 Targets 
The average weekly costs per local E20.47 f 18 70 
authority dwelling of management . 
The average weekly costs per local E14.97 E14-07 
authority dwelling of repairs 
Local authority rent collection and 97% 95% 
arrears: proportion of rent collected 
Average relet times for local 
authority dwellings let in the 41.1 42 
financial year 
The percentage of urgent repairs 
completed within Government time 95% 95% 
limits 
Tenant satisfaction with overall 
housing service provided by the 68% 70% 
landlord I 
Source: LBN 2000 - Best Value Performance Plan 2001/2002 pp. 148-152 
The overall setting for Best Value in Newharn could be described as 'welcome 
change' from these published accounts. Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
failed to have any significant impact because of the negative image of the 
Borough and reluctance in any case to consider alternative providers. Best Value 
marked a fresh approach with 'blinkers removed'. The general impetus, and in 
line with Best Value, was that costs would reduce and quality would increase, 
accompanied by a commitment to involve other service providers. Finally, this 
change is presented as one of 'managed' consensus. Some councillors, workers 
and unions had not originally indicated acceptance of Best Value. 
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11.3 Westminster City Council 
The Council's vision is to ensure that Westminster continues to be 
the most attractive and well run borough in which to live and work 
(WCC 2000, s. 1). 
Westminster has a population of 220,800 (about 102,000 households). 15,212 
homes are council owned and tenanted and 8,500 are council owned leasehold 
properties (Audit Commission 2002, p. 12). The council estimates that there is a 
repairs and improvements backlog of over 200 million pounds (WCC 2001, 
p. 29). 
At the time of the research Westminster was a Conservative-control led council. 
The Conservative Party held 47 of the City's 60 seats, with the Labour Party 
holding the remaining thirteen at January 2002. 
Westminster's Vision was agreed in April 2000 and was accompanied by five 
aims: to be the safest City; the most attractive City; a modem, successful City; 
and a City that works for its residents (WCC 200 1 a, s. 2). 
To achieve these aims, certain core values were set including meeting needs, 
working in partnership, environmental sustainability, and ensuring that staff "are 
well trained and empowered to ensure the delivery of high quality and improving 
services" (WCC 2001a, s. 3). Best Value is described as underpinning these aims, 
and it will "maximise value for money by challenging how and why services are 
provided, comparing performance with others and testing competitiveness to 
deliver continuous improvement" (WCC 2000a, p. 7). 
Westminster volunteered to pilot Compulsory Competitive Tendering (VCT, 
Voluntary Competitive Tendering) in housing management which resulted in the 
formation of fifteen housing management contracts. By 1998, after some four 
years of competitive tendering, housing management had transformed from being 
almost entirely in-house to a service significantly devolved to the private sector. 
Council housing staff reduced from over 1000 to around 400 during this period, 
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and in tenns of service contracts ten of the fifteen were retained by the in-house 
team, with three won by private contractors and two transferred to RSLs. 
Table six illustrates Westminster's projected performance during the first year of 
Best Value, with detailed data contained in Appendix D. Costs were projected to 
rise in line with inflation, with reductions in real terms expected following 
repackaging of management and maintenance contracts in April 2001 (WCC 
2000, p. 25). This new system, introduced during the interview period, would 
involve six contractors managing seventeen 'village' areas in addition to fifteen 
tenant management organisations responsible for managing 2,106 tenanted 
homes and 1,731 leasehold homes (Audit Commission 2002, pp. 15-16). Relet 
times were expected to remain static because of an over-supply of housing for 
older people, with reductions in letting times expected within three years (WCC 
2000, P-26). 
Table Six: Westminster City Council Best Value Performance 
BVPI description 1999/2000 2000/2001 Targets 
The average weekly costs per local E29.41 01 00 
authority dwelling of management . 
The average weekly costs per local E18.35 L20 11 
authority dwelling of repairs . 
Local authority rent collection and 96% 96% 
arrears: proportion of rent collected 
Average relet times for local 
authority dwellings let in the 19.8 days 20 days 
financial year 
The percentage of urgent repairs 
completed within Government time 96.8% 96% 
limits 
Tenant satisfaction with overall 
housing service provided by the N/A 55% (Projected) 
, -landlord I I - 
Source: WCC 2000 Best Value Performance Plan 2000/2001 pp. 27-30 
The transition from Compulsory Competitive Tendering to Best Value is not 
readily apparent. With the exception of performance data there is no reference to 
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a specific Best Value-related change. The new regime is relayed as a structure 
upon which existing ideas and practice can be applied. The Authority's 2000/1 
Housing Investment Programme strategy statement states: 
The City Council welcomes Best Value as a natural development of 
our enabling approach to the testing of services and methods of 
service provision. In Westminster the competitive testing regime has 
already achieved many of the core Best Value principles, notably 
resident consultation, rigorous reviews, market testing, key 
performance indicators and customer involvement in monitoring. 
(WCC 2000a, p. 14) 
Best Value is presented as an evolution of past practice; the 'natural 
development' referred to above. 
11.4 Summary 
The discussion in this chapter has illustrated that the sites of the field research 
were characterised by a number of similarities and differences. From the 
published material it is apparent that the two authorities had similar levels of 
enthusiasm for Best Value. 
In terms of projected performance the boroughs had set similar proportional 
targets, although differences in current standards were apparent. Newham's 
management costs, for example, were almost 50 per cent lower than 
Westminster's. In addition, Newham recording significantly higher rates of 
resident satisfaction. Conversely, Westminster had considerably lower void 
times. 
The key aspect of change related to Newham. Newham's portrayal was one of a 
Borough characterised at one time as poor. This, the literature reflects, was not 
what was required and the new image sought was one of opportunity, potential 
and willingness to engage with the business community. Change was necessary, 
and once recalcitrant staff and unions appear to have embraced the reality of Best 
Value together with residents, politicians and management. The message was one 
of common purpose, with the Best Value initiative providing the prospect to 
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approach the future with 'blue sky thought'. Change and consensus marked the 
arrival of Best Value with a commitment to become a thriving borough. 
Westminster did not have to reorient its general approach with the arrival of Best 
Value. Their experience of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and the move to 
contracted services coincided with their interpretation of Best Value. For 
Westminster continuity and consensus characterised their experience with the 
expectation that they would continue to flourish. 
138 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
Pre-Best Value Context 
12.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the experiences of those involved in 
housing management prior to Best Value. This aim corresponds with earlier 
questions set associated with the hypothesis that the implementation of Best 
Value will be influenced by past practice and circumstance. The chapter is 
structured according to the themes that arose: political context, service 
organisation, competition, service standards and consultation. These themes are 
summarised in the chapter summary, arranged by respondent group. 
12.2 Political Context 
Ncwham 
Newham, at least until the early 1990s, had been a 'traditional' Labour borough, 
with a strong commitment to public services provided by the local authority. 
Prior to Best Value, and roughly coinciding with the introduction of Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, NC I noted: 
A change of philosophy in 1994 - we moved from being a Borough 
that was negative, to a Borough concerned with financial stability, 
looking for a quality of life for everyone who lives and works in 
Newham. A few young councillors got in and had this idea, we can 
look at ourselves, and bring more money into the Borough. 
Similar feelings were expressed by two other councillors: 
We shared the perception of the leader, we needed a mechanism of 
establishing value for money, for improving delivery and efficiency. 
We were concerned about industrial relations, there was a strike 
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between 1992 and 1993, a disruptive trade union, a producer oriented 
bureaucracy, a need to establish a modem mechanism (NC2). 
Before Best Value we had this dissatisfaction. Less strategic 
direction, more reactive, a more fraught relationship with central 
government, I don't think we would have been given the accolade of 
council of the year under the previous administration. Thinking about 
things has really been the impetus. The change in the character of the 
council from about [19]86 onwards has been that there has been a 
great thrust. We are not going to be seen as a one party state, with all 
the corruption, but as vibrant, forward looking (NC3). 
Newham councillors' feelings on the time before Best Value were almost 
exclusively confined to these broad statements on strategy and political 
mobilisation. Around 1993 there appears to have been a realisation that severe 
problems existed in Newham. Negativity, poor value, a self-interested and 
possibly corrupt local authority, and industrial unrest led to poor housing 
services. The problems to be addressed included image, attitude, efficiency, trade 
union disruption and the relationship with central government. There was 
however optimism centred on the "few young councillors". The problems, from 
these accounts, arose because of a local administration with no redeeming 
features. The solution would come from political leadership. 
A different perspective of the leadership was revealed by two of Newham's front 
line workers. The first point remarked on was that the management 'type' had 
changed over time, for example: 
They used to recruit according to people they thought would do a job 
for the community, now they want people who can do a good job at 
monitoring and reporting and producing good figures (NW I). 
The 'they' in this extract is a reference to the local political leaders, and it is here 
that the most important change occurred: 
[Councillor Robin] Wales used to say before he became leader, was 
'I work in the private sector, I work as a manager in British Telecom, 
and we can get staff to do this with no problem, you know, we've got 
call centres, we've got shift work, we've got all of the customer 
service stuff we want, why can't you do it, I don't believe you can't 
do it. The service is different, and I'm going to make you do it' 
(NWI). 
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The 'you' was a reference to the entire workforce of the local authority, and this 
could be achieved at senior management level as follows: 
They leaned on senior officers, they got people out they didn't want, 
and they told Andy Jenningslo they weren't going to renew his 
contract so he had to go, they got people to retire all over the place, 
they got rid of loads of senior housing staff, and in other 
departments, and brought in younger people more like themselves. 
Lots of New Labour type managers got dropped in. Lots more 
agency staff as well run by a sort of housing consultant (NWI). 
Newham's vision was mentioned in chapter eight as the underpinning rationale 
of the service change - the NWI summarised it as "meaningless load of old 
clichds. It's like Robin Wales got one of his customer service statements from 
British Telecom" and just changed the names". Concerning the vision NW3 felt: 
"You could consider it as a fascist doctrine. I see it as having undertones of 
excluding people who should be included. There are political pay offs, at the 
expense of certain people". As for why Robin Wales should orchestrate such an 
elaborate and contrived scheme of local authority metamorphosis, NW3 
continued: "Possibly because he believes it, but probably for career and political 
ambitions. We all know he got his knighthood for services to local government - 
he toed the line and that was his reward". 
These accounts could not be verified by reference to the other respondents' 
replies. Three of the four managers interviewed were in post during Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, and only one mentioned pre-Best Value Newham in 
political terms. NM3 felt that Newham considered Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering purely. on its merits to drive improvements in services, and not a sign 
of'sycophancy: 
We had eighteen years of Tory government, and a lot of that impetus 
for change came because we were a Labour borough, and didn't 
accept the fact that just because you have a Tory government you 
have to give up your principles, your service orientation. 
10 Newham's Director of Housing 1993-6 
" Councillor Wales' employer 
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This raises the question of where the dynamism originated if not from politicians 
and directors who 'come and go'. NM3's account appears to relate to a notion of 
a Labour 'authority 'naturally' synonymous with quality public services. 
However, and as shown from the councillors' accounts, it seems clear that 
Newham's 'Labour' did undergo change in the mid- I 990s, and it would therefore 
be logical to relate NMYs comments to the newer (and current) political 
administration. 
None of the Ncwham residents discussed this period in a political context. 
Westminster 
When asked for their opinions on housing management services prior to Best 
Value the Westminster councillors mentioned the authority's image. WC4 
described Westminster as "clearly controversial" prior to the mid-1990s after 
which it "stopped doing the more controversial things". While WC4 did not 
expand on the 'controversy' WCI offered a perspective on Dame Shirley 
Porter's period of leadership (1983-9 1) and mayoral off ice (1991-92). Describing 
Porter as "very wise and very plugged in to keeping up appearances" the 
councillor continued: 
She proved to be very popular, and you can't take that away, people 
wish they'd thought of it first, and that legacy brings bad things, but 
there is a difficultly, it's an outside perception thing, even if the 
cemeteries and the asbestos and all of that hadn't been there, because 
Westminster is essentially so rich there's a lot of belief that problems 
can be solved in borough. 
This suggests a picture of an image-conscious authority tainted somewhat 
unfairly by past events. Within the authority during the 1990s, and before Best 
Value, WCI recalled that the relationship between housing management and 
councillors was fruitful with "no acrimonious them and us". 
WC2 remarked of the period that the authority was set on divesting itself of 
housing responsibilities: 
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It was the stated policy of Shirley Porter to eradicate council housing. 
She was quite successful. The staff didn't have much choice, they 
either sang to her tune or disappeared. 
The 'Porter Years' was a sensitive subject for the Westminster politicians and the 
impression gained was one of image building and consolidation: 
There's a perception to deal with whatever happened in the past, and 
it's awfully difficult, and I would say that housing have done a lot of 
work on this, to align with other local authorities (WC 1). 
Only one other Westminster respondent, a manager, made a link between 
political leadership and past practice, stating that the move to Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering was prompted by "a political will to see how the private 
sector could operate" (WM I). 
12.3 Service organisation 
Newham 
For the managers in Newham, Compulsory Competitive Tendering created 
divisions within the authority between the 'contract' staff (those that delivered 
the service) and the council's client unit (those that monitored the service): "We 
should have been talking to tenants and delivering a service rather than looking 
over our shoulder all the time" (NM3). This was a reference to the client unit ("I 
wouldn't necessarily call them colleagues"), and the manager continued: 
We spent five, six years plus, more with half the council on our 
backs, coming down to our office, descending on us, spending hours 
poring through our files, and seeing the ways we were doing things 
(NM3). 
A more general point concerning the difficulty in justifying the split within the 
authority in this way was made: 
It was always going to be difficult to explain to clients why a group 
of people, the client team, which didn't actually see the public was 
the area of growth, and the area of diminution was the contractor 
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team, which was given the service. It was never possible to explain 
that properly, so we didn't bother to try (NMI). 
The monitoring arrangement was clearly an area of friction for these Newham 
managers. 
Two of the Newham front line staff felt that Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
brought added bureaucracy with significantly more checks (NWI) and 
paperwork (NW8). Residents, councillors and Newham front line staff offered no 
comments on service organisation. The issue of competition, rather than the way 
in which the competitive environment was organised, evoked a range of 
responses detailed in the following section. 
Westminster 
The Westminster managers also recalled aspects of service organisation. Prior to 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering the City had undertaken decentralisation of 
housing management: "We invested a lot more in decentralisation than other 
authorities, and actually operated at seventeen estate based offices in the mid- 
eighties. I think we were ahead of our time" (WM2). On the negative side one 
manager felt constrained by its strictures of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
- "I flound CCT to be far too prescriptive". Most of the negative comments 
recalled managers' concern with the bureaucracy that arose with the Authority's 
approach to Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Considerable diversity existed 
within the fifteen housing contracts, with over 300 sub-contracts for different 
aspects of estate services, a situation described as "Problematic. Everyone was 
blaming everyone else, and a failing contract became very difficult to manage, 
and it was easy for the provider to say it was not our fault" (WM 1). 
Further, monitoring these contracts presented difficulties which prompted a 
simplified measurement system: 
The first couple of years there was incredible scrutiny and 
monitoring, and I think that was very much a Westminster approach, 
and once we got away from that degree of monitoring, we rested on 
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the eight key, down from 32, performance indicators, things started 
to flow a lot better (WM3). 
On positive recollections of Compulsory Competitive Tendering in Westminster, 
two comments were made. Firstly, "One of the real benefits we had with CCT 
was that it was a wonderful opportunity to internally benchmark" (WMI). This 
was a reference to the possibility to compare performance with other providers in 
terms of cost and quality, across and within the authority. Secondly, the split 
enforced by Compulsory Competitive Tendering between client and contractor 
was considered to be a bonus: 
The client contractor split has actually moved Westminster along. It's 
because the contractors can focus on the service exclusively. They 
are free to deliver the service, and the client can sort out the 
democratic and bureaucratic processes, so I don't see it as an 
obstacle, I see it as a must (WM2). 
As a final point related to the organisation of services, two respondents 
commented on the impact of service changes on employees. One Westminster 
councillor was "concerned about people's rights at work. They were swept 
away" (WC2). This was a general comment about all workers in Westminster's 
housing management service: the staff 'contracted' from the local authority and 
new employees. A Westminster manager also recalled the effect that process of 
tendering had on staff- 
Inevitably there was a painful process that was gone through in the 
first-round of CCT from the staff's perspective. I don't think there 
was a very clear understanding about what the potential service 
improvements were going to be under CCT, but once we had gone 
through that pain we became very focused, output focused, and we 
had learnt to let go. (WM3) 
The manager did not elaborate on the nature of difficulties faced by staff at this 
time. It is interesting to note that none of the Westminster staff respondents 
recalled 'pain', leaving the possibility that any staff affected had left the 
authority, or the sample did not include those that may have endured that 
situation for example. 
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12.4 Alternative Providers 
Newham 
The Newham cohort had no direct experience of external service provision: "the 
private sector that people thought was out there was never out there" (NM3). 
There was no other commentary relating to non-local authority providers during 
this section of the interviews from the Newham respondents. 
Westminster 
Two of the Westminster councillors with experience of contractors and contracts 
provided opinions on the City's contracted services. WCI identified auditing 
anomalies that accompanied the Compulsory Competitive Tendering process 
where certain costs were concealed: 
When things went wrong, and they have to send a team in at a cost of 
one million pounds to put things right, that never got mentioned. So 
it's [the published savings] a completely fictitious figure in lots of 
ways when you look at it over a period of time, it reflects the set of 
rules that applied on that particular day. 
This was important to WC I because of the "obsessive and constant" updating of 
the apparent cost advantage Compulsory Competitive Tendering brought. The 
publicising of possibly misleading financial advantage was one aspect of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Another related to contractors and 
contracts: 
We go time after time, I've sat on the contracts committee for a few 
years, and we go through this process and the initial people just peel 
away in quite rapid progression, and there's an awful lot Westminster 
is involved in (WC I). 
WCI felt that the 'peeling away' was due to "immature markets and overly 
complex contracts". An additional aspect of the tendering process was provision 
for contingencies, whereby the council could withdraw a contract with relative 
ease in, for example, cases of non-compliance: "I know you have to pay for get- 
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out clauses, and I think on balance that's not something that Westminster are 
willing to do, they'd rather have it cheaper and take the risk". 
The suggestion here is that 'Westminster', and it is not clear who specifically 
within the City WC I is referring to, was prepared to adopt contracts with faith in 
the implementation clauses negotiated at the outset, and forgo the insurance 
offered by 'get-out' clauses. This strategy was of particular significance with the 
"high impac t" housing benefits service which, "instead of costing ten thousand 
pounds, cost ten million pounds". Overall WC I concluded: "It was just done on a 
quick and cruel basis, if the bidders came up with decent solutions, some sort of 
vision, and the lowest price, then they were taken". WC2 was critical of the 
calibre of staff contracting brought: "Contractors weren't necessarily contractors, 
they could have been bus drivers taking a couple of months off work". 
These comments from two Westminster councillors suggest that the authority's 
approach to using alternative providers was compromised by the availability and 
quality of contractors and by inadequate contract specifications. The managers' 
comments were confined to administration of contracts. 
The remaining Westminster respondents, the staff and residents, did not 
comment on contracted services before Best Value except in the context of 
service standards, discussed below. 
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12.5 Service Standards 
Newham 
In Newharn NR1 reflected that before Best Value services were "fairly poor - 
cleansing, street cleaning, hardly ever see a sweeper on the estates. Repairs - it 
was such a long drawn out process". NR2, before becoming involved as a 
representative and before Best Value, was ambivalent about council services: "I 
just paid my rent and didn't bother with anything else". However, there was 
clearly a reason for NR2 to stand as a representative, and this was expressed in 
two ways. Firstly, the opportunity to become involved arose because of 
unemployment, and secondly "half of us was getting, and half of us wasn't. 
That's when we got together and decided to get something going". The 'getting' 
was a reference to general estate improvements and day-to-day management, and 
is recalled in further detail below within the Best Value section, where the 
respondent attributes change to the Best Value period. At this point, the issue 
appears to have been that some residents did receive what NR2 considered to be 
satisfactory levels of service, and other residents were excluded. 
The only manager to comment in this context felt that Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering involved a financial focus on particular services, which led to some 
poor service delivery and led to aspects of housing management becoming 
overlooked: 
The tenants did not get a good service under CCT, they got the 
residue, after the rate of return was organised. The first thing was not 
to fail on a job, so we got maximum bonuses. The second thing was 
to deal with aborted calls, you know, where they knock on the door 
with a feather. I think the tenant suffered under CCT (NM4). 
Despite recollections of 'crap' services by the Leader within the published 
accounts (above, chapter nine), no councillor reflected on poor services during 
this period. 
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Westminster 
The Westminster councillors were not impressed with the quality of housing 
services prior to Best Value. WC1 added to the comments above concerning 
service providers: "What surprises me is that they're expected to deliver while 
there's been little competition". There was an inference in WC I's account above 
relating to 'get out' clauses that services were not to the standard expected. WC2 
noted that once contracting started: 
We began to see a decline both on operations and maintenance 
levels, because what it meant in practice was the cheapest alternative. 
Repairs, generally, done less effectively. 
These comments were broadly mirrored by the residents' representatives. WRI 
described Compulsory Competitive Tendering as "meaningless as a policy" that 
"didn't mean anything to tenants". Savings that arose through the 
implementation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering were "of no benefit to 
tenants at all, rents didn't go down, and lessee charges remained the same, so 
they were still just as inefficient"MR2 reflected that housing services during 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering were "poor". 
Service standards prior to Best Value were not cited as 'good' by any respondent. 
Residents expressed most dissatisfaction although their comments could not be 
described as emphatic. The final element covered in the following section as 
singled out by the respondents, and one which might be expected to receive 
commentary from residents in particular, is consultation. 
12.6 Consultation 
Newham 
Newharn resident representative NR3 commented on frustration related to 
participation. While "the one thing they've always encouraged in Newham is 
tenant associations", NR3 described the relationship as a series of "puppet 
meetings" at which information would pass to the residents, with no opportunity 
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for feedback: "Consulting the tenants is not giving them a report, not giving them 
a glossy paper on how wonderful tenants are, not giving them a written vision on 
'this is how Newham's going to go"'. 
Similarly one Newham. manager felt that Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
"broke the link between housing management and tenants" (NM3). There was a 
sense that tenant consultation and accountability was neglected with the drive to 
adopt the Compulsory Competitive Tendering agenda: "Some of the basic things 
in the balance of a comprehensive service did get a priority under CCT but 
certain things like tenant liaison, tenant consultation, I think a lot of that got lost" 
(NM3). 
The remaining Newharn respondents did not comment on consultation at this 
stage in the interviews. 
Westminster 
Each of the Westminster resident representatives voiced ardent opinions about 
the state of resident involvement before 1997. WRI ascribed the departure of 
Lady Porter with a revival in participation, when: 
Participation became more meaningful after 1993 or 1994 when she 
left. We established the panel as the body for statutory consultation. 
Bayl iSS12 arrived with a different outlook. 
However, WRI described the subsequent routes for expression, despite the new 
forum for representation, as "Superficial. Changes happened which didn't work", 
and "The tenants never felt they were getting anywhere, a talking shop, we were 
told what they were going to do, and they did it". WR2 recalled: 
Yes, they consulted, but at the end of the day a lot of the things we 
told them about and things we weren't happy about were just glossed 
over. When you look back you could say 'Yes they did consult us but 
they didn't take our ideas on board'. 
12 Vic Bayliss, the Housing Director appointed at that time. Mr. Bayliss was still in post at the 
time of the research. 
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Around the beginning of 1998 the entire c, onsultation framework "broke down" 
(WRI), and the lack of organised representation remained until 2000, at which 
time "It was a traditional interface between tenants and the organisation. A 
complete distrust between the tenants and the City Council" (WR3). 
In Westminster in 1998, five years into Competitive Tendering, the relationship 
between Westminster's resident groups and the authority "was in a very sad 
place" (WM3). WMI attributed the situation to "a personality thing". 
A significant aspect of resident involvement for one Westminster manager 
involved the consideration of the leaseholders who bought their homes under the 
relatively advantageous discounts available prior to 1999. Over one third of 
residents to be consulted were leaseholders. The manager held this characteristic 
to be of significance in the way services were delivered, and: 
It had far more impact than CCT in the way that we responded to 
residents' requirements, because then we had an influx of incredibly 
articulate and demanding residents, and as a result we had to shape 
up significantly, and as a result our service improved right across the 
board, the speed and manner we respond to inquiries" (WM3). 
This could be considered as being advantageous to leaseholders, for whom the 
service 'shaped up'. Prompt responses to enquiries would implicitly be 
advantageous to all, although two elements should be highlighted. Firstly 
services significant to tenants may not hold the same significance as services for 
lessees. Examples here could include transfers, internal repairs, mutual exchange 
and rent collection methods, which are of no direct importance to leaseholders. 
Secondly, management services such as nuisance control, estate cleaning and 
major repairs are of interest to lessees, and there is a suggestion that services 
could have been skewed towards these activities before Best Value. One manager 
commented that "Leaseholders tend to be far more vocal about issues such as 
nuisance" (WM2), although there is no evidence here to suggest that 'tenant- 
centred' or more general services suffered as a result of this growing and 
'incredibly articulate and demanding' group of residents. 
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Neither 'shaping up' nor leaseholder-tenant distinctions were identif led by WM 1, 
who commented simply in this context: "It was evident that residents didn't feel 
able to influence the service". 
None of the Westminster councillors or front line staff associated issues of 
consultation with the pre-Best Value era. 
Resident involvement in decision making does not appear to have been a strong 
characteristic of either Council before 1997. The situation in Westminster was 
especially ominous, settled in the 'very sad place' of mistrust and dissolution of 
formal structures of liaison. The suggestion of lessee favouritism is a notable 
aside. 
The following section contains a summary of the pre-Best Value interview 
findings and the link with the next chapter. 
12.7 Summary 
The aim of this section is to set out a summary of the research findings in this 
chapter in two ways: firstly, by theme according to respondent; and secondly an 
analysis correlating respondent's data. 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering: Actors' Views 
Managers' Experiences 
Overall, it can be summarised that managers in Westminster and Newham had 
considerable reservations about Compulsory Competitive Tendering although it 
should be stressed that criticism was centred on the way in which it was enacted, 
the method, rather than the principle of tendering services. 
The most obvious area of departure between the Newham and Westminster 
accounts concemed the client-contractor split, with Westminster managers in 
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favour, and Newharn managers against. This difference in opinion draws 
attention to two highly significant local circumstances. Firstly, Westminster's 
$contract team' did not include managers at director or assistant director level. 
The Westminster managers interviewed here were client managers under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and as such were not in the position of 
having to directly make their services perform to Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering standards: they had to instruct others what to do. The Newham 
managers were operations or contracts managers under Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. NM3 remarked that the client unit were 'on their backs' throughout 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering because the pressure was on managers to 
perform in an operational, rather than a strategic, sense. The second local 
circumstance that gave rise to this difference in managerial remit was that 
Westminster had been successful in tendering a large proportion of its service to 
non-council providers. Managers in Westminster were charged with the role of 
enabling this transition, whereas the Newharn managers created an artificial 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering environment simply because, it was argued, 
no tenderers could be found. 
The Compulsory Competitive Tendering experience had resulted in the creation 
(or consolidation) of 'strategic' Westminster managers and 'operational' 
Newharn managers. This situation favoured the Westminster group, particularly 
following the simplification of the contract system they managed. 
Managers also expressed concern about the low levels of and commitment to 
resident involvement. 
Residents' Experiences 
As an overall point from the responses recorded for this research, it would be fair 
to conclude that none of the interviewees reflected favourably on housing 
management under Compulsory Competitive Tendering. It would therefore be 
expected that a change in approach would be welcomed if that change recognised 
I 
past failings and put in place constructive structures for remedy. Despite the 
disparate nature of the views recorded, two common themes can be identified. 
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Firstly service standards, and the terms 'poor' and 'fairly poor' were used by 
representatives in both authorities. However, as this indication was not 
unanimous, it is difficult to conclude that this was a matter of 'urgent' 
importance for the residents. Further, it is unclear where the problems lay, 
whether with management, systems of work, front line staff or reporting access 
for example. Because the representatives replied in general terrns, without 
specifically identifying an aspect of housing management, it is suggested that the 
overall expectation for both authorities was for a general improvement in 
services. 
Secondly, the issue of resident participation evoked a similar response with 
different emphases. The ardent statement from Westminster respondents revealed 
a deep dissatisfaction with the participation structures during the short time of 
their existence. The situation in Newham, however, was not so clear. Only one 
representative recalled a pattern similar to that of Westminster, and expressed 
dissatisfaction with broad policy decisions - in the extract cited centralisation. 
The distinction between consultation on broadly strategic decisions and local 
matters of policy implementation is illustrated greater with clarity in the chapters 
on Best Value interpretation and influence. At this point in the analysis, however, 
it can only be concluded that some dissatisfaction with participation 
arrangements in Newham were voiced. In terms of expectations from Best Value, 
it could be deduced that most of the residents would welcome some means of 
assurance that their opinions counted towards shaping services. 
Appropriately, perhaps, these criticisms of housing management under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering are precisely those identified by the 
Government and leading to the introduction of Best Value. Improvements in 
quality of services and engaging residents through the Tenant Participation 
Compact are central features within the Government's guidelines to authorities. 
Also, in the same sense that Best Value guidance contained little except negative 
reference to Compulsory Competitive Tendering, the resident representatives had 
no positive recollections of the period. 
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Councillors' Experiences 
The Newham councillors summed up the time before Best Value as a period of 
difficulty, conflict and poor service delivery. The overriding sense was one of 
intense frustration at the entire organisation. They wanted quality of life for the 
people of Newham, a modem mechanism to achieve this, and to be seen as 
$vibrant and forward looking'. It was also presented as a time of optimism as 
changes appeared to be happening centred on the drive from local politicians in 
general and the Council leader in particular. 
It is difficult to generalise from the Westminster councillors' responses because 
the opinions were quite diverse and only two of the councillors could offer direct 
experience of the period before Best Value. However, it would be reasonable to 
deduce that Westminster councillors would want to be removed from -any 
controversy that might have existed in the recent past. Minority views on poor 
services, hidden costs, incompetent contractors and poorly specified contracts 
would suggest remedy in some or all of these areas are important. The main 
consensual themes appear to be that none expressed principled rejection of 
contracting housing services, and a liberal non-controversial image in method 
and practice. 
Two quite different sets of issues existed for the Westminster and Newharn 
politicians prior to Best Value. In Westminster the emphasis was on image 
building allied to a cautious conservatism in their approach to service delivery. In 
Newharn the clear and emphatic message was one of image change. Councillors 
wanted a modem, efficient, investment rich environment for their housing 
service users. 
Front Line Workers' Experiences 
This chapter contains very few references to front line workers9 contributions. 
Most of this group did not readily ascribe any difference to what was happening 
before the arrival of Best Value. For example, the interview would start with the 
question "What was your experience of the pre-Best Value era? " and the 
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respondent would ask for clarification. The question was rephrased: "Can you 
recall anything good or bad relating to your job or the services you delivered 
before Best Value? ". This did, in general, elicit a 'not really' response from most 
of the respondents. 
For Westminster this result does tend to confirm the notion that Best Value in 
practice coincides closely with previous methods of service delivery. For 
Newham summarising is rather more difficult. Two of the respondents did offer 
highly expressive accounts of a 'fascist doctrine' and councillor-placed 'New 
Labour-type managers'. While these respondents were patently not happy about 
the pre-Best Value situation their contributions offer more to 'how' and 'why' 
events unfolded, rather than 'what' happened in terms of services prior to Best 
Value. 
Collcctive Expcricnccs 
Respondents emphasised particular topics that could be seen as matters of 
importance; the 'problems to be solved' or 'practice to be continued' by 
respondent group. In many ways the results were predictable: councillors, 
comments on political matters; managers on service organisation; residents on 
consultation and service standards. In other words these were matters of 
importance to the respondents, and it may be thought likely that they would 
continue to be important under Best Value. 
In terms of shared experience and expectation the broad finding was that 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering was not a popular policy. However, this 
view was formed from different perspectives. 
Both sets of managers commented on the restrictions imposed by Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, centred mainly on the work generated through contract 
tendering. Newham managers were also frustrated by monitoring within the 
organisation. Residents and managers were generally unimpressed with levels of 
consultation, with the overall sense that engaging service users had become 
relegated beneath the drive to comply with tendering requirements. 
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Councillors of both authorities were concerned with image, although again this 
arose from different standpoints. Compulsory Competitive Tendering had 
generated friction between Newham's workers, managers and residents, 
culminating in poor services. Newharn councillors' borough had become 
synonymous with malaise and pessimism. For Westminster councillors the 
problems arose from controversial decisions, and a possibly inattentive approach 
to contracting. 
Having established that Compulsory Competitive Tendering, or at least the time 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering, was marked with difficulties it should be 
highlighted that very little dissent was directed at the principle of contracted 
services. The main criticisms were centred on the coercive method and 
compromised implementation. 
In considering these perspectives it is significant to note where the apparent 
cause of these difficulties lay, and in this respect two factors can be identified. 
Firstly, Compulsory Competitive Tendering was singled out as problematic, in 
that compliance generated administrative burdens of little beriefit to service 
provision. This view was propounded by, in the main, managers. Secondly, poor 
communications and rapport within the organisation. This was most explicitly 
illustrated in the relationship between residents and the local authority, although 
strong indications of antagonistic relationships between the Newham's 
politicians and senior management and front line staff were also apparent. The 
sole example of a productive relationship arose between Westminster's 
management and councillors. 
This issue of collective experience is considered again in more depth in the 
summary of the following chapter where interpretations of Best Value are 
considered. 
The findings presented in this chapter have been useful to set the context and 
understand the interface, and the characteristics, of the pre-Best Value 
environment. It might be expected that for those who identified deficiencies 
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under Compulsory Competitive Tendering, such as the lack of resident 
involvement, internal conflict and poor image might 'push' to achieve change. 
A task for the next chapter is in part to establish whether Best Value is, or indeed 
can be, interpreted in such a way that the limitations of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering can be addressed. Newharn was clearly not successful in the 
implementation of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Would they continue to 
face difficulties under Best Value? Would the 'spirit' of Best Value be adopted? 
Westminster clearly was aligned to Compulsory Competitive Tendering and 
therefore, by the reasoning suggested in chapter eight, ready to adopt Best Value. 
The next chapter evaluates the importance of this matter of expectation together 
with actors' interpretations of Best Value. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Interpretation of Best Value 
13.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to set out how the individuals and groups interpreted 
Best Value. The objective is to summarise and correlate the views expressed in 
terms of construal between and within the groups in two ways: the way in which 
Best Value addresses the issues that arose during Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, and the implications for actors. 
The interview findings are presented by respondent group, rather than 
identifiable issues as in the previous chapter. Two reasons for this choice are 
given: 
Certain groups provided far more material than others, and listing issues 
arising would tend to 'swamp' some of the respondents. This comment 
applies particularly to senior management who provided lengthy answers to 
questions and complex opinions on Best Value. This does lead to an 
imbalance in the length of sections in this chapter. The reason for this is the 
length of contributions combined with required explanatory notes, rather than 
any implied correlation between length of contribution and the significance 
attached to it. 
2. From chapter nine certain matters of importance were identified with 
particular groups. By setting out group opinions that relationship can be 
reconsidered. 
The chapter is organised by respondent group alphabetically, and concludes with 
a summary of their interpretations and expectations of Best Value. 
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13.2 Councillors and Best Value 
Ncwham 
The opening response to the question of interpretation and expectation evoked a 
series of replies notable for the emphasis on what Best Value was 'about': 
It's not just about housing, it's our corporate philosophy (NC3) 
It's easier to say what it's not. You can look at the legislation, but the 
way it impacts on us, in order to create a culture, you see it's more 
about culture, to keep services in-house, moving away from 
competitive tendering, which has a lot of rigidities, to one of multi- 
variate analysis, best value is far more vigorous and rigorous. And 
it's impacted on us; we're more interested in quality issues. (NC2) 
NC2 and NO related the significance of Best Value as the cultural and 
philosophical basis of the Council's activity. In terms of operational change NC2 
noted a new flexibility within Best Value accompanied by 'vigour and rigourl, 
quality and maintenance of in-house services. NCI gave a similar reply stating 
that Best Value "is the best possible service at a sensible price, not the lowest, 
but the best balance of delivery and expense". Departing from NC2's remark that 
Best Value is synonymous with in-house services NCI added "It's without 
looking at whether the provider is public or private". 
With some initial differences of interpretation about how Best Value would 
shape services, the councillors did mark the policy as highly significant in terms 
of its effect on the organisation. 
When asked to elaborate on their initial views certain points of focus arose: 
costs; certain practical difficulties that had arisen; inspections; performance; and 
consultation. 
Having mentioned cost in the initial response NCI provided an example later in 
the interview: 
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We have made savings, in terms of the service centres, considerable 
managerial input, structured way, we've learned the lessons of 
housing benefit, more structure, more considered. We did have 72 
housing officers, now we have 28 community officers, they've got 
bigger patches, the financial benefits are in, but we need to keep up 
the pressure. 
Savings, such as those envisaged with the new management of the housing 
benefit service, would be achieved in a different 'more structured' way. Part of 
that structure is mentioned in the extract above, with the reduction, reoriented 
workload and renaming of the housing officers charged with managing the 
Borough's 27,000 council properties. While responsibilities had changed for 
front line staff, concern was expressed by NCI conceming the support they 
would receive from the 'back office' support staff. 
I think I would like to see more focus on the back off ice, such as 
ASB [anti-social behaviour], we have a new Director of Housing and 
Community Services, we do need good performance management, 
keep up the pressure, all voluntary redundancies though, keep up the 
performance gains, save the money, push up the performance. I think 
we do OK, we need to focus on getting the performance gains. 
NCI was optimistic about the dual-track Best Value requirements of reduced 
cost and increased quality with a tacit acknowledgement that improvements 
could and should be achieved. In suggesting Newham had "become more 
interested in quality issues" with the arrival of Best Value. NC2 felt that the 
Council "may on retrospect have taken on too much when we should have been 
doing things". This was a reference to the monitoring and inspection 
preparations, important because "Newham has a reputation to uphold. I think we 
have to prove that we're open and transparent and all the rest of if'. While 
recognising their importance NC2 did express some irritation with the 
inspections and monitoring: 
You're not always driven by the outside world telling you you have 
to be inspected. We can say we need to be inspected, and have other 
people say what's going well. It would be nice not to have to wait for 
the consensus. We can do grids and mapping, and we can all ask 
awkward questions. 
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NC3 praised the introduction of the Best Value performance indicators which 
had "focused on absenteeism and made it easy for us to target poorly performing 
parts of the service". The councillor continued: "The new culture means we do 
whatever's necessary. I'd rather people live in places with gardens. I wouldn't 
want to live in Canning Town. It's not social engineering. It's Best Value". 
Westminster 
The Westminster councillors described Best Value with ambivalence. In general 
there was concern that the required processes may 'weigh down' service 
delivery. There was also a sense of qualified optimism. WC4, for example, 
"groaned a bit when it came in", and although the councillor had reservations 
about the application of Best Value to council activities other than housing it was 
not "a particular burden". The point for WC4 was that Best Value "is useful and 
it need not deflect you". The usefulness was a reference to the inspections which 
could "build trust in a way of doing things" and the 'Compacts where "relations 
[with residents] are very good and people feel involved. They think their input is 
being taken on board". There was however a strong sense that Westminster 
would have taken these issues on board in any event and will pursue their course 
regardless of Best Value provisions: 
We have a political agenda in housing which is politically 
uncontroversial ... we've stopped doing things which are more 
controversial. I don't think it has made the change, but it has helped 
the change become recognised. (WC4) 
This extract reveals an additional point: the 'politically uncontroversial agenda'. 
This was not "ideologically driven" or: 
... using Westminster's housing stock as a tool of social engineering, in reality it has become a fairly unideological council, and I think 
that's a good thing. I don't think Best Value made that happen. It 
came too late for that, but it helped people recognise that it happened, 
and that has been useful. (WC4) 
The usefulness of Best Value is seen in terms of a means to distance the City 
('has become') from any ideology with which it may have been associated. This 
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point, in addition to improved communications with residents, summarises 
WC4's interpretation of Best Value. 
WO described Best Value as "another word for management by objectives, but 
it doesn't do any harm to manage by other people's objectives". 'Other people' 
was a reference to residents. While the councillor felt that "so far I think it's very 
good" a concern related to the amount of time spent aligning with the 
requirements of Best Value when: 
Our officers are ahead of the game. Let's start and not wait, a lot of 
officer time is spent producing the paper to fit in with the new 
system. There's a career, an industry, there in just writing the stuff 
(WC3). 
This echoes WC4's reference to 'doing it anyway' with the added burden of 
increased administration. Related to this point of aligning to the requirements of 
Best Value WO added that "when we get it working this Government or the 
next will say 'Do it differently"'. 
WCI explained Best Value in terms of a recent event where "the new regime 
makes complete and utter sense". This was a reference to the form of contract 
administration where the council would oversee the work and performance of 
individual contractors: 
it's extraordinary how all these hybrid contracts could have 
manifested themselves, and expected anybody to be able to get the 
best service. It can't be seen as giving the best service ... it's taken a long time for the people in this organisation to realise that people 
don't really care if they have to wait so long as they know it's going 
to be done (WC 1). 
The new system replacing the 'hybrid contracts' involves area contract 
administration undertaken by separate contractors, in turn answerable to the 
council housing department. This change was not however attributable explicitly 
to Best Value by the respondent. Another aspect of the Best Value era, as 
opposed to the actual process, was staff continuity. While "Most staff who were 
unhappy left long before the change" staff turnover remained an issue for WCI: 
"The thing people bitch about incessantly is that they have one housing officer 
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one minute and another the nexf'. The councillor gave a personal example of the 
staffing issue: 
My worry is that some of those who have gone have been slow to be 
replaced. The other week I asked for a key fob, and asked if they 
needed it back, and they said 'No, no one's covering that', so you do 
pick up on that, and I did pick up on it (WC I). 
Again this was not directly attributable to Best Value process, rather the wish of 
certain members of staff "adamant at wanting to stay in the public sector" with 
44no magic solution" to their loss. WC I therefore chose to describe Best Value in 
terms of certain events that happened, or continued, since the introduction of the 
policy. Best Value would not prove to be a 'magic solution' to staffing 
difficulties, although the processes had not deflected the contract organisation 
initiative. 
WC2 felt that while "We haven't seen the results yet I hope it's not a form of 
CCT" adding: "I'm convinced Best Value is about finding the cheapest method". 
On consultation WC2 believed it was "difficult, people become so jaded because 
nothing ever materialised" although the inspections "should be good and 
hopefully iron out problems". WC2's account projected many of the concerns 
expressed in the previous chapter about the change from Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering to Best Value, although a sense of cautious optimism was 
placed in the inspections as a possible check to contractual ambiguities. 
WC2 was the only respondent during this stage of the interview to link Best 
Value with the medium-long term housing service, stating: 
Arms Length Management has been prompted by Best Value and 
coerced by Government. It's a good idea, well, better than anarchy 
and has more accountability than we have at present. 
Having given their initial impression of Best Value the key concerns and 
attributes were expanded upon during this section of the interviews and three 
themes developed: consultation, performance indicators and inspection and 
monitoring. 
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On consultation WC4 felt that since Best Value and the introduction of the 
'Compact the new system was "successful, relations are very good and people 
feel involved". On the other hand WC4 felt "sceptical given the unbelievably low 
levels of participation". WC3 mentioned the inclusion of residents as an initial 
response to what Best Value means and continued: "Residents get the feeling that 
people are listening to what they have to say, but they may come up with some 
strange or unworkable ideas". Despite this comment concerning the usefulness of 
resident input councillors did feet that consultation had at least improved from 
times past. 
Concerning performance indicators, WC1 expressed concern about 
differentiating between areas: 
They give you a broad benchmark to get a quick picture, it's what 
you're not being told which is often the problem ... I'm conscious 
that there's a Rolls Royce service going on in one area and a pretty 
poor service on another. 
While useful as an overview WCFs concern related to identifying the cause of 
poor services where they arose, citing particularly the inconsistency in delivery. 
Similarly WC2 thought the performance indicators served as "good guidance" 
countered by the unreported aspects of the service covered by the statistics: "Just 
look at the estates and the mistakes the contractors make. There's too much 
leeway". Overall the indicators were seen as a useful barometer of service 
standards but equally notable reservations concerning their accuracy and 
coverage were expressed. 
With reference to the inspection, WC4 spoke at some length about the Best 
Value inspectorate, emphasising two points. Firstly, there was considerable faith 
in the internal audit processes that had "built trust in our way of doing things". 
Secondly, while an external audit such as that provided by the inspectorate 
"would perhaps explain things a little more clearly", it would not make any 
difference: 
If we were doing things fundamentally wrong then Best Value 
wouldn't help us in any way. It would perhaps just explain it aI ittle 
more clearly, and create some sort of a fight, you know, the 
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inspectors would say you couldn't do this, couldn't do that, and we'd 
say well, we'll do it anyway (WC4). 
WC I described the inspection as a "mechanism at the end of a paper chain" and 
felt it could "penalise those who have done a good job in the past to present a 
level playing field for those who haven't provided such a good service in the 
past' '. 
These interpretations of Best Value inspections suggest a certain usefulness 
about the inspection and monitoring aspects of Best Value although this was 
tempered by comments related to the bureaucracy and an overall impression that 
inspection is largely superfluous. 
13.3 Front Line Workers and Best Value 
Newham 
Generally, when asked what Best Value meant to them, the respondents gave 
critical views - "worse than CCT, less transparent ... the proposals under Best 
Value aren't challenged" (NW3); "It's a necessary evil ... more onerous than 
CCT, the continuous aspect to it. You can peel away, get lean and mean, but 
eventually people have got nothing left to give" (NW8); and NW5 summed up 
the Best Value experience as follows: 
Any time I've asked managers for a definition of it, they haven't 
really told me anything. All I could really say is what it means to 
staff, or what I perceive it to mean for staff. It means constant, 
constant reorganisation, and being expected to do more for less, I 
think, with a huge emphasis on image. Housing is being completely 
gutted as far as I'm concerned. 
NW2 was the sole exception, reporting that "Best Value means providing a good 
service at Best Value - economically but also providing a quality service". 
When asked to elaborate on their initial response the themes ccntred on 
performance, consultation and services. 
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On performance, the respondents reflected negatively on the indicators. NW3 felt 
that "they've chosen indicators for me but they don't reflect the work I do. 
They're spurious and not a fair indicatoe'. Two respondents felt the indicators 
failed to pick up on the less tangible aspects of the job, and made "what actually 
happens on the ground, day-to-day, with actual people, less important because 
that's unreported" (NW6). NW4 suggested that the performance indicators were 
"not particularly satisfactory, no detail, for example, on estate standards, just 
repairs. It's difficult to tell what people are dissatisfied with". For NW5 the 
performance indicators failed to reflect "the service we are providing", and "You 
know, we are really good at producing figures, and, you know, nobody at the top 
has too much principles, but at the end of the day we will do fine". Finally, NW2 
provided a degree of balance: 
I have my own PIs [perfon-nance indicators], which is performance 
for correspondence, members enquiries, estate cleaning, those are the 
things that are important to me, so no, I don't really think about the 
Best Value PIs. 
The arrangements for resident participation under Best Value attracted a range of 
opinions. NW8 for example felt that "we try to be more innovative, we try to be 
more flexible, we've learnt to work smarter", and NW I recalled that "Five years 
ago tenant involvement was something we were striving for but it wasn't a 
reality, it was something we did after the event", whereas now "we're genuinely 
trying to get tenants and residents involved in the management process". NW3 
on the other hand suggested that "We have to consult on virtually everything. In 
theory it's good, but we get more bogged down in consultation than actually 
doing things". 
Concerning services the front line staff felt that the impact on provision, and 
particularly themselves, had been adverse. The reorganisation and the increased 
use of agency staff had created issues with neighbourhood housing management 
where the Borough had "lost a lot of local knowledge, and you have to argue to 
get a job on. They're new staff, it's not their fault, a lot of local knowledge has 
gone" (NW2). NW3 felt that Best Value in housing had led to a situation where: 
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One office had an average of twenty people, they now have about 
one tenth of the staff, a sledgehammer to crack a nut, and I really 
don't think this will give an improved service for tenants but then 
again I don't think that was ever the idea. 
For the staff "Stress levels are extremely high because people are having to take 
on more and more" (NW8); "at the moment a lot of people are running on 
empty" (NW3); and: 
Lots of members of staff are running around like blue-arsed flies. 
Some people are doing far too much work and some people are 
keeping their heads down are doing very little. Specifically, the sort 
ofjob I do. Should I be saying that? (NW5). 
NW1 was more phlegmatic, suggesting that "we're trying to improve things and 
recognise that it hasn't been ideal in the past, we want to give a proper service". 
Westminster 
The initial responses to interpretations of Best Value revealed a variety of 
impressions. WW7 felt it meant "taking care of residents" and "turning around 
voids in a short time". Others voiced some criticism. WW6 felt that "the contract 
process is far too complicated, the wastage is a lot of time dealing with 
relationships that are contract based rather than work based"; and WW4: "It's a 
structure that has been prepared, and senior managers will see it as things we 
measure our performance by, but that's not the same as what the residents want". 
Finally, for half of the respondents, a relatively neutral opinion: "I've heard of 
Best Value, but I'll be honest with you I don't really know" (WW2), and "It 
means nothing to me but at the moment, having worked for Westminster for so 
long, it's just another phrase that has come along to describe the best way of 
doing things". (WW8). WW3 suggested that "We're all plodding along and I 
don't think anyone's thinking about if'. 
These initial feelings about Best Value, with the exception of the single 
respondent's comments on void times and resident care, are difficult to construe 
as changes arising because of Best Value. Later, when asked to expand on their 
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interpretations of Best Value, two themes arose: contracting, and notions of 
quality. 
All of the respondents were approaching a change of contract moving from the 
City Council, to a private contractor. The main uncertainty this presented was 
which contractor would be their new employer. Although the process of 
contracting had been set out some time before Best Value, it could be suggested 
that nuances of the contracts - aspects dealing with resident inclusion and quality 
for example - might reflect emphases within Best Value. One respondent 
expressed some uncertainty about the new contracts: 
It can be confusing when looking at Best Value, and I'm not sure 
what the different bits are, we've been told to be nice to the tenants 
because we're not sure who's going to manage them (but) someone's 
going to be making a profit out of it, if the service has already not got 
enough money, how are they going to improve the service? It already 
appears that it's been skinned right down to the bone as it is (WW2). 
Others were more optimistic, feeling "It'll be better when we're a private 
company because we can be a bit more vocal" (WW4) -a reference to the notion 
that housing benefit failures had been obscured ("it's all hush hush because it's 
all really bad politically for Westminster"), and rent arrears ascribed unjustly to 
front line workers. Overall the respondents were uncertain about the nature of the 
impending contracts, and the general sentiment of the remaining front line 
workers was summed up by WW3's comment above - 'plodding along'. The 
enduring facet of these accounts is that the staff simply did not know what the 
future held in store in the detail. All they were aware of was a change in 
employer, and not the specification of the contract. 
As to how Best Value was affecting their current contract, most of the 
respondents highlighted increased or reoriented performance monitoring -I 
notice that there's more emphasis on the time voids are turned round, rent 
arrears" (WW2); and "A clearer set of targets, and the emphasis on what you're 
doing, rather than who does it" (WW6), for example. WW4 suggested that the 
emphasis was adjusted towards aspects of the service that held little interest to 
residents, with a focus on rent arrears rather than "crime and the effects of crime, 
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which they [the residents] see as a housing management task". WW2 continued 
on this theme, suggesting that aspects of the service relating to cleanliness and 
graffiti could be overlooked. The reports of changes to the systems of monitoring 
were confined to these perspectives, and notably none of the respondents 
reported any change to services as a result of this. 
The final point identified by the Westminster front line staff related to staff 
morale, and centred on two elements: pay and workload. WW2 reported that 
there was "a very low morale about pay. A couple of my colleagues are looking 
to leave, most of their grumbles are about pay". WW4 noted that "It's not well 
paid compared to our competitors, and with all the hassle and abuse you get it 
can be hard sometimes". In addition to 'being hard', three of the respondents felt 
there was too much work: "I think we're quite understaffed" (WW7); "Less work 
would help in my job" (WW2); and "I need more time, you've got people with 
quite a lot of problems but you're always aware of the next appointment" 
(WW3). None of the staff relayed any uncertainty related to job security - indeed 
WW2 added "It's very unlikely I'll lose my job, so I'm told, there's few enough 
of us as it is". 
13.4 Residents and Best Value 
Newham 
The Newharn resident representatives offered a number of initial interpretations 
of Best Value. NR4 felt that Best Value was being used as a "public relations 
exercise", and while "There are lots of good officers who work very hard, and 
it's trying to improve" the local authority "concentrates too much on the PR 
[public relations]. If Newham did what it said I'd be happy. You just end up 
disillusioned". NR2 noted that the arrival of Best Value brought a more 
communicative council - "The Best Value they give is that they are willing to 
listen, they do come along to our TA. Chris Wood [Director of Housing], I have 
no problem getting him to come along". NR3 suggested that Best Value was: 
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CCT under a different guise. The difference - under Best Value a lot 
more will be kept in-house. I haven't noticed much change in 
services. It's given TP [tenant participation] a boost - there's a lot of 
active TAs [tenants associations), and other action groups and what 
goes with it. Best Value ... it's just a name tag, it doesn't seem to have anything you can relate to. 
Overall, therefore, there were suggestions of an increase in resident involvement, 
from a receptive and image-conscious council, and one voice of disapproval. The 
Newharn cohort expanded upon their initial opinions, and these are presented 
below. The bulk of the interview material was set within their context of 
participation, which in turn focused on involvement in day-to-day and strategic 
decisions. 
For local estate matters, such as repairs and tenancy management, tenant 
organisation has yielded benefits: "Since we've become a TA, we've had a new 
car park, new doors, new windows, fences" (NR2); and "For example, if 
someone comes up to me and says the door entry system doesn't work, I can get 
on to people, and within a couple of days it's fixed" (NR3). NRI suggested that a 
'minimalist' approach to repairs was in evidence: "The tenant, when they ring up 
and want a repair done, they don't want a little bit of wood put in the door, they 
want a new door post". Overall, however, the level of service was generally well 
regarded, and part of the reason for this was relayed by NR3, and an explanation 
of the 'nuts and bolts' system of management control. 'Nuts and bolts, or 
routine, local matters of estate management feed up a decision making chain. 
Effectively, NR3 reported, if a complaint is received three times at Area Tenants' 
Liaison Committee it ascends to Borough-Wide Tenants' Liaison Committee, 
whereupon a favourable outcome is likely: "Our nuts and bolts are pretty good - 
we do tend to get quite a lot done on an estate issue". 
Turning to strategic issues four areas were identified: rents, housing benefit, PFI, 
the Tenant Participation Compact, and the housing office reorganisation. 
NR4 recalled the decision to raise rents as an example of infort-ning under the 
guise of democratic involvement: "There was no vote, but the council say that it 
was done with tenants' agreement". NR2 recalled the decision in more detail: 
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A lot of jargon was involved, the Federation called a meeting which 
was not well attended by residents, and not at all by councillors ... if 
the Council says it's going up by five pounds then it's going up by 
five pounds, it's no good sitting there, and they start mind boggling 
you with things, it's just a fact of life, just a way of life. I think that's 
what the problem is. When something comes up they bring out all of 
these terms and people go 'What? I've got a life'. 
Two different perspectives on the same issue - non-inclusion on decision making 
- are given here. One perspective suggests a need to involve residents to a greater 
extent, with the implication that they would be willing to engage in dialogue, and 
vote on the best way forward. The other, given by NR2, is that certain issues of 
an especially (or apparently) technical nature are simply beyond the capacity of 
residents ('mind boggling') given the time required to fully comprehend them 
('I've got a life'), at least in the way they are presented. 
Concerning the involvement of tenants and the piloting exercise, there is 
certainly evidence that they were consulted about Newham's original application 
to be a Best Value pilot, although it is not clear how effective this was: 
The complicated thing was, during the Best Value stuff that was 
going on, we also had this cabinet structure where housing 
committees went out the window, where local councillors weren't 
sure what their profile was. In a sense we're lucky and in a sense 
we're not lucky because sometimes things don't get debated. We 
know that Newharn goes to pilots because one way or another they 
get more money out of it. And they like to, I've realised over the 
years, that Newharn liked to be a pilot because they like writing 
rules, ten to the dozen (NRI). 
The cabinet structure is described within Newham's performance plan as "a 
system rather like the national government's cabinet, with a leader and group of 
senior councillors making strategic decisions" (LBN 2000, Ch. 1). This on the 
surface appears no different to the 'old' service committees, except that there is 
only one 'supreme' cabinet, and there does appear to have been some confusion 
reported by NRI about how decisions would be taken within this centralised 
decision making forum, and who would be involved. The outcome would appear 
to be that the new structure served to give information after the event, rather than 
172 
allow discussion before it: "Where it used to go from the bottom to the top, it's 
going from the top down" (NRI). The additional point, concerning Newham's 
prolific written output, is certainly accurate and this is probably true of most 
local authorities in the build-up to Best Value. The enduring message from the 
tenant representative is that Newham 'writes rules', rather than reflecting 
opinion. This leaves residents 'lucky' in the sense that they are told about rules, 
but less fortunate in that they have little input into their formulation. 
The housing benefits administration was externalised in July 1999 to CSL, a 
company familiar with housing benefits administration. NRI was clear - "We 
was never consulted on that issue". This is not to say that the tenants' groups did 
not know about the imminent change: 
Now, the unions tried to come to the tenants and say 'This is 
happening, get your act together', and we said we would join with 
you, and we had one meeting. At that meeting, it was the actual then 
Chair of Housing, and the then Director of Housing, said 'I don't 
know why the tenants are sitting here, this is not a HRA issue'. So 
what they did is what we've got now (NRI). 
In effect, the tenants were told that this was not within the remit of tenant 
involvement because housing benefits administration did not fall within the 
HRA, and was not therefore a resident-related matter. Other residents did, 
however, associate housing benefits with their experiences of Best Value. NR3 
recalled that "We have a company, CSL, dealing with benefits, and it's been 
abysmal", and NR2 recalled how complaints made through the Borough-Wide 
Tenants' Liaison Committee had not improved matters. In the event, the CSL 
contract was terminated for reasons of poor performance at the close of the 
research period (February 2002). Although this cannot be confirmed as either 
coincidence or consequence, it could be a vivid example of resident lobby 
success. 
Newham propose to use the Private Finance Initiative to provide services in the 
housing areas of Canning Town and Custom House. On this issue NRI 
commented: 
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Newharn has got involved in PFI (the Private Finance Initiative). The 
proposals for PF1 are not going with the Compacts - we raised 
seventeen 13 points at the meeting where the PFI proposals didn't 
match the Compact requirements, so we're stuck at the moment. 
NR4 also recalled the meeting at which the PFI was announced: 
With PFI, we were given notice of it on the night of the meeting. 
With phase one of PFI, we involved DOME, and raised a number of 
questions. The housing officer blew her top. When I asked about PFI, 
I didn't know what it meant, and the council just said 'we signed the 
agreement before the Compact so that doesn't count' (NR4). 
In April 2001 the tenants in the affected Private Finance Initiative area held a 
meeting14, chaired by a representative from a housing consultancy, DOME. The 
purpose of the meeting was to agree the terms of the Private Finance Initiative 
proposals. The council sent a representative of management to the meeting to 
relay answers to questions the meeting had sent in advance. The answers had 
been written by a senior manager. In answer to the question "What will happen if 
residents are not satisfied under the Private Finance Initiative contract? " the 
council representative replied "There are many ways of measuring satisfaction. 
Refer to previous answer", and the question "Who is responsible for what 
services? ", the council replied "Good point badly put. Refer to previous answer". 
The 'previous answer' was a reference to a bundle of documentation, sufficiently 
voluminous that the DOME consultant could not have brought it to the meeting. 
Responses from the meeting included: 
Why can't [the Newharn senior manager] answer the questions! 
We're going round in circles. We're not being involved, we're being 
informed. Our comments are never taken into account, just flung 
back at us. They ask us to take part, then tell us what to do. 
The DOME consultant attempted to elaborate on what intended meanings might 
have been, but this proved impossible due to "continuous cross-referencing to 
13 The points referred to were listed in a report commissioned from DOME Consultants, 
appended to a letter to the Federation dated 13'h September 2000. The report lists twelve 
"important areas of concern", including no power sharing, tenants not "at the heart" of PFI 
decision making, no tenant forums, and no consultation prior to the PFI tenders or knowledge of 
the influence on the final choice of contractor. Six secondary areas of interest included 
community safety, rent setting, repairs budgets and anti-social behaviour strategies. 
"' Attended by invitation as part of this research. 
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updated versions of contracts and question answers, we can never be certain 
which contract is being referred to. There's a lot of jargon and huge volumes of 
paper which I can't carry around with me" (DOME consultant). The council 
officer was a 'carrier' for the responses, and offered to relay the criticisms. There 
is an important point to make when reporting this meeting: the residents were not 
apparently dissatisfied with the idea of the Private Finance Initiative. Over the 
previous months there had been visits from prospective contractors, with 
presentations outlining how services would be delivered, and on the whole the 
tenants seemed enthusiastic about this aspect of the Private Finance Initiative. 
Indeed, trips were planned at the end of the meeting to visit some of the 
prospective candidates' estates. The aspect of dissatisfaction related to the 
unknown details of the contract and the great difficulty in understanding what 
the implications would be in the case of problems. There was no noticeable 
disquiet about the inevitability of the scheme, although this had surfaced in 
previous meetings15, and it had been agreed that meetings should deal with the 
details and contractor selection issues, not the Private Finance Initiative itself. 
NR2 reflected this attitude during the research interview: "There's no point being 
negative, it's PFI come what may". 
NRI was the only respondent to comment specifically on the Compact: "It was 
conveniently forgotten as soon as it was written. No one's reviewing Compacts. 
It's supposed to be a living document reviewed every year. It was signed in 
March 2000 and that's the last we heard of it". 
The reorganisation of service delivery, from fifteen Local Housing Offices to 
seven Local Service Centres, attracted comments from each of the resident 
representatives. The main point at issue concerned the process of decision 
making, rather than the decision. NRI commented: 
What we wanted is for them to come to us and say to us 'how do you 
want your service being runT Not, 'let's change your service and 
then deliver it and then call a puppet meeting and say, 'Oh, as of 
Monday your local office will no longer be in existence, this will 
happen'. 
" The meeting recalled the disruption of anti-privatisation group members. 
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As with the PFI, this is not to say that the representatives were necessarily in 
disagreement with the proposals, and there was a suggestion that this could be a 
route to improved services, or at least "Well, it can't be any worse! " (NR4). A 
similar sentiment was expressed by NR2: 
The local housing offices are not - I'm not saying everyone, because 
we've actually had people sending letters of support to keep their 
offices open - people tend to think 'maybe it's better the devil we 
don't know than the devil we know'. I'm not sure, it might be hard 
for some tenants to get to the new offices, we'll have to wait and see. 
What is of significance is where the decision was made for the office 
reorganisation. According to NR2 the decision did not involve residents, 
although on who actually decided the respondent disclosed that "I haven't got a 
clue where the idea came from. They're not very popular". 
Westminster Residents 
When asked for opinions on Best Value WR2 felt that an emphasis on resident- 
oriented service quality was apparent, and cost was not a primary consideration: 
Best Value? It means, it doesn't necessarily mean money wise, I 
think it's what a provider can bring to us, not the cheapest. 
Sometimes you might take on a more expensive contract but in the 
long run you might get better value out of it. And so I think the 
residents might get something out of it, we're not looking at money, 
we're looking at our needs. 
The other respondents related Best Value to specific issues. WR3 felt that Best 
Value was about "trying to take forward strategic issues" with respect to resident 
involvement, adding "but we'll just have to see where it goes". WRI explained 
that Best Value implementation was failing to take account of private sector 
comparisons: 
The big problem is local authorities comparing themselves with each 
other. What they're not taking on board are the recommendations that 
say they must compare themselves to the private sector, and that's 
not being done, and that's the most important thing to me. 
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While "in theory its one of the best thing's that has happened", WRI expressed 
reservations throughout the remainder of the interview related to what might 
happen in practice. 
The remaining comments set out in this section were to an extent 'enticed' 
through follow up questions ('Any characteristic of Best Value that stands out 
for youT for example) to try and encourage either more detail of the opening 
comments, or other aspects of importance. Two themes were expanded upon 
later in the interviews: participation, and methods of service improvement. 
Firstly, on the issue of resident participation, at the time Best Value practice was 
introduced in Westminster (April 2000) many tenant groups existed, although 
there was little coordination, or opportunities for the residents to lobby and 
express opinion en bloc. The embryonic state was described by WR3: "We didn't 
have a bank account, office, constitution - anything". From WRYs experience, 
the feeling was one of "tensions not with the service, but the interface between 
tenants and the council. The TAs have been going round in circles for a long 
time". 
WR2 expressed considerable optimism about the new structures for resident 
participation. This feeling centred on two components. Firstly, the respondent 
reported a feeling of sincerity and approachability from members and, 
particularly, senior officers. When commenting on the large amount of 
information received ("the postman thinks I work for the council") WR2 praised 
the assistance received from staff: 
It takes time, that's why Loma [Resident Participation Officer] is so 
good, there's only so much you can take in, you can phone her and 
she'll be right back to you, you're not just thrown out there. What I 
have noticed is, if I phone up to talk to Ken Hackney [Contract 
Managing Director] or Nigel [Assistant Director of Housing] you get 
through, and that wouldn't have happened a year ago. I speak to Vic 
Bayliss [Director of Housing], Ken, on a regular basis. 
WR2 spoke at length about "openness"t "listening to people", "chugging along 
together" and sharing meals with senior staff, and remarked how this constituted 
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a definite and recent change: "I couldn't have imagined it eighteen months ago". 
The second component recalled by WR2 concerned the 'Compacts. 
When I signed I didn't have any reservations, but a few people did 
make comments, a couple felt it was just the council getting their 
own way, with their agenda, but I went on board to take them at their 
word, and see what tenants could get out of it and what we can give 
to them. If we are let down - we won't be let down. I am quite sure 
this is the future of the council, or at least I'd like to think it was. 
WR2 is clearly approaching the future of participation with a determined 
sanguinity, although it is possible to detect some doubt ('I'd like to think', 'if we 
are let down'). Significantly, these comments were based on the expectation of 
resident-led changes and the respondent was unable to give any examples of 
successes. 
WR3 and WRI felt that the significant factor in the success of participation lay 
with the housing panel, in effect the central assembly point at which opinions are 
voiced, and comprising members, senior officers and resident representatives. On 
this issue WR3 commented "The acid test will be the housing panel where 
basically they take complaints to councillors". WRI summed up participation as 
the housing panel: "What tenant participation in Westminster means at the 
moment is eighteen members of the housing panel". As to whether the panel 
would prove to be effective for residents, WRI was sceptical: 
It just depends how it's done, the consultation with tenants, and will 
it mean anything? I go back to my point about Westminster being 
able to make a case; they make Mandelson 16 look like an amateur. 
But I suspect it'll be the normal sort of thing that goes on in local 
authorities and will be meaningless. 
Concerning the number of panel meetings WRI recalled the seven meetings in 
the previous six months, when four meetings annually had been originally 
scheduled, and that "The mood gets a bit awkward, and the feeling is that we're 
drifting back to a meaningless body, and the problem is that the chair of the panel 
" Peter Mandelson, a Labour MP and former cabinet minister, attributed by some with clouding 
issues with 'spin'. 
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is in Westminster's pocket". As for the Compact, WRI commented: "Sounds 
awful for me to say, but I think it's a meaningless piece of paper". 
A final point on participation concerns the extent to which the representatives 
reflect the views of residents in general. This was discussed as a general point in 
Part Two, but was mentioned in a different context here. Since 1980 over 40 per 
cent of the original stock has been sold, but this had not always been to owner 
occupiers: 
A lot of people on my estate took up right to buy, but for a lot of 
people banks and building societies wouldn't give mortgages, they 
sold on to estate agents, so we have quite a transient population, so 
there's different types of tenants and leaseholders, that brings along 
problems. We represent those [the tenants of leaseholders] people as 
well, but they're not that interested, they might only be there for six 
months, you can't expect them to take up an involvement in a place 
where they're only going to live for a short time. So really you've got 
a bit of a fragmented community (WR2). 
As for accountability WRI suggested that there were no 'checks': "There's no 
mechanism to report back, I'm just representing my own view. Most tenants 
don't even know the panel existe'. 
in summary the comments on the structures of resident participation under Best 
Value varied between hope and cynicism. It remains the case that it is difficult 
for any firm conclusion to be drawn on the structure now in place due to its 
recent arrival. 
The second specific issue raised related to service standards. WR2 expressed 
concern about the communal cleaning being "not all it could be. We discuss what 
we expect, the services the estate will need. We don't know yet how good this 
will be, how flexible they'll be with the grey areas". WRI relayed some 
experience of dealing with contractor disputes: 
I've had many meetings with the cleaning company, numerous 
managers, I've had the Directors down, and they say 'Look, yes I 
agree with what you're saying but within my contract I don't have 
the money'. Another example, within concierge systems, how can 
they employ people who sit there and can't do the job, and then say 
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within the contract price: 'This is the quality of people I can afford to 
employT It's a nonsense. 
From this interpretation of contractors, it would appear that the specification is 
set to a significant extent by price, with quality arising as a 'bonus'. While it 
would not be strictly accurate to deduce that this is an interpretation of Best 
Value - the contracts predated the implementation - it remains the case that, over 
a year into Best Value, contractual ties appear to be binding the authority. 
13.5 Senior Managers and Best Value 
Newham 
When asked about Best Value, and any expectations they had, the Newharn 
managers gave the following replies: 
It's about a number of things. It's about delivering a service that 
people want, it's about an appropriate level of service, it's about 
making sure that the service provides value for money, and it's about 
ensuring that the resources are placed in the areas where they achieve 
maximum effect (NMI); 
It is about better assessing what the community wants and then 
delivering that in an efficient and effective way ... it isn't just about 
cutting costs it's about being prepared to be radical, to change the 
shape of your organisation, and if some bits of it needed more 
expenditure, then you need to be prepared to put it in (NM2); 
It was left up to us to define ... I think Newham took it on in its own 
way, I mean so many things were wrong that have tried to be 
corrected through Best Value. I don't know if we've got it all right, 
there's lots of issues around joining up what we do, because 
obviously we're dealing through a front house which isn't under our 
managerial control, there are issues like that, I suppose it is a 
fundamental review (NM3); 
To do it properly, you've got to be able to benchmark to show that 
you're giving value for money, a level of service, so you have to look 
for benchmarks that are relevant, so you can look at other authorities 
but the best way is to look at yourselves, outsourced compared to in- 
house. In terms of work load you have quite a lot. From my point of 
view it's very exciting, not at all monotonous, all sorts of things 
going on, intellectual even, but further down the organisation I would 
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imagine it's rather more monotonous. From my point of view it's 
good stuff, but it's a lot of work, you have to look at your services, 
and you have to look at what whether you should be providing them 
and to know that you need to know what it would cost if it was 
outsourced, you have benchmarks, and you have to look at all the 
European stuff, so you've got your benchmark established, and much 
more consultation than you ever had with CCT, asking people what 
sort of services they want, then there's monitoring and all the 
feedback to government and the inspectorate (NM4); 
Finding a consensual theme identified by the Newham managers is difficult. 
Although many went on to elaborate in the remainder of the interview, these 
initial 'reflex' responses indicate four key features. 
Firstly, resident involvement was identified by three of the four respondents, 
with two of these suggesting that this aspect of administration should improve 
from what existed before. 
Secondly, the issue of cost was expressed specifically by three managers, and in 
a number of ways - value for money; effectiveness and efficiency; increasing 
costs if necessary; prioritising costs; and comparing costs through benchmarking. 
Thirdly, the issue of administration was identified by two managers. NN13 
identified 'joining up' as something that needed addressing. This was a reference 
to the separation of management responsibilities between which considerable 
overlap still remained. For example in the case of a transfer: repairs (void times), 
lettings (time waiting for a property to return to use), housing benefit (allocation 
affected by a housing benefit claim) and front line contact (via the Local Service 
Centre for tenants wishing to apply for a transfer) all have different managers. 
NM4 remarked on the positive aspects of change for the management of 
administration, countered by possible 'monotony' for those 'further down the 
line'. NN14 also mentioned outsourcing as a means of measurement, rather than 
an actual Best Value outcome. As a point of inference this is worthy of note, and 
the managers expanded on this issue later in the interviews, and is discussed in 
more detail below. 
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Fourthly, a palpable sense of autonomy, creativity and worthwhile industry 
associated the introduction of Best Value. These characteristics were in part 
reflected in the observations of administration, although the terms such as 
'intellectual', 'left to us', 'exciting not monotonous', 'be radical' and the 
provision of a service 'that people want' imbue an added enthusiasm. 
In summary, Best Value was initially interpreted as focusing on resident 
involvement and costs in a broadly positive light, and administration as a 
possible area of concern. The overriding impression was positive. 
' 
Follow-up questions were asked in reply to the opening answers, and five general 
themes were expanded upon: improvements evident under Best Value (tenant 
involvement, contractor split); performance; inspection; staffing requirements 
and outsourcing. 
NM2 reiterated the positive nature of resident liaison that had arisen since the 
introduction of Best Value, and felt that I think we are closer to residents now 
because of the changes", and gave the example of consultation over the 2001/2 
rent increase as evidence: 
Tenants were very unhappy at the rent increase, but they were very 
pleased that they have been talking to us about it, and had an input, 
before it went to the councillors, and that is a complete change to 
how it used to be in previous years, the residents would get their 
letters, and that was it - if you didn't like it terminate your tenancy. 
NM2 gave two reasons for the success of the actual forum and the contribution 
this made to constructive dialogue. The first was the attitude with which all 
parties "came to the table", which NM2 described as "our philosophy where 
everybody takes their hat off. We respect each other for being people, and we 
just talk through issues and agree ways forward". The second was the mutual 
understanding of the partnership between resident and landlord, where: 
Residents understand the rights and responsibilities argument that we 
bang on about, they think it's right if the council deliver a service 
people should pay their rent, and they should not smash up their 
house or upset the neighbours. They are quite happy to support us on 
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that. It's two-way, that's the thing about partnership isn't it? I think a 
lot of talk these days is 'But of course we're a partnership', but all 
sides have to put something into it, or it isn't a partnership, and I 
think we've done that in the way that we consult with residents, and I 
think we've done that well. 
it is possible to construe this extract in an authoritarian light, as if the respondent 
is saying 'finally, our argument has been won, and tenants will comply with our 
version of what is to be expected of us and them'. This suggestion must be 
balanced with the assertion that this has evolved and is consensual -a real 
partnership. NM4 was more ambivalent about the balance in, and nature of, this 
partnership: 
There's more consultation now than ever there was, it's just d ifflicult 
sometimes getting people to continue the consultation process. The 
process I've been through is that there's a lack of interest from a lot 
of people, and it's not possible to get views except from a narrow 
band of people, whether they're TAs, RAs, or just people who like 
the sound of their own voice. I suppose there's a point here, that the 
better the service the less you're going to hear from people. But it's 
ourjob to try and get people interested. 
Three points are made here: that residents are reluctant partners; that views are 
not necessarily representative; and the inference that levels of involvement could 
be related to the standard of provision. While not contradicting NM2, this does 
suggest that tenants are not 'putting in' with quite the enthusiasm implied. There 
was little doubt however, that tenant involvement in housing management had 
increased under Best Value. 
The other improvement to have arisen under Best Value was the abandonment of 
the client-contractor separation that arose under Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, and attracted significant criticism from managers because of the 
divisive and time-consuming nature of the arrangement. NMs 1,3 and 4 
remarked specifically that this aspect of administration had been removed. For 
example: 
Under Compulsory Competitive Tendering we structured on a hard 
client-contractor split, that was our Director's view at the time, we 
took it more seriously than others, it wasn't the way I would have 
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done it, for what it's worth. What Best Value has done is that it's 
taken that away (NM3). 
Although there is no longer any 'client' and 'contract' unit, in that former client 
functions such as monitoring and tendering are no longer delineated within the 
organisation structure, NM4 reflected that while this was an example of 
"breaking down the CCT walls", the old terminology still remained and the new 
system was "still being developed, you need a control element, we have a client 
officer doing spot checks". None of the respondents reported a return to the 
antagonistic relationship of the past, however. 
The second point raised by managers was the performance measurement aspects 
of Best Value. A problem with analysing the responses given is that none of the 
managers stated, in clear terms, what they thought about performance 
measurement in housing management. Each broadly positive comment was tied 
in with a caveat. For example: 
You say you want to improve things, even though the intent is one 
hundred percent, it doesn't mean you'll necessarily improve things, 
at least in the first place. Think about the massive managerial change 
in terms of trying to take staff through this process which changes 
jobs. What people need to understand, there's a price for all this, 
you've got to wait and look at performance indicators over a period 
of time (NM3). 
NM3's comment was a reference to two aspects of the 'price' of change - the 
general staff upheaval, and specifically the choice to privatise housing benefits 
which was mentioned in association with a rise in rent arrears after seven years 
of improvement. The manager explained further: 
This is the modem world, we might be a local authority, but people 
have lost their jobs, people in benefits have transferred under TUPE, 
there's no security. If someone says to me, 'Yes you'll have a job 
with Newham in five years' time' I'd say 'Well, I don't know what 
crystal ball you've been looking in but it's not the same one as 
anyone else around here'. I think we reflect, and this is another thing 
about CCT that people fail to grasp, is that security went under that, 
there's always been cuts because of budgetary problems, the staff had 
to go, in terms of Best Value it's no longer a threat it's just a reality. 
If it doesn't work you've just got to make it work (NM3). 
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The manager was explaining the 'reality of the modem world' as the justification 
for the changes under Best Value; not a 'threat' but something that has to be 
4made to work. The thread between these 'costs' and performance measurement 
appears to have been lost through these extracts if considered in isolation. 
However, it is reiterated that this was comment was made in the context of 
performance measurement. The view is considered as one of ambivalence 
because it does not appear clear quite what the manager thinks about 
performance measurement between this dichotomy of costs and benefits. it is 
apparent that there have been costs, and the price is located within a pragmatic 
realisation that this simply has to be tolerated in order to claim the benefits that 
will arise at some time in the future: "Performance has declined but over time 
that'll improve, you've got to let it run over a period of time. We're starting to 
deliver now but we weren't last yeae, (NM3). 
Another manager commented on an additional aspect of performance 
measurement. On the one hand, it is a crude and not necessarily accurate 
appraisal of service delivery, and, on the other, valuable feedback was being 
obtained: 
It does concern me, the reason for that is that you can be doing a 
fantastic job but be out of key with the performance indicators. If 
you're doing that you're going to be regarded as not particularly 
good. And, when you lay the political overtones over that, whether 
you're in tune with the government of the day or whether you are 
not. You've got to play the game, we played CCT, we played the 
game, but looking back I think 'Why the hell did we say these 
thingsT. But to a certain extent you have to do that, but the feedback 
I'm getting from tenants is that parts of the reorganisation is good, 
with the focus on rent arrears and anti-social behaviour for example, 
but on the other hand there's a lot of people unhappy about 
community housing not dealing with repairs (NMI). 
So, while performance indicators were a source of concern, the pragmatic 
approach was shared with NM3, of 'having to do it' and then forward, to making 
the best of the situation. The additional point of note is the remark concerning the 
valuable feedback relating tofocus on rent arrears and anti-social behaviour, and 
unhappiness with the way of reporting repairs, rather than levels of performance 
in those areas covered by the BVPls. This suggests that while the performance 
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indicators may be observed, the actual BVPIs were not mentioned here, and this 
variance with 'what is required' was further emphasised by a concern with the 
authority's stress on 'soft' areas of performance at the expense of the traditional 
'hard' performance indicators: 
I will speak parochially at this point, we have lost some of the hard 
edge things because of the reorganisation. Void control, right from 
termination to pre-letting to allocations and technical inspection, the 
hard targets have gone and community housing is developing other 
targets in relation to vulnerable tenants and supporting tenancies 
(NMI) 
While there is a BVPI related to voids, it does not require the detail mentioned by 
the respondent 'lost' through the transition to Best Value. Returning specifically 
to the issue of compliance with the statutory indicators, which did not receive 
further specific comment from any other manager, NMI remarked "I'm quite 
confident in our performance". 
Overall, while there appears to be disquiet relating to the consequences of 
measuring performance, and the scope of the indicators, there was no evidence of 
fundamental disapproval, and Newharn managers are interpreting this aspect of 
Best Value with guarded enthusiasm. 
The third issue, the prospect of inspection by the Audit Commission, expected 
during the interview period 17 , attracted comments from two of the managers. 
NM1 was confident about the process: 
I don't have a problem, business as usual, I mean we have what you 
might call some rehearsal sessions, where we look at ourselves and 
go through a process of trying to replicate what can happen, but 
really it's about what happens on the ground, and making sure that 
you present it properly (NMI). 
Aside from the overall 'no problem' perspective, NMI appears to reflect some 
nonchalance about the inspections, having gone 'through a process'. There is a 
sense of frustration about successfully demonstrating the achievements of the 
17 As at May 2003 Ncwharn had not received a Best Value inspection for housing management 
services. Their repairs service was inspected in October 2002 and received a 6fair, one star rating 
with 'promising' prospects for improvement. 
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authority within the inspection frame. The issue of preparation was echoed by 
NM4, who reflected less confidence in the authority's readiness, and at least the 
possibility that they may be deflected by an inaccurate inspection: 
We love them [inspections]. We think they're marvellous, we'll 
probably get one soon. Well, it's a necessary evil, you can't have this 
sort of set up without people dipping in .... I think that the system's 
probably sound, but like all auditing it needs to be sensitive to the 
powers they have, sort of swingeing in, undoing all the good that 
management have done ... It's just pointless, waste of everyone's 
time, if you've done a review (of the services) (NM4). 
There is a barely disguised bitterness in this account. The prospect of 'undoing 
management's good work' by a 'swingeing' audit, culminating in the 'pointless 
waste of time' having previously reviewed services themselves. Taking the last 
point as a 'sole criticism', this is a damning appraisal of the worth of the 
inspection from one point of view. A sense of interference, and undermining the 
abilities of those working in the housing department, was voiced by another 
manager: "there's lots of expertise we can use, but I think the inspectorate will 
drive reviews to an extenf'(NM3). 
overall, although the inspections appear to be considered as, in the words of 
NM4, a 'necessary evil', it is difficult to draw conclusions beyond this. For 
example, there is at least the indication that inspections should be set and staged 
at the convenience of managers. This is all but stated by NM4, but more care is 
needed with NMI's interpretation. One further point that can be made is that 
managers do consider the inspection as a form of test, in the sense that they are 
being assessed for the services they manage, and whatever they may think of the 
examination process, the need to comply is clear. 
Fourthly, the issue of staffing needs under Best Value was described by NM3 in 
the following terms: 
One of the things that happened under Best Value is that we cut a lot 
of staff, that was an efficiency saving, there's less staff around now, 
expertise is trying to cope with that, we have good expertise and IT 
systems, but we have less staff and the same amount of work. 
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This extract reveals an interesting aspect of how Best Value is being interpreted. 
it gives an indication of how the cost-quality issue is being resolved in Newham. 
Costs are driven down through staff cuts, and the deficit in staff is being met by 
texpertise' and information technology (IT). There is some insecurity in the way 
the extract is phrased. While the combination of expertise and IT is 'good', it is 
at present 'trying' to bridge the gap between the constant workload and the 
reduced workforce. As to the option of retaining staff until proven systems were 
in place, NM3 explained the progressional logic precluding this alternative: 
The staff had to go, in terms of Best Value it's no longer a threat, it's 
just a reality. If it doesn't work you've just got to make it work. I 
could see the whole stock transferring to make it work. 
In dissecting this extract the flow is as follows: first phase, reduce the workforce; 
second phase, compensate for the reduced workforce with improved systems and 
methods; third phase (which may not be required if phase two works) transfer the 
housing stock. Phase one is a 'reality', and appears incapable of challenge; it 
simply has to be 'made to work'. NM2 suggested that problems are evident in 
phase two: "There's a difficulty around the so-called 80-20 split". The 180-20' 
split is a reference to the anticipated resident service given from the Local 
Service Centres, where "for every ten people who go into the local service 
centre, eight should leave after no less than five minutes' queuing with a smile 
on their face" (NM2). The remaining two people visit specialist staff ("I can't 
remember what jargon we used") whose inquiry may be more involved. NM2 
concluded that the system was not working as anticipated because "In order to do 
that you need a highly trained and motivated staff who can actually deliver the 
service". There is a difference between NMYs suggestion of difficulty, which 
can be addressed through technical, technological or stock transfer methods, and 
NM3's acknowledgement of difficulty, which requires trained and motivated 
staff. 
The fifth and final aspect of Newham managers' interpretation of Best Value 
concerns outsourcing: the provision of local services by non-council providers. 
One manager, NM4 described changes in Newharn in the following terms: 
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Various percentages are being banded about at the moment in terms 
of sections, which will be outsourced, but it hasn't been defined 
which yet. No timescale, how long is a piece of string? 
In reply to a question about whether services would improve under Best Value, 
NM4 replied, in the context of the work with which s/he was responsible, "In a 
personal capacity, no, it won't improve. It will improve competition, yee, and as 
to why this should happen: 
We'll give out everything we have problems with, and really it's 
false to assume that we haven't thought through those problems and 
tried to find an answer, and the only answer is to give it to someone 
else. To suggest that a private company will suddenly find a solution 
to what has been to us a long-standing problem is not the answer. 
The two points made in this extract are that first, problematic aspects of the 
housing service are to be given to a private contractor. Defining quite what a 
, problem' is in Newham's housing department is difficult to establish from the 
managers' accounts, simply because no explicit criticism was made, with the 
notable exception of repairs and maintenance. Here the criticism cited by NMI 
related to a problem rooted in "a big cultural thing", where technical staff did not 
communicate effectively with residents. This had arisen as a significant problem 
following the reorganisation, where customer service oftlicers located at the 
Local Service Centres (formerly housing officers and district offices 
respectively) no longer had responsibility for repairs. The problem, in NMI's 
view, was that technical staff were reluctant to take on any form of interaction 
with the residents beyond 'talk to your housing officer'. They were not, 
according to NMI, "people people" so "we have to ask why are you working in 
this job, you have to relate to the public". As a problem this would not seem to 
relate to outsourcing, at least directly. 
The second point made was the view that outsourcing as the only answer to those 
problems is misplaced. NM4 proceeded to illustrate this assertion by hypothetical 
example where, the argument ran, the council has many years' experience of 
working with problems specific to the Borough's housing. A contractor would 
apply their 'stock' solutions to whatever that problem was, which could be 
inefficient, ineffective, or simply wrong. And as to why a contractor would be 
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willing to take on work with which it has little local experience, NM4 felt that 
"there's plenty that could do it, my point is that they won't be able to do it as 
well". 
None of the other managers reflected these opinions, at least quite so 
emphatically. NM2 explained the process of competition, and non-council 
provision of services, in the following terms: 
The actual way the council wants to work with contractors has 
changed from one of competition just for the sake of competition, to 
partnership, the Egan' 8 stuff, it's all about a different way of working 
these days. We are actively taking part in the PFI schemes; we are 
really going out looking for suppliers who certainly respond to us 
when we say we want to do this. 
The authority is now looking for providers to work with, rather than adopt the 
previous rigid working relationships based on contract compliance. NM2 
proceeded to explain that this was a move away from being a "one unit" provider 
of services to an approach based on diversity, explaining that: 
We are giving them [housing contracts and homes] away hand over 
fist, we've got two PFI schemes which involves up to 2,500 
properties and different managing agents, we have a massive 
redevelopment scheme in Canning Town which involves another 
2000 properties, and again we're changing management 
arrangements there. 
Further, NM2 made a distinction between Newham in the 1980s, when it "did 
have a number of problems" which may have deflected partnerships, and this 
"has shaken us up, which we kind of typified last year [2000], because we're 
getting all this glassware now, Council of the Year (Local Government 
Commission Awards 2000], communications awards, things like that so again 
we've had some recognition for the changes we have made". 
An additional issue here is that none of the suggested moves to other providers 
had actually happened, with one exception: housing benefits, contracted to CSL 
18 Rethinking Construction: The Report Of The Construction Task Force (DETR 1998); Working 
Group Reports: Integrating Rethinking Construction with Best Value, Partnership Approaches to 
Procurement (Local Govcmment Task Force 200 1). 
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in 1999. NM3 attributed this move to a belief that a centralised service would be 
an improvement, and consistent with Best Value. Previously, benefit claims were 
administered via several points of contact throughout the Borough. Almost two 
years into the contract concern was expressed about the ability of CSL to provide 
a service at least equivalent to what it replaced. When asked by a councillor 
"What has happened to all the promises, all the money we have put into this 
contract? ", the authority's manager responsible for housing benefit contract 
administration replied: 
We have been through a period of partnership, but we have more of a 
contractual relationship now, more forceful. They have been made 
aware of our intentions here. They're thinking about their profit 
margin in a way we haven't seen before. One of the reasons we hired 
them was their economies of scale 19 . 
Tying this in to how managers are interpreting Best Value, the experience of this 
contract is likely to be a point of reference if contracting other services is 
considered: partnership turned to contract, and 'unseen' profit orientation. This 
was articulated by NM3 as a realisation that the private sector experience lacked 
any 'depth' for the interaction required: I don't see the social side of what CSL 
do. You've got to leave time for tenants, but I don't think that the private sector 
will give that amount of time". And here a clear distinction between 'private 
sector' and 'partners in provision' arises. NM3 described housing associations as 
"appropriate", in terms of reducing bureaucracy which is "what the government 
is looking for", and having a "plan" for the provision of services alongside their 
existing portfolio. NM2's account of outsourcing mentioned above includes 
RSLs within all of the projects currently tabled. The enduring point is that 
managers in Newharn are interpreting Best Value and 'sensitive' outsourcing as 
compatible. 
19 This manager was not interviewed as part of the research, and the extracts cited are from the 
LBN Housing, Environment and Leisure Scrutiny Committee Meeting, 20th March 2001, held in 
public. 
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Westminster 
The opening question "What does Best Value mean to you? " was answered with 
broadly positive responses from the Westminster managers: 
Customer focus, maximises the potential for joined-up thinking, and 
joined-up commissioning, and exposes areas where there needs to be 
a dramatic step change in performance and identifies in other areas 
where there is to be a drive towards continuous improvement. I think 
it has accelerated the synergy that can result from effective joined up 
working. Best Value has been the main vehicle for understanding 
what the residents want from the council, ensuring that we take a sort 
of broader approach beyond competition (WM2); 
I think it is far more genuinely about consultation than CCT (WM3); 
It was Best Value working together with the repackaging of 
contracts, that helped bring the council and tenants back together 
again. We decided to embrace Best Value into what we were doing 
anyway, and in hindsight, and that has really helped us, it has brought 
alive the actual process for us, it wasn't just an academic exercise 
(WM 1); 
Best Value is a toolkit that we can use. Best Value has been a big 
plus for Westminster (WM4). 
An additional initial comment on Best Value reflected frustration by one 
manager with the 'compare' requirement. The following quote is quite 
ambiguous in that it is not an explicit criticism of the need to compare with other 
providers, but appears to move between doubts about the process ('apples with 
apples', 'honest approach'), questioning the need to observe the process in any 
case ('we're way out there'), yet accepting considerable improvements could be 
made ('a great deal to be learrit'): 
Compare, that varies a hell of a lot, about the honesty with which that 
is approached by different boroughs, and the degree of energy that 
has perhaps been put into it, and sometimes you're not comparing 
apples with apples, and certainly when we were trying to do our 
homelessness indicator comparison there were only three or four 
other London boroughs that had directly comparable patterns and 
therefore, and indeed supply patterns, so the statistics were 
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meaningful. But if you look at the key indicators on homelessness 
we're way out there, and there is a great deal to be learrit (WM3). 
The common, and only specific, theme identified by Westminster managers was 
enhanced resident involvement, and this appeared to be a significant hurdle 
overcome in light of the breakdown of communications in 1998. WM2 identified 
'joining up' and 'accelerated synergy', and while these terms can mean 
associations with contractors, for example, the strong contextual link in the text 
would suggest that residents were being referred to. As a spontaneous response, 
Best Value for Westminster managers appeared to be primarily about resident 
involvement. 
in order to provide some additional detail follow-up questions centred on the 
opening 'feeling' about Best Value, and the broad aspects of Best Value itself. 
The answers to these questions revealed further nuances of senior managers' 
interpretation of Best Value, identified as competition, performance indicators, 
benchmarking, inspections and innovation. 
Firstly, each manager expressed an awareness of the notion that Westminster 
could be perceived as competition-led. They acknowledged that there was some 
justification for this view in the past, although Best Value had led to a new, 
wider, focus: 
Westminster has always used its track record on competition more 
than any other single local authority, and we have always used that 
competition philosophy as our form of challenge, but what is 
interesting about Best Value, is that it is suddenly changing, and the 
conceptual thinking about why we are doing it, and is there a better 
way of doing it. At Westminster the thinking I think has been, and 
Best Value has been the main vehicle for this, in terms of 
understanding what the residents want of the council, ensuring that 
we take a sort of broader approach beyond competition (WM2). 
This appears to imply that use of alternative providers is more than 'competition' 
by virtue of the 'sort of broaderýapproach' - responding to residents' wishes and 
challenging current practice through 'conceptual thinking'. WMI felt that 
Westminster "would be in danger of being seen as concentrating on 
competition", although the tendering for the new contracts "helped bring the 
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council and tenants back together again, residents were involved in writing of the 
specification". Competitive practice is thereby considered in a wide, inclusive, 
sense. 
The second issue mentioned, performance indicators, was viewed as something 
of an administrative burden by WMI and WM2. In answer to a question about 
negative aspects of Best Value, one manager cited "the rigour with which we 
have had to go through the performance information process" (WM2). An 
important point here is that this manager felt that performance data was not 
parti cularly relevant for housing because the department was getting feedback on 
services direct, from the residents: 
Perhaps the rule of thumb is that in service areas and corporate areas 
that are less exposed to the customer, revolution is needed, but in the 
housing department we have a strong tradition of being close to our 
customer because of the direct access; they pay rent or a service 
charge in return for a service. Now with council tax, it is rather more 
generic, rather more gentle; you don't have the direct relationship 
(WM2). 
The 'strong tradition' of being close to residents is an issue that had been 
discussed, and sustaining the argument that 'direct access, remained a feature of 
a contracted service did receive some further qualification above, in the 
discussion of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and the beginning of the 
client-contract split. The reasoning forwarded by WM2 was that contractors 
deliver a service unencumbered by democratic and administrative processes, and 
that service is defined by the resident in consultation with the local authority. If 
the service is failing, two routes are open if the provider does not respond to 
requests to change: legal enforcement of contract, or change of contractor at the 
time of contract renewal. 'Performance', therefore, is something that is primarily 
estimated by residents. However, the BVPIs are considered in the sense that they 
are obligatory, and some irritation was apparent with the statutory frame, where 
it varied from Westminster's previous scheme. During Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering Westminster initially used 32 indicators for housing management, and 
WMI reflected "that if something is the 32nd of something it is not key, so we 
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knocked it down to eight key indicators". With the advent of Best Value, the 
system of performance measurement was further modified to include bonuses: 
We brought in incentive schemes, where we pay ten percent extra for 
hitting key areas of performance, and this came in through the Best 
Value process, and we built in for the first time repairs, and we put a 
percent of their payment in as customer satisfaction, which we put in 
as survey work, and the whole of our incentive scheme is based 
around the Best Value framework (WM I). 
This addressed the 'improve' aspect of Best Value, and specifically mentioned 
repairs. However it was clear that what had been identified by Westminster as the 
important signifiers of performance did not coincide with the BVPls, and the 
manager continued: 
In hindsight we are starting to relook at that, because we have the 
Best Value indicators, but there are a whole host of things which 
aren't caught by the BVPIs. We have some of the highest rents, so 
that does muck around with some of our indicators, and, a Labour 
member said this: 'Don't chase the Holy Grail. Some of these 
indicators, you'll never get to, and what does it matter? "' (WM I). 
Three issues arise from this extract. 
1. The consideration of what the BVPIs include, that could reflect Westminster 
in an unfavourable light. The reference to rents is probably a concern with the 
amount of rent to be collected (that is, greater per property than other 
authorities), rather than rent levels which are not considered as a performance 
indicator. 
2. What the BVPls exclude, the 'whole host not caught', is of significance 
although none of the managers identified a specific area not covered by the 
statutory indicators. Overall, these two points suggest that managers had some 
reservations about the form, but not the principle. WMI remarked that the 
authority was "very comfortable" with performance measurement because of the 
experience gained under Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
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3. The recounting of the rhetorical question of the councillor, which does 
suggest a certain nonchalance towards the entire issue of the statutory indicators. 
Westminster managers are engaging with the process of performance 
measurement primarily through refining their internal systems. 
Thirdly, benchmarking was considered to be a worthwhile tool for improving 
management practice, although its use was considered to be more appropriate as 
a means of self-criticism through internal assessments, rather than to gauge 
practice and performance relative to other non-Westminster providers. This point 
was made above by WM3 concerning the difficulty in finding meaningful 
comparables ('apples with apples' and the 'honesty' of other authorities), and 
was approached differently by WM2: 
I'm cynical. I think we need to work smartly, then think why we are 
doing it and how we use it ... you do your benchmarking study, and a lot of benchmarking clubs leave it at that point ... We recently had a benchmarking exercise completed by Arthur Andersen 20 which was 
focused on repairs, and out of that we found our costs were average, 
but we were performing above average, which was fine,, but out of 
that we said to the tenderers, 'here is the Arthur Andersen 
benchmarking, it identifies a dozen areas where we have got an 
opportunity to improve our service, we expect you to play back to us, 
with your tender invitations, what improvements can you secure for 
us as part of your tender submissionT 
This use of a consultant's report would appear to meet a definition of 
benchmarking, as "a process of measuring your service's processes and 
performance and systematically comparing them to the performance of others in 
order to seek 'best practice"' (Foot 1998, in Bovaird 1998, p. 9). However, 
whether this achieves a "sepsitive probing of the different contexts of the 
services being benchmarked" resulting from an "intensive social interaction 
between a range of actors, and notjust a technical 'numbers-crunching' exercise" 
(Bovaird 1998, p. 10) is unclear, and would depend on the report in question. The 
only other reference to benchmarking has been mentioned above, by WMI, who 
recalled that Compulsory Competitive Tendering presented a 'wonderful 
20 Chartered Accountancy firm 
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opportunity to internally benchmark', and this appears to be rooted in the belief 
that Westminster is at the pinnacle of the best practice model, which can only be 
improved by 'tweaking' the system in place: 
I have to say that I don't think from our experience that compare has 
brought about significant changes in the way that we do things, 
because we are quite good at what we do, but I would say that 
wouldn't I? (WM3) 
Westminster managers are 'doing' benchmarking, although the extent to which 
the process is used appears to vary by respondent between internal comparisons 
and tender 'leverage' via third party analysis. 
Inspection was the fourth issue identified by Westminster managers, and 
considered a positive aspect of Best Value - "I welcome the inspection process, 
in that it touches and feels the service in a way that the current inspection service 
doesn'el, and understands it from a holistic point of view" (WM2). The 
optimism of WM2 was shared by WMI, who recalled an internal inspection 
designed to reflect what was expected from the Audit Commission, and the 
"amazing correlation" between what tenants wanted improving most - the 
internal state of their homes - and their strategy to meet this goal. This was a 
reference to the Arms Length Management proposal, which in itself could be 
considered a necessary but not sufficient aspect of the inspection proper. In 
summary, the impression gained from managers was that the inspection was a 
positive aspect of Best Value, with no mention of drawbacks. 
The fifth interpretation identified by Westminster managers was the innovation 
that will arise with Best Value. Each of the managers relayed with some 
enthusiasm positive outcomes that have arisen with the introduction of Best 
Value. These were discussed in the form of anecdotes to illustrate some of the 
innovation that was taking place. 
21 A reference to the annual HIP submission appraisal described by WM2 as "One-dimensional, 
going through a tick box process, basically following the HIP statement by civil servants who 
don't know the service at all". 
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One example is a reference to the way Best Value seems to be forcing a wider 
view of how and why services are provided, and who should provide them: 
If you look at what the housing department does, we have just over 
1000 sheltered housing units, you then look across at social services, 
they have a number of residential care homes, some of which are 
contracted, you can look at the health authority in terms of the 
services they are providing, you will also then look at services for the 
elderly in the private sector, and then suddenly you take a lead 
through Best Value in terms of challenging and understanding ... 
We've commissioned the Nuffield Institute to do a piece of research 
about mapping the demand, and as a result housing, social services 
and the health authority will commission and recommission services 
in a dynamic and different way, and that's partly as a result of Best 
Value - the evolutionary thinking has forced that, the blinkers are off. 
That is a genuine bottom-up type example where it will make a 
practical difference (WM2). 
Within this extract there is an appreciation that some degree of overlap exists 
between departments, both in terms of the needs of the client group, which it is 
acknowledged may have been misunderstood (hence the commissioned 
research), and the resources available to meet that need. This revelation has 
arisen because the 'blinkers are off, and the service can now 'evolve' in a 
, dynamic and different' and 'bottom-up' way. 
Concerning approaches beyond competition, what the manager has described is a 
process flow involving different departments which will, when it comes to 
deciding who will actually deliver the service, result in options still open for 
competition. Whether these approaches - thinking beyond competition, cross- 
departmental working, and policy based on commissioned research - are a result 
of Best Value is difficult to estimate, although from this manager's point of view 
a markedly different approach is in place where "suddenly you take a lead 
through Best Value" (WM2). 
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13.6 Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to establish the ways in which Best Value was 
being interpreted, and the extent to which the problems with Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering were addressed. It was hypothesised (p. 85) that a variety 
of interpretations could arise, in part based on Barrett's concern that 
managerialist policies such as Best Value are relatively closed to interpretation; 
ambiguities and emphases that could arise, highlighted in part two; and 
Dunleavy's notions of bureau shaping that could apply to Best Value, discussed 
in chapter five. 
This section is set out in two parts. The first details the findings relating to 
actors' interpretations of Best Value. The second provides three perspectives of 
the changes that were perceived to be arising with the advent of Best Value: the 
extent to which Best Value would change or continue Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering practice; the changes that were either anticipated or experienced; and 
the consequence of any changes to individuals and groups. 
13.6.1 Best Value and Change: Actors' Views 
Councillors 
Both Newham and Westminster councillors were broadly in favour of Best 
Value. Individuals expressed concern relating to support staffing and monitoring 
(Newham), and increased bureaucracy and 'interference' (Westminster), 
although none gave strong feelings of disapproval. 
in Newham the politicians were interpreting Best Value mainly in terms of the 
way the policy meshes with the ideological message implicit within their vision. 
Certainly, aspects of process received comment although the overall point was 
one of progress and direction, and on this Best Value appeared apposite and 
requisite. Westminster's local politicians were more ambivalent, with none of 
their concerns necessarily placated or compounded by their view of Best Value 
process. Their anxieties during Compulsory Competitive Tendering were not 
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recalled during discussions of Best Value experiences, reinforcing the notion that 
events could (or would) unfold without controversial incident -a matter of 
importance to this group. 
The key difference between the councillors' views was their impression of the 
contribution Best Value would make to their authorities. For the Newham 
councillors there was a clear impression that Best Value was needed to reinforce 
the vision, and there was no contradiction between Best Value and the 
underpinning ideology with which they felt comfortable. A clearer idea of that 
ideology was given in the previous chapter dealing with the pre-Best Value era, 
where the tangible aspects included financial probity, customer oriented services, 
and improved strategic thinking. The central themes were cited as vibrancy and 
modernity. Councillors in Newharn viewed Best Value as a policy with which it 
should engage, providing emphasis to reinforce cultural signals, ideological 
direction and matters related to the cost-quality equation. Meeting and sustaining 
these elements was of most importance to Newharn councillors: this is what Best 
Value meant to them. 
The Westminster councillors considered that Best Value may have inspired focus 
although the policy was unlikely to deflect the City from its established path. 
Concerns raised, such as the superfluousness of external inspection and added 
bureaucracy, were considered endurable. The point here is that insofar as Best 
Value directives and required processes coincide with what Westminster's 
housing department is striving to achieve the policy could be considered 
'appropriate'. 
In essence Best Value had been accepted by Westminster and embraced by 
Newham. Also, and while certain exceptions have been highlighted, there was a 
general sense of contentedness with Best Value. 
Front Line Staff 
It was difficult to estimate what expectations the Newham staff had of Best 
Value from chapter nine, dealing with the Situation prior to Best Value. The 
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impression they gave relating to Best Value was characterised by three aspects: 
their welfare and job satisfaction; service quality; and potential for improved 
services. The balance in opinions around these points was between guarded 
enthusiasm and determined negativity. 
The Westminster staff also characterised Best Value with three areas: tacit 
acceptance of the imminent contract change; insensitive methods of service 
appraisal; and excessive workloads and poor pay. 
In comparing the two groups' opinions the Westminster cohort were less divided 
around the issues they identified. 
Residents 
Both sets of residents expressed opinions on involvement in decision making. 
The Newharn representatives felt their input on and satisfaction with day-to-day 
repairs was adequate. There was not a sense of unbridled praise for this aspect of 
their landlord's performance, although the absence of any particular failure in 
these two respects is notable. Phrases such as 'the devil we know' were tempered 
by the acknowledgement that reporting mechanisms were good, and minor estate 
works and individual repairs were satisfactory. The main issue for Newharn 
residents during Best Value was their involvement in broader decision making 
that affected a Jarge proportion of the housing stock. In the case of housing 
benefit exterrialisation the residents were excluded from input on grounds of, 
what appeared to be, irrelevance. This should be balanced with the possibility 
that they were in part influential in 'de-externalisation'. On decisions 
surrounding the Private Finance Initiative a clear sense of frustration was 
apparent as residents attempted to negotiate the unhelpful, obscure and verbose 
interface between themselves and Newham's management. 
The Westminster representatives' opinions varied. Interpretations were given on 
the main forum (Westminster's housing panel), the elected representatives' 
accountability and capacity to reflect residents' opinions, the 'Compact, and the 
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relationships between the representatives, senior management and front line 
workers. In general these aspects were recalled with disillusionment: the 
representatives had dealt with these issues, or similar, and no improvement had 
arisen with Best Value. One recently elected representative did offer an 
enthusiastic account recalling a friendly and constructive dialogue with 
managers. This was not shared by the other more 'seasoned' respondents. 
Isolated views were expressed by resident representatives. In Westminster 
service standards were highlighted, linked to a perceived inadequacy in contract 
specifications and the money available for services. In Newharn the commentary 
was consistently linked to concerns over change. It was generally agreed that 
there was room for improvement in day-to-day services such as tenancy 
management and repairs. The issue for Newharn residents was simply that they 
did not have the information or opportunity to effectively assess or influence the 
nature of any changes under Best Value. 
The Compact did not feature as a document of any significance for either set of 
respondents. 
Summarising the representatives' views on Best Value is difficult when 
considered within the structure of this part of the thesis, in that the bulk of the 
interview material relates to influence over policy interpretation and 
implementation, an issue covered specifically in the next chapter. This finding is 
notable in the sense that this is primarily what Best Value is interpreted as for the 
representatives rather than, say, the standard of their homes and immediate 
environment. In summary the comments on the structures of resident 
participation under Best Value varied between hope from the newer 
representative and cynicism by the more seasoned respondents. That hope, 
particularly in terms of strategic matters, appeared especially distant for the 
Newham residents. 
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Senior Managers 
Both sets of managers, overall, considered Best Value to be a positive step for 
council housing in their Boroughs. Several themes were covered during the 
interviews that broadly indicated affirmation, although some reservations and 
differing emphases were evident. 
Consultation with residents was the most agreed upon issue. Both groups 
recalled past relationships with residents, although in each case the link was 
inferred from comments pointing to need for improvement, rather than explicitly 
criticising the previous nature of the relationship. One exception to this was a 
Newharn manager's comment that residents used to 'get a letter and that was it'. 
Both sets of managers did agree that the structures in place were a considerable 
improvement and a constructive partnership between residents and the council 
would characterise housing services under Best Value. 
The second aspect of change identified by both councils' managers was the 
organisation of administration. Enthusiasm was voiced by the Newham managers 
as respite from the client-contractor split arose with Best Value. Westminster 
managers viewed the change as one of outlook using words such as "dynamic", 
46smart" and "joined-up" to explain the innovation that had accompanied Best 
Value. 
Thirdly, on inspections two of the Newham managers expressed irritation with 
the inspection service and the possible deflection they might bring from 
established practice. Overall however they did regard the inspections as a 
necessary aspect of their housing management service, with a stoical attitude to 
observance. The two Westminster managers who mentioned the inspections were 
confident that the City was markedly aligned to the Audit Commission's 
requirements. 
Competition was the fourth interpretative theme the managers shared. Pinning 
down the Newham managers on competition was difficult. All considered that 
alternative providers would feature in the future, although little clue was given as 
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to why, other than consideration being a required aspect of Best Value. What is 
clear from the interviews is that managers are likely to be circumspect about any 
future externalisation. That one manager recalled that their choice of housing 
benefit provider thought of profit 'in ways never considered' suggests that they 
will approach externalisation with assiduousness. For Westminster managers 
competition was commented upon, with the broad line that some justification for 
continued use of competitive providers would be needed. Their notion of 
competition involved 'conceptual thought' which principally meant resident 
involvement in decisions concerning extemalised services. 
The final common aspect of Best Value for managers was performance 
measurement. A mixed, although generally positive, view was given by Newham 
managers. Comments relating to usefulness, necessity and means to gauge 
improvements were made. These remarks were bridged by reference to some of 
the costs of performance improvements, or costs of the "modem world" as one 
manager considered them. These costs related to job security and relevance of 
the measures used, although the unerring sentiment was that observance was 
necessary, if somewhat irrelevant. It was therefore difficult to reconcile the 
managers' views beyond the guarded support noted. The Westminster managers 
were unconvinced by the value of the statutory BVPIs although not performance 
measurement per se. They placed confidence in their existing systems of 
measurement and while a councillor's cynicism was recalled, a clear sense of 
deference to the statutory indicators was evident. The common point in 
comments on the performance measurement regime is that both sets of managers 
expressed reservations, yet each relayed the message they were important, and 
would be observed. 
13.6.2 Perspectives of Change 
The field research revealed six elements of change taking place under Best 
Value: ideological reinforcement; conditions of employment; resident 
participation; accountability; services; and competition. Each of these elements 
affected local actors in different ways. 
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For Newham councillors, alignment with their Vision was a prime concern, and 
Best Value was seen as a 'modem' asset that would help achieve a shift in the 
perception and the capacity of the Borough. Best Value provided the balance of 
focus and autonomy that was not apparent during Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. This matter of overarching ideological reinforcement was shared by 
the Westminster councillors, although this was not likely to be a cause of change. 
Rather, Best Value could serve to reinforce the existing political direction. Best 
Value was not considered in this way by any other actors with the exception of 
the Westminster managers, some of whom referred to the 'philosophical' outlook 
Best Value allowed, and to a lesser extent the Newham managers. In terms of the 
relationships arising two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, articulating service 
provision in terms of Best Value and corporate direction had become a 
sustainable aspect of political discourse. Politicians were generally comfortable 
discussing the future of their housing services in terms of Best Value. Secondly, 
this comfort was most explicitly reinforced by Westminster managers, and less 
directly by the Newham managers. Other actors did not describe Best Value in 
these broad strategic terms. 
The second change to have, arisen under Best Value concerned conditions of 
employment. Front line workers related excessive workloads and low morale, 
and managers generally agreed with these accounts. Managers were, however, 
enthusiastic about the changes to their work environment. This broad trend was 
marked by a difference between the authorities: Westminster employees were 
less 'anxious' about the administrative requirements of Best Value than the 
Newharn cohort. For example, while the Newham managers welcomed the 
relaxation of the client-contractor split this was a change 'under development'. 
The third change concerned resident participation and the introduction of the 
Tenants Participation Compact. The complicated and varied picture can be 
summarised in two ways. Firstly, in Newharn resident involvement with day-to- 
day matters had improved, whereas inclusion on strategic decisions had 
deteriorated. In Westminster the new structures had not resulted in significant 
changes other than re-established routes of communication and cordial 
exchanges. These had not altered the capacity to influence decisions. Secondly, 
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the managers of both authorities felt that resident inclusion had improved with 
Best Value. This issue is discussed further below in association with table seven. 
The fourth change experienced by the authorities related to accountability, and 
this was specifically referred to in terms of the Audit Commission inspections. 
Two Newham managers were critical of the need for external monitoring, 
although no inspections had been carried out at the time of the field research. 
The fifth change related to services, and a number of perspectives arose. 
Managers commented positively on the measurement of service provision 
through the use of performance indicators. Westminster resident representatives 
did remark on the organisation of contracts as a limitation of service provision, 
although generally services had not, in either Borough, changed significantly. 
Front line staff in Newham felt that change had reduced service effectiveness 
through the loss of experienced staff and a stressful work environment. 
Another perspective of change related to services, and one not commented upon 
by respondents, concerns the performance data collected by each local authority. 
A selection of housing-related information is illustrated in table seven. Points of 
note include the increased cost of Newham's services, and Westminster's 
decrease - considerably in the case of management costs, and possibly a product 
of the contract changes. Figures relating to the overall housing service indicate 
improved satisfaction and opportunities for participation in Newham, which is a 
result that would not necessarily have been predicted from the field research. 
However, this result could coincide with involvement on day-to-day, and not 
strategic, matters. The Westminster results are restricted to a survey carried out 
in 2000/01, with a repeat survey not due until 2006/7 (WCC 2001 a, p. 54). 
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Table Seven: LB Newham and Westminster CC Performance Data 2000/01 
-2001/02 
Performance Indicator April 2000 - March April 2001 -March 
2001 2002 (Research 
Pe iod) 
LBN WCC LBN WCC 
Average weekly costs per 
local authority dwelling of 23.28 30.09 27.06 22.17 
management (f) 
Average weekly costs per 
local authority dwelling of 13.49 21.37 15.12 17.50 
repairs (E) 
Local authority rent 
collection and arrears: 92 92.3 100 96 
proportion of rent collected 
Average relet times for local 
authority dwellings let in the 50.3 30.8 45.9 22.2 
financial year (days) 
Tenant satisfaction with 
overall housing service 59 61 65 N/A 
provided by the landlord (%) 
Satisfaction of council house 
tenants with participation in 38 46 45 N/A 
decision making (%) 
Sources: LBN Best Value Performance Plan 2002/2003; WCC Best Value 
Performance Plan 2002/2003 
The final broad change that arose related to competition, and its use in service 
provision. Councillors generally touched on this subject with ambivalence, 
expressing neither favour of disfavour. The Westminster front line workers, 
facing contract change at the time of the research, were uncertain of the 
consequences: some welcomed the consolidation following an insecure period, 
while others were unsure of where service improvements could be made through 
transfer of service provider. The Westminster residents voiced no clear objection 
to alternative service providers, although some felt contracts had been 
mishandled. The clearest statement on competition came from the managers. The 
Newham managers' approach to competition varied between trepidation, 
cynicism and a belief that it would result in poor services. Notwithstanding these 
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reservations all were certain that alternative providers could, and probably 
would, feature as part of Newham's future housing service. Westminster 
managers expressed no doubts, although they did voice an awareness of the 
increased need to justify their approach to competition. 
overall, therefore, for the councillors and managers Best Value broadly met 
expectations. The policy was serving to reinforce and enable Newham's 
ideological message. In Westminster it was considered by councillors as benign 
and consistent with established patterns of delivery. Relationships with residents 
had improved, and processes associated with performance and inspection, while 
viewed with considered reticence, were not unexpected or unmanageable. On 
competition and the prospect or continuance of contracted modes of provision, 
both groups indicated that a considered approach to non-council provision would 
accompany Best Value implementation. 
For residents and staff, expectations of Best Value were, in part, not realised. The 
residents were appreciative of involvement in day-to-day matters, although 
control over the longer term service changes was minimal. This situation was 
particularly marked in Newham. Some staff reported difficult working conditions 
and inappropriate methods of delivery and measurement, while many 
respondents offered innocuous accounts of Best Value implementation. 
It is apparent from this analysis that on many of the issues arising different, and 
occasionally contradictory, perspectives of change and Best Value are in 
evidence. For example residents' views of consultation differ considerably from 
the perception of managers and councillors. The clearest instance of agreement 
arose between managers and councillors, with the impression gained that the 
relationship had become consolidated in Westminster to a greater extent than in 
Newham. Newham managers expressed doubts associated with the broad push to 
comply with Best Value, particularly on the issue of competition. Westminster 
managers presented a more confident appraisal of the operational connection to 
the Best Value compliance. 
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A question that can be asked at this stage is: 'Whose version of Best Value will 
be adoptedT. That councillors, for example, have no fundamental issue with Best 
Value is not an indication that they were in any way responsible for its 
implementation. The matter of influence in these accounts is covered in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Influence and Best Value 
14.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the last category of interview material. The aim is to 
establish who or what controls the implementation of Best Value by considering 
the accounts of local actors. 
Chapter ten highlighted the opinions of actors relating to Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, and chapter eleven set out how Best Value could change 
approaches to service delivery from the perspective of key actors. This chapter is 
about realisation of policy: who or what is likely to steer policy process and 
outcomes. 
The data is presented in sections by respondent. The opening question asked was: 
'Who or what is likely to influence change during Best Value? '. Prompting or 
directing answers was avoided, although when a theme arose the respondent was 
invited to elaborate if necessary. 
The chapter concludes with a consideration of key forces identified during the 
research, and the nature of associated changes they would direct. 
14.2 Councillors 
Newham 
The Newham councillors did consider themselves influential in the formulation 
and implementation of Best Value housing policy. However, their comments 
involved a considerable amount of qualification. NCI for example recalled: "The 
original proposals for Best Value went through a small working group of 
councillors". The working group considered the "recommendations of an 
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evaluation panel which was made up of officers". One of these 
recommendations, the exclusion of the in-house bid for the housing benefit 
service, was accepted and implemented. On that decision, NCI continued: "If 
only we could have turned that back. But we did use our influence later on and 
reversed that decision", and: 
I was quite clear with him, I said 'I don't want any more balls-ups 
like with housing benefit, I don't want it'. I want no big bangs, no 
surprises, no collapse in rent collection, substitutional arrangements 
made, done in a careful way, not like the housing benefit stuff, so I 
did lean very hard on that and I think he did learn a lesson. I did put a 
lot of pressure on. 
The 'balls-up' arose from an officer's decision, and accountability lay with the 
Director. NCI described the consequence of this situation as one where "I think 
he did learn a lesson. I did put a lot of pressure on". The lesson was to deliver 
services in line with the councillors' broad wish of improved performance and 
cost savings. This experience had not affected NCI's appreciation of the skill 
and importance of the senior management team: 
A lot of stuff is delegated to them. I work very closely with Chris 
[Wood, the Housing Director], they are very influential, a very strong 
team, very powerful and innovative team, these are bright people 
with plenty of ideas. We select all the senior ones, they certainly 
know what strategic direction we're after, they generate a lot of the 
ideas, the practicalities, but we drive the overall agenda, we want to 
improve services and cut cost, and everyone is very clear on that. 
It follows from this account that management are free to interpret policy within 
the strategic direction set by the politicians, which corresponds to Best Value 
requirements. As for the type of manager required, NO added to NCI's 
comment relating to selection: 
We have a new breed of senior managers, rigorous new ways of 
appointing, head hunting, we go out for the best people. 
This reinforces NCI's view that policies in Newharn are implemented by a 
specifically selected management team. In addition NO noted the role of 
councillors: 
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A core group of councillors took control over Best Value. It was too 
stark and regimental. We were willing to accept that mistakes might 
be made, but we stand by what we say. Running the council is big 
business. 
Similarly NC2 suggested that councillors were influential "in terms of policy 
developmenf'. Concerning operational matters a certain detachment was 
required: "I would argue that we should go around more, but it's not about 
picking up debris, literally the shit". 
The three councillors clearly felt that they had a role in the 'shape' of Best Value 
which, in turn, was enacted by senior management. 
As for influence of other actors NC I, on the involvement of residents in decision 
making, noted: 
Since the new governance there has been a problem with this, 
because tenant reps used to be on the housing committee, and have 
cabinet input. I'd go to the Tenant Fed[eration] meetings, and a 
couple of Compact meetings, but I think the linkage between tenants 
and members needs to be strengthened. I think at some of the 
meetings tenants do think that officers are too much in charge. 
The councillor was referring to the executive nature of the new cabinet structure 
referred to above (p. 172). Notwithstanding the limited opportunities for input the 
councillor did feel that operational priorities reflected residents' wishes: 
Take the LSC [Local Service Centre] near here, you'll have a lot 
higher satisfaction for the CSOs [Customer Service Officers] here 
than you would ever have had for the old housing officers. No 
disrespect, but they're all trained up now, it's a different world, all of 
these tenants say that they want it, so they do have an input. Capital 
resources. Tenant led improvement under the Compact, three and a 
half million pounds given to them, they decide it. I haven't got a 
problem with that. A few others have, but I don't (NC 1). 
NC2 provided a complex account of traditional representative structures of 
"primarily white working class men, and I don't want to be too rude, but they 
have negative agendas" and the councillor's wish to adopt a "community power 
strategy" involving particularly non-white and older residents. As things were 
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meetings were "not well attended. I know it can be a bloodbath, I know it can be 
negative". Overall it was difficult to establish NC2's opinions on actual resident 
impact in decision making, although the overall impression gained was one of 
'work to do': "What we need to do for community engagement is not to have 
things seen as top down". The councillor spoke at length on this theme and, at 
one stage, frustration became apparent: 
Whoever comes to surgery is often discontented, but the confusion, 
why is there that confusion? There may be anger, reluctance to 
change, but people really don't like being told. 
The councillor could have been referring to any of a number of issues: closure of 
offices, housing benefit problems, or dealing with a call centre for example. 
Changes that were happening were associated with anger and reluctance, and it 
was the councillor's responsibility to 'tell' them change was necessary. 
Two of the councillors expressed an opinion on the influence of front line 
workers. NCI considered that there "is resistance to some of the changes" 
although the main source had since left the authority: 
Quite a few have left voluntarily, nobody, very few people have been 
made compulsorily redundant, we had a fair number of people follow 
Andy Jennings over to Islington, he didn't agree with a lot that was 
happening, Islington [Mr Jennings' new employer] are going the 
other way, so I think the people we've got agree with us about the 
resistance to change, an unwillingness to provide a good service. 
The councillor singled out Andy Jennings, the Director of Housing in 1996, and 
it is possible that the extract refers to a range of employees. The message is that 
those who did not agree with Best Value or vision-related proposals left the 
authority and the following extract makes clear the attitude towards front line 
workers: 
That's life, let them move on, no disrespect to them, let them move 
on and do something else, but the situation has moved on. It used to 
be that officers and councillors were almost afraid of the workforce. 
We're elected to change things, the public support change, we're 
quite clear about that, and that's what we're going to do, and we ain't 
backing off (NCI). 
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For those still in post NC2 had forthright views on any influence they might 
have: 
I firmly think that housing officers will talk to people like us 
rather than their managers over issues, and they know that we 
are not directly going to do whatever it is. I've got some 
negativity towards them [front line workers]. 
The implication from this extract is that employees would approach a councillor 
because managers take little notice. By not 'directly' acting, that is, to become 
involved in particular issues, the employee had some hope that the councillor 
might reflect concerns in a broader policy-oriented context: a hope misplaced in 
the case of this particular councillor, however. 
Westminster 
Overall the Westminster councillors felt that managers controlled much of 
Westminster's affairs. They considered their role, and the role of others, as 
relatively minor when deciding how Best Value would work in practice. With the 
introduction of Best Value they saw no need to become involved beyond the 
level of ratification. 
WC2, commenting on the contracting accompanying Best Value, felt that 
"Management set the pace. Dance with the tune or dally out the door. Objections 
may be noted but the contract would continue". WC3 had similar feelings: 
We can spend a lot of our time making sure that officers implement 
policy efficiently and effectively, but we can't actually tell them what 
to do. Senior management is extremely influential. It takes something 
pretty serious for a councillor to overturn a well thought out senior 
officer's recommendation. Myjob, it's like non-executive director. 
WCI rationalised the dominance of management through their situation: "They 
have the expert knowledge and the skill and the time and the focus to be clear 
about how they are going to implement Best Value". WCI did however reflect 
that when the original course of contracting council services was made, the 
origin was not departmental managers: 
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That was Shirley's [Porter's) legacy. I'm sure she had a friend of a 
friend and that was why it was instantly decided to take it [council 
services] out (of council control]. I'm sure it was done with the best 
of intentions, I'mnot accusing anyone of cronyism at the expense of 
the taxpayer. No one else ever spoke on the issue. 
The course was set by the prominent politician of the day. The implementation 
was, and remained, thejob of the senior administrators: 
I and my colleagues feel that this [Best Value] is a hoop we have to 
jump through for the government and so long as the officers don't 
spend too much time on it and too much money on it, and it doesn't 
derail us from what we want to do, we're not going to get madly 
involved. So to the extent that it does not conflict with our political 
goals, then I think the dominant group [in the implementation of Best 
Value] is the senior officers (WCI). 
WC4 expressed a similar sentiment: "Politicians will win if they can be bothered 
but often they can't be bothered". It certainly appears as if managers are enacting 
Best Value according to the will of the politicians, leaving no need to 'bother' 
with intervention. 
The influence of residents was mentioned by three of the respondents: "They 
don't have much power as it stands. The local forum may improve it, but they 
tend to be dominated by one or two people" (WC2); "I would say in Westminster 
residents are quite influential and increasingly so, we're doing more consultation, 
but there is a problem with these groups, you always tend to get the same people 
(WC3); "The group whose role has increased the most is residents. It doesn't 
necessarily mean they're dominant but their role has increased, more than anyone 
else's has" (WC4). A suggestion, therefore, of at least improved involvement 
although tempered by a lack of representation. 
Finally front line workers were considered to have limited input: "We've lost 
control of staff views. Our only relationship now is with the contractors" (WC2); 
"Their role has probably increased a bit relative to before, but only a bit, not as 
much as residents" (WC3). 
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14.3 Front Line Staff 
Newham 
it would seem improbable that the front line staff in Newharn would credit 
themselves with the move to the working practices they described in chapter 
eleven, and indeed their explanation for the current state lay, in the main, 
elsewhere. 
The senior management team was considered to hold significant influence by 
two respondents, with the decision to form the six Local Service Centres, for 
example, originating from them (NWI). In general terms NW8 felt influence lay 
with: "Senior officers, they're the ones who have most clout. When you think 
about it, they're the professionals, they should know the pros and cons about 
what is being put forward". 
The notion that managers were dominant in policy implementation was not 
shared by all the respondents. NW3 believed that members were influential and 
that change "wouldn't happen if they didn't want it to happen, they dictate how 
Newham goes forward, what policies we pursue". On the other hand, NW2 felt 
that councillors had little knowledge of what was happening in terms of service 
delivery and operational structures, and cited as an example the practice where: 
, 'They still phone up and ask for senior housing officers, even though they don't 
exist any more". An additional strand to the influence of councillors was voiced 
by one of the respondents who initially sided with the suggestion of manager 
influence. NWI continued: "We have a powerful leadership as well. Robin 
Wales has a very clear idea about where he wants to go, how he sees Newham". 
NW5, recalling a conversation with Chris Wood, Newham's current Director of 
Housing: 
1 had a brief conversation with the Director of Housing when he first 
came round. He asked me was I happy with what was going on. So I 
said 'No. I think de-centralised housing is far better'. And he said 
'Yes, I do. Maybe it will change in the future'. I just don't know 
anymore, but that's what he said. 
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This extract highlights that the Director was implementing a process - the 
recentralisation of services - he disagreed with. This is not to say the Director 
considered the decision poor or even inappropriate, although two possibilities 
arise: it was not his decision, or it was a 'hard' decision made as a pragmatic 
response to Best Value pressures. 
Turning to the influence of residents the Newham front line staff felt that they 
had little effective input, and expressed some scepticism in the application of the 
new structures. NW5 for example recalled: 
There was questionnaires answered about closing district offices. It 
wasn't 'Do you [residents] want these district offices closed, would 
you prefer to keep a de-centralised housing system? ' It was 'Do you 
want Canning Town or Custom House closedT. 
During liaison with residents NW8, while feeling "disempowered" and 
"sometimes I feel as if I'm not consulting them, and that's on my conscience", 
suggested that some move towards a more democratic regime was evident. NW8 
gave examples of influencing the PFI process (as opposed to the proposition), 
and described the redevelopment of Canning Town as "... social engineering. 
You dread the [Newham] Recorder. The reality is that in terms of deciding the 
options to be taken forward, people weren't consulted". NW3 felt that tenants did 
enjoy a degree of influence, although not on broader strategic issues, rather 
"involvement will be on projects on estates". 
While it was agreed (by themselves) that front line staff had little influence on 
the decision to adopt the new structures, it was clear that they had sorne input 
during the change. This was alluded to by NW5 who suggested that some form 
of consultation with staff about change did generally take place, although: 
In Newharn Best Value consultation means when you put out some 
information, an exercise where a senior manager comes in and tells 
me 'this is what's happening, take it or leave it'. No proper 
discussion with staff. 
A formal process of consultation with staff on the Best Value reorganisation 
proposals did take place through a series Of staff forums. NWI recalled that 
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66staff were involved at an early stage, deciding the shape of the service", and 
although "that is not to say that the real decisions were not made latee'. NWI 
concluded that "it could have been a lot more stressful than it was if people 
hadn't been involved at that early stage". NW5 considered the staff involvement 
to have been contrived by management - "They had staff working in teams to 
report back to management, see how it was going. These were hand-picked 
people. It wasn't 'Do you want to volunteer? ', they picked people they wanted". 
In essence, therefore, it appears that staff were notified of imminent changes 
through a formal network, although the extent to which their input was reflected 
appears to them to have been minimal. 
Westminster 
The Westminster front line workers ascribed influence to residents and 
managers, albeit qualification and emphasis was apparent in their accounts. 
Four of the eight respondents discussed residents, and residents' groups, in the 
context of influence. WW6 noted an "improved level of respect" towards 
residents, rather than "treating them like the undeserving poor". WW6 added that 
the "style of involving residents is still crude, I don't think the Compact is very 
successful". The respondent did point to one example of influence: "Tenants 
have had input on the contracts themselves, the way they are formulated". WW4 
described resident representatives as the "people who have influence in 
Westminster ... very old school, institutional ised, quite bigoted members of the 
community". WW7 suggested that "Some of the tenants, I think i; depends on the 
rep[resentative], around the estates have quite a bit of power", although it was 
not clear what influence they had. WW7 continued: "You've got to draw a fine 
line, you can't give them too much power, but at the end of the day you've got to 
listen to them". WW2 pointed to a lack of resident inclusion: "I don't think 
there's enough consultation with the tenant, and I think we need to work on the 
culture that the Council won't do anything they say". 
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It is difficult to draw conclusions from this array of opinions, varying as they do 
between suggestions of dominance within the resident groups, and conflicting 
accounts of whether residents' opinions were taken on board. 
On the question of which other groups or individuals may influence, again, a 
variety of opinions were offered. WW2 felt that it was "hard to tell",, although the 
difficulty in identifying a source was obscured by the contracting process, and 
the influence individual contractors might have. Overall the prospect of 
contractor control led WW2 to "feel quite negative"I and this remark was made 
in the context of profit and cost cuts. WW6 stated that control lay with "Senior 
managers without a doubt. I also think councillors, but the real driver of change 
is senior management". WW3 suggested that the lead came from senior 
management, and explained this in terms of the infrequency of contact and 
isolation: 
Vic Bayliss [Director of Housing], whoever, might pop in, the odd 
email, I think that's happened twice over the last two years, it's quite 
them and us, not because we're treated badly or anything like that, 
it's just that we don't see them much (WW3). 
WW4 expressed Best Value in terms of "Something senior managers have taken 
on board" with their "emphasis on reducing costs. They will see it as improving 
quality in the performance indicators". While senior managers may, from this 
point of view, have controlled the Best Value agenda, WW4 did not feel that this 
extended to accountability: 
Ultimately we're the ones who will fall by the wayside if those things 
[performance indicators] aren't achieved. It won't be the senior 
managers, it won't be the Vic Baylisses. I think that most of the staff 
here recognise that. 
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14.4 Residents 
Newham 
Resident representatives considered a variety of actors to be influential. The 
material in this section commences with NR2's account which reflects a broad 
range of influence, followed by the opinions of the other respondents, who 
located influence more specifically. 
NR2 considered that since Best Value "The grey suits were beginning to be 
approachable. I didn't know before that you could meet these people, all they 
were to me was letterheads". This is not to say that senior officers, the 'grey 
suits', were the people in control, more that they were receptive to talking with 
representatives: "I think the Best Value they give is that they [senior managers] 
are willing to listen". In answer to the direct question 'who or what is most 
dominant in shaping your housing services under Best Value? ' the respondent 
replied "That's a hard one. The tenant involvement unit front line staff'. There 
was no suggestion here that these groups led in any way: "They're scared of 
doing something which is right because they can be accused of leading a 
meeting", although they were essential in coordinating and enabling meetings. 
This was therefore recognition of the two tier process in participation - the 
creation of legitimate assembly, and the attendance of 'amiable' key actors, 
including the front line C'we get on very well") and management staff. Overall, 
the message conveyed was one of no single source of influence and that the 
systems of organisation under Best Value provided a balanced environment 
conducive to dialogue. NR2 made these comments in the context of day-to-day 
housing management, and reflected that the residents were "getting a good 
service". On broader issues, such as regeneration, NR2 was less complimentary. 
The following comment was made following a discussion of recent publicity 
relating to redevelopment proposals: 
Don't listen to a word Robin Wales [Leader of Newham Council] 
says. Robin Wales is a politician. People hate him in Newham, they 
know what he is, they know he's all spiel, the only one they listen to 
who stands up there is Chris Wood [Director of Housing]. I'm not 
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saying that they don't know what he's up to, because people do 
know, but they'll listen to him, Chris Wood. When you come back 
[from the decant and redevelopment programme], what will the 
council tax be like? Will you want to live next door to people who 
have got Porsches outside? 
NR2 is reflecting concerns about the displacement of a part of Newham's 
community by reference to a new Porsche-owning Newham resident group. The 
respondent was physically upset at this stage in the interview at the prospect of 
the split of this established community. Further, NR2 was unsure how 
representatives' views were being received: "They are being understood, they're 
being listened to, but what they are going to do about it nobody knows". Despite 
the obvious anxiety, there remained a sense of acquiescence: I feel they know 
what they're doing, it's just a question of 'let's get the best out of it"'. As for 
how this was to arise NR2 had emphasised the cordial rapport built up with 
senior council officers, and felt that this was the way to achieve valuable input 
into strategic agendas such as the regeneration proposals, as had been 
successfully achieved at estate level. However, the respondent felt that a vocal 
minority were "abusive" to the council officers. Further, this had led to NR2's 
withdrawal from the mainstream resident forums, allowing this minority to 
continue as a destructive and non-representative force: 
I truly believe is that the Council is trying to do it [Best Value] but 
certain tenants are trying to stop them. I have absolutely no idea what 
their agenda is. The people being consulted are not the people, [the 
council] doesn't care who's representing the tenants. 
The feeling that the opportunity to engage in dialogue about the future of 
Newham's council housing might be lost was the prime concern for NR2: 
"That's why I'm scared about being knocked off every committee". Two points 
can be made here. Firstly that NR2 was not, at any point, convinced that resident 
input would actually influence the eventual outcome of the redevelopment 
proposals (council indifference to representation and "nobody knows", above). 
Secondly, NR2 believed that the group of "certain tenants" engaged in blocking 
what could be a fruitful exchange of ideas. This was an account reflecting deep 
concern about an opportunity denied to shape strategic decisions, and maintain 
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any semblance of a 'bargaining position' in the face of Newham's future vision 
for housing provision. 
NR2's account is difficult to place in terms of the appropriation of housing 
policy as it reflects all the actors considered in this work. Further, the suggestion 
of 'scattered influence' was challenged within other Newharn accounts. 
NR4 expressed influence in clear terms: "It's run by officers, and we're made to 
chase our own tails". As for how managers managed such control, NR4 offered 
two explanations. Firstly, there was the view that managers had effective control 
of the political process, where "Councillors don't know what's going on. What 
the housing scrutiny members are being told is what he wants them to hear. 
Officers tell the councillors what to say". Although the meaning is not entirely 
clear from this quotation, the significance centres partly on 'him', an Assistant 
Director, and members and residents 'being told' by officers in general. Secondly 
there was another reference to this Assistant Director who, NR4 proceeded to 
suggest, "has absolute contempt for residents. It's just him controlling things. All 
roads lead to him ... [the Assistant Director] told me I couldn't talk to 
councillors except through the Director". NR3, however, offered a different view 
of this Assistant Director, describing him as "approachable" and "a very nice 
man". 
In addition NR3 offered views on influence in the implementation of Best Value 
When asked who or what is most dominant in shaping services in Newham the 
respondent replied: "Managers, because they're approachable". The association 
here was that managers listened to the resident representatives, and acted on the 
information relayed. The problem with this account is that NR3 was using a 
variety of examples to define 'manager', including housing officers, tenant 
participation officers, housing team leaders (all defined as 'front line workers' in 
this work), as well as the Director and other senior managers. Notwithstanding 
this broad definition, it was clear that NR3 enjoyed a fruitful relationship with all 
staff- 
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The reason why they were so good is because they were so 
approachable. if I was off for a day I could walk round and go to the 
counter and ask to see them, then you'd hear the buzzer and they'd 
be down straight away, you could have a cup of tea or cup of coffee 
and say what you had to say, it works very well. 
it is not possible to read 'dominance' into NR3's account because of this sense of 
cordiality, an issue important to the respondent: 
Shouting and hollering got you nowhere, and I've been to meetings 
with our old committee and that's all they ever done, bang the table 
and walk out, and that proved nothing, you get nothing done like that. 
You rattle someone's cage and you'll get nowhere. 
The decision making environment for NR3 was therefore constructive and 
responsive, unlike times past when the main problems lay with disruptive 
resident representatives. Concerning councillors and influence, NR3 felt that 
their role was peripheral more because of capacity than opportunity: 
[Best Value] takes some explaining because it's all pie charts and 
column charts and stuff like that, certain members who haven't been 
on there for too long tend to get a bit confused, but there's enough of 
us there to help them out, and the officers help. 
overall this representative was satisfied with the implementation of Best Value 
and the involvement of all local actors, concluding: "We seem to think this isn't 
a bad old council, they are there listening. Now it's all open and above board. 
They have a brand new policy and we was involved in setting up the new 
policy". 
in general it was difficult to locate the subject of NR3s account - quite 'what' the 
council was listening to. The respondent mentioned cleaning, repairs and 
caretaking as matters considerably improved with the advent of Best Value. In 
the context of decision making no such link was explicitly given, although these 
'day-to-day' matters appeared to be of most concern. On these, as well as on the 
residents' involvement in shaping the services, NR3's account reflected a 
pluralistic relationship between all interested parties. 
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NRI's account differed from that of NR2 in terms of emphasis. During the 
interview, NRI recalled examples of decision making including ratification of 
the vision, housing benefit privatisation, the Private Finance Initiative and 
Housing Revenue Account submissions. Overall the respondent expressed some 
dissatisfaction with the involvement of residents: 
I have seen reports written [that say] 'We [LB Newham] have 
consulted the tenant reps', and I ring them up and say 'WhenT [they 
reply] 'Oh, didn't I ring you last Tuesday fortnight? '. And that is 
their consultation: me. I'm just a tenant in Newham, I'm not 26,000 
people. Even if they did tell me I probably didn't even pass that 
information on to my management committee. 
NRI. is saying that Newham's management does involve residents in decisions, 
although the manner in which this is done could be improved. NRI also 
identified a shift in the role of councillors and their relationship with residents 
since the aff ival of the cabinet system of decision making that accompanied Best 
Value. Prior to the cabinet decision making unit, "Councillors would come along 
and say 'Well I think you should know this is being talked about"', whereas the 
councillors with whom the residents had built relationships were now out of the 
decision making forum, and not cabinet members. This had resulted in a situation 
where "The scrutiny committees discuss policy after it's made and disseminate it. 
So where it used to go from the bottom to the top, it's going from the top down". 
NRI's account, and indeed those of the other Newham representatives, overlaps 
with the opinions stated in chapter eleven. In this chapter dealing with 
appropriation of policy, managers were portrayed variously as friendly, helpful, 
and obstructive; councillors as ineffective, benign, uninformed and, in the case of 
the leader, 'hated'; and front line staff referred to by one respondent as a vital 
and useful bridge between themselves and management. For the residents and 
their representatives a similarly mixed picture: a disruptive group of 
representatives, useful and constructive input on day-to-day matters, yet little 
input on 'larger' decisions made particularly at cabinet level. All of these 
comments explain more about the decision making environment than who 
actually makes decisions. This lack of clarity is partly due to the overlap between 
this section dealing with influence and the discussion in chapter ten dealing with 
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interpretation. The overall interpretation-influence link is considered again in the 
conclusion to this part. At this point it can only be stated that Newham resident 
representatives identified a variety of influences dependent upon personal 
methods of communication, the actor involved, the type of issue under 
consideration and the forum in which it was discussed. 
Wcstminster 
In general the Westminster residents recalled influence centred on managers and 
themselves. Councillors were not considered effective in influencing policy, and 
staff were not mentioned in this context. 
In answer to the question "Is any one group or individual influential in the 
implementation of Best Value? " WR2 replied: 
I would say that managers are more powerful, but at the end of the 
day they are only one group. Whether they could get another group to 
go intol cahoots with them I wouldn't like to say. 
Despite the initial reference to managers, the emphasis shifted with further 
comments - "it's so open now" (on the relationship with managers); "we're all in 
it together, we all need each other" (on councillors); and "Two years ago we 
wouldn't have been sitting discussing council policy" (on resident 
representatives). The reference to 'policy' was illustrated by a recent example, 
where the authority agreed to discuss the prospect of opening up a stairway to 
deter "people sitting and smoking their drugs". 
WRI did comment on the volume of material the authority had supplied and 
expressed some concern over an ability to understand the full context - "it takes 
time, there's only so much you can take in". Overall, however, WR2 expressed 
guarded satisfaction at the involvement of residents: 
Some people think they've got a second agenda, but I think I'll just 
take them on their word, because if you approach something 
positively then I think you'll get more out of it. 
225 
Contributions from the remaining Westminster representatives suggested a 
different interpretation of the source of influence in the authority. WRI felt that 
the main driver of change was central government policy where "funding is the 
principal restriction, the real bugbeae', and proceeded to explain that "officers 
account for the difference between local authorities", drawing on the example of 
Westminster's extensive outsourcing and the Arms Length Management 
Organisations proposal. On the issue of Arms Length Management, WRI 
continued: 
Managers control meetings totally. Some councillors feel that they 
arc almost being used. We ask for as much notice as they can give on 
the course they intend to pursue, what the results of the policy can 
actually mean, but that's what we see as our future, so when a policy 
comes up, we as a Federation can get another group of experts, but at 
the moment we can't do that, even to interpret it is difficult. A lot of 
it is social housing speak and it's not even plain English, and is 
meaningless unless you're way into the problem. Frankly many 
tenants don't know what they're being asked an opinion on and I'm 
sure the same is true of some councillors, and it's couched in a way 
that there is no alternative, if you have choice, but it's a meaningless 
choice. I think it should mean a lot more than that - whether you have 
one thing or the other, but whether you want either. It'll take us three, 
four, five years to become the main tenant group that can put forward 
an opinion based on knowledge rather than gut feeling. 
in essence WRI is suggesting that officers lead the policy agenda, and within the 
above extract a clear sense of frustration is apparent at the presentation of one 
choice (Arms Length Management) which the residents are unable, or possibly 
unwilling, to fully understand and offer informed opinion on. WR4 felt that: "An 
issue is trying to take forward strategic issues, but we'll just have to see where it 
goes". This comment was made in the context of the lack of resident involvement 
in strategy pre-Best Value, and an acknowledgement that at least structures were 
now in place to facilitate the possibility of resident inclusion. 
Councillors were presented by WRI as either those who see politics as "a 
stepping stone to Parliament and you can completely write them ofr', or the 
"dedicated ones who have a clear idea of what they want to do but lack the 
coordination to the extent that their input is meaningless". On the other hand, 
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WR4 felt that the "acid tesf 'of the new structures under Best Value would be the 
housing forum, and the interface between residents and councillors: 
I think members might be concerned that their role could be affected 
by Best Value in certain ways, they feel that they are the elected 
representatives and they can see what the needs are. I think bottom- 
up is what we are striving for. 
This links to WR2's comment above, relating to new structures, although in this 
case some disquiet is evident concerning the new role of members. The "certain 
ways" relate to the housing forum itself, together with the (at the time) proposed 
cabinet system of political administration. 
WR3 expressed a related frustration in recounting a meeting of the housing 
forum: 
The most important thing is lack of knowledge. For example, I put 
forward a motion, saying that if (this) was adopted as an option, we 
could lay down some ground rules, basic principles, and I got one 
vote, not because they [the residents] disagreed but they didn't know 
what I was talking about. We need the forum and the means of 
presenting issues. 
This is suggesting incapacity of resident representatives to engage with 
coherence and confidence at the housing forums. Lacking 'the means' effectively 
placed residents outside the decision making process. Even if resident 
representatives were able to contribute, WR3 voiced a further concern: 
We need to expand the tenants we're consulting, we've got to find 
new ways of doing that, but they're all [in their sixties] and we're 
consulting that group all the time, but we need to have a crkhe, but 
none of that is happening. This is a real problem. 
This sentiment was echoed in general terms by WR4: "Whatever level of 
participation you have, how reflective is this of the tenants as a whole? ". WR3 
also expressed a view that officers maintained a "Victorian monolith [within 
which they are] trying to keep control" and added an appreciation of financial 
constraints imposed by government on senior officers. What was not clear to the 
respondent was: 
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I don't understand why they're not saying that [the constraints are 
imposed by central government], they should say 'Tbis is the policy we'd 
like to pursue but this is the policy we're being forced to pursue'. 
As with the Newham cohort a variety of views centred on the power of residents 
and managers to influence change, with scattered references to other local actors. 
In addition the issue of overlap with the findings in chapter thirteen makes a full 
summary of the Westminster representatives' views difficult within the confines 
of this section. Full analysis has to be reserved for the summary. 
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14.5 Senior Managers 
Newham 
Newharn managers presented varied accounts of decision making. Most were 
comparative, and each contained a different emphasis, considering one, or more 
commonly, a number of groups as influential. In addition Newham's vision was 
assigned significance. 
NM2 chose to describe current influence through a comparison with past patterns 
of control. Before the advent of Newharn's vision NM2 felt that non-elected 
actors had little input - "If you compare it to several years ago in Newham they 
(councillors) probably didn't want to know what the residents thought ... the 
politicians said 'No. We run it. That's that. We don't want other people 
involved"'. 'Other people' included senior managers, where their ideas were not 
taken on board "no matter how much the senior officer wanted them to happen" 
(NM2). The change, for NM2, arrived with the creation of the vision: 
You see if you work in Newham, you know that it's almost like what 
you learned at the first day at school, it's very helpful to senior 
officers because all we do is aimed at delivering that vision ... I think 
the vision has really provided a focus in Newham. In all the time that 
I've been here, it has provided a focus for all of us in that time, and 
those developments that have taken place are seen to support 
sustained delivery of the vision. That has been supported, and any 
that wouldn't have done that, we don't do them anymore, and there 
are a number of things we don't do now. Don't ask for examples 
because I won't be able to remember because we're so locked into 
positive stuff, there are certainly things we don't do because they 
wouldn't support the vision, and therefore we don't do them. So there 
is that hub to all of it everything flies off the wheel in that way. 
This extract has been cited in full to illustrate the revered zeal with which the 
vision is considered by this staff member. To parallel the essence of a corporate 
mission statement with such a personal experience as the 'first day of school' is 
testimony to the impact on this individual. More prosaically, there are certain 
practical loci - 'sustained delivery of the vision', and exclusion of options that 
do not conform to the vision that transcend other operational considerations, 
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including Best Value. Equally, the manager does not give any suggestion about 
what the vision might mean, having 'forgotten' abandoned practices through the 
focus on 'positive stuff . 
Although not recalled with quite the enthusiasm as NM2, one other manager 
referred to the vision. NM3 suggested that Newham had "changed its approach to 
delivering services anyway", and now "Best Value is only part of a process (led 
by) a corporate vision that we never had before". The change, therefore, arose 
not because of Best Value, but by the new corporate direction it had set. NM3 
felt that this direction had been adopted by councillors who "have a vision, a 
published document", although this falls short of suggesting that the idea 
originated with members. Significantly, the vision arose because of a concern 
with the Borough's image - "We didn't want a reputation based on being the 
second poorest borough, there was a fundamental change of view, we wanted to 
get resources by saying 'leave it to us and it'll get spent best... (NM3). Further, 
the vision was not a product of consultation - it arose "irrespective of the 
consultation process, and most people would go along with that" (NMI). 
As to its origin, from their accounts the two managers felt that while councillors 
were agreeable to the vision, they were not specifically instrumental in devising 
it. it is therefore not clear who had the vision initially. 
Moving specifically to the role of actors in decision making Newharn managers 
reflected a belief that the role of residents was of some importance, although the 
commentary reflected a passive voice -a suggestion of what 'can' be done, 
rather than what was actually taking place. For example, two of the managers 
remarked: 
What we can do is we can ask people out there who pay our wages, 
'what sort of market would you like in relation to repairs and 
maintenance, anti-social behaviour, caretakers - what would you 
like? These are the funds that we have available, how would you like 
us to set it ouff (NM I). 
You need to be prepared to listen to residents, think about delivering 
what residents want in line with your core vision and purpose, senior 
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officers need to be creative and able to turn those ideas into practical 
functions that deliver the outputs (NM2). 
Aside from the reflexive aspect of these comments, two significant elements of 
constraint are evident: NMI's choice based on 'market' and 'funds', and NM2's 
reference to 'vision' and 'purpose'. Resident preference would therefore be 
sought within these guidelines. NMI also mentioned the new forum - the Tenant 
Liaison Committee (TLC) - for discussions on wider issues, and "in that way we 
are accountable in very broad policy terms to tenants". 
NM4 expressed optimism with the arrival of the new regime: "Hopefully with 
more consultation under Best Value, I would say tenants are better off', and 
NM3 reflected that there was now a "yearning to get what people wanted". This 
was expressed by NM3 in two ways: the major strategic decisions which could 
not involve residents ("You can't talk to everyone ... that's a chief officer type 
approach"), and decisions that can involve residents: 
On some of the consultation meetings I went to, people were saying 
'I've never seen my housing officer, they're always doing their 
arrears', whatever, 'we want to talk to our housing officer', that 
shaped why we went to central arrears (NM3). 
The rationale here is that housing officers; relieved of the task of rent arrears 
would have more time to speak to residents, and the manager is suggesting that 
centralising the rent control section was informed in part by residents. 
Front line staff, according to NN12, had been influential in the sense that they had 
demonstrated sufflicient flexibility to help make change work: 
... [front line stafl] are 
influential because if they hadn't been able to 
make the change then all the huff and puff that I and the leader of the 
council and everybody else would come to nothing, because the 
organisation wouldn't have changed all the way through. 
The decision to make changes under Best Value, or 'huff and puff' of members 
and senior officers, involved staff in the sense that they agreed with it or they did 
not. By cooperating with the drive to change, NM2 is implying that staff agreed 
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through deed. NM3 reinforced this view, arguing that the reorganisation was 
sensitive to staff needs in that "you've got to have a process that's fair to all 
individuals ... there's an equal opportunities policy to fulfil". Agreement of staff 
was therefore reasoned and reasonable through this equitable method of 
transition. 
In terms of their own influence, one manager felt that their role was central to 
Newham's policy course: 
I think we have got a lot of influence, I think we do have in terms of 
what we can do, the way that we can manage and control people's 
lives, and the services that we deliver, yes very much ... In terms of 
my own role I have tried to influence the service in terms of the way 
I want to do it (NMI). 
Generally, however, the influence of members and managers were mentioned in 
tandem. For example, the decision to partially centralise the housing 
management service was "driven by senior managers and members" (NM2), and 
overall NM3 recalled: 
In my opinion what happens is that if an officer has an idea they'll 
discuss it with members, some will agree, some won't, like any 
group of people. They may ask 'what will Canning Town get out of 
itT. It's about lead officers and lead members getting together, and 
then getting together with lead members of the community, but 
you've got to work at speed so you've got to have well formed ideas, 
it's not just about officers making careers out of reports. 
NM3 is acknowledging the role of members and other actors in the decision 
making process, while the important distinction is the origin of ideas, set with 
officers applying their 'well formed ideas at speed'. This was echoed by NM2: 
If you go to the politicians and say 'This is an idea which is very very 
radical, gives you loads of problems, with the trade unions even, but 
will help you deliver the vision, what do you want to? ', they will 
make their mind up pretty quickly and most of the time you can get 
on with it, take the flak, deal with the problems, whereas if you don't 
have that strong political leadership that can be lost in a committee 
for fifteen years. 
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NM2 is associating the political leadership with adherence to the vision, and a 
willingness to be persuaded by arguments that appear to fulfil vision-type goals. 
This was explained further by reference to a form of partnership between 
members and officers - while "the level of influence we can have can be 
considerable, you do have to have the politicians saying 'yes, we want them to 
have that influence"'. NM4, while not suggesting that officers led the decision 
making trail, certainly reflected an opinion of being able to influence it: 
Even though they are a Labour council councillors are absolutely 
genuine about the service to tenants. If I said to them, with a certain 
amount of evidence, that your best way forward is to get rid of the 
[in-house service], and employ someone else I think they would give 
that serious consideration, that's my feeling, they wouldn't turn 
round and say 'No chance', and I believe that, terribly focused on the 
service. 
Having established that members did want the best services for tenants available 
, despite' being Labour party members, NM4 felt that given evidence they could 
be swayed by an argument that appeared to coincide with that goal. Even so, 
NM4 concluded: "I personally feel that power is with the members, but I may be 
na*fve". 
Wcstminstcr 
Influence in Westminster, for the managers, revolved around the triangle of 
councillors, residents and themselves. Staff simply endured change. 
All of the respondents felt that residents had a significant role in deciding how 
services were delivered in Westminster: "Best Value is putting the resident, 
consumer, and the wider community, in the picture in a far more meaningful 
way" (WM2); "Who is in the driving seat? On the housing management side I 
would say that the residents are pretty high up there" (WM3); "Residents -I 
think initially we had to convince them that this was not just another talking- 
shop, and they started to see that they have more influence, and they are starting 
to embrace if'(WMI). 
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These views indicate that managers are clear that residents have 'meaningful 
influence'. This is not a picture of dominance, and sways between potential ('is 
putting', 'starting to embrace') and ambiguity ('in the picture'; placed to be, but 
not in, 'the driving seat'). The comments are directly related to the discussion 
earlier, on the way in which managers are interpreting Best Value, and the 
reconstruction of effective liaison structures and subsequent dialogue. Managers 
appeared confident that the means of expression is at least leading towards 
inclusivity of residents in decision making. This was illustrated in two ways by 
the managers - examples of successes with the new partnership, and emphasis on 
methods of discussion. 
An example of success under Best Value concerned the 'panel' system of 
consultation, where delegates of the various resident groups assembled with 
officers, contractors and councillors to discuss management issues, where 
"residents are an intrinsic part of management, rather than just sitting there 
taking pot shots, saying 'You're rubbish', we have given them real power and 
influence" (WMI). This example did serve to highlight the distinct groups of 
residents - tenants and leaseholders - with WMI adding that the presence of 
8000 lessees did "lead the agenda, where they look for value for money", WM3 
noted this characteristic above, under Compulsory Competitive Tendering, with 
the rise in "incredibly articulate" lessees during the City's enthusiastic sales 
programme. 
WM2 expressed this aspect of influence similarly, insofar as the authority 
consults with residents about what service is wanted, which "forces the client to 
articulate what service is supposed to be provided, a sort of disciplined thinking 
in terms of the specification". The authority then negotiates with the contractor to 
provide the service necessary, and in this way "residents are able to influence the 
shape of a specification". Articulating wishes, and understanding the context, had 
been eased by management through the use of non-technical communication - "I 
think the trick is not to use the Best Value language, performance indicators and 
acronyms. It's more appropriate for officers to know what BVPIs are and so on, 
but make it real for them and they can really see what they get out of it" (WM I). 
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Concerning the influence of staff WMI and WM3 did provide some feedback 
that reflected conflict and hardship during change, and a sense that staff were 
being persuaded of the arguments for housing management under Best Value. In 
recalling some of the negative aspects of change WM3 recalled: 
There were some serious misgivings from a number of frontline staff, 
some of whom had been here a long time like myself, who were just 
not comfortable with the idea of moving into the private sector ... our 
internal trading wing had very little chance of competing if they had 
stayed in-house, they had to go out, to externalise and find a partner, 
I think that staff went through a very difficult time as a result of that 
externalisation ... as you may 
know we had a little piece of industrial 
action in March [2001], there was very strong feeling about leaving 
the public sector, and not a very happy one, and I think that a very 
small number of staff actually voted with their feet. 
This extract points out that staff faced 'discomfort' at the sole option of 
externalisation, and they did experience hardship: they 'went through a difficult 
time', resorting to a strike and in some cases leaving the authority. The point to 
be drawn is that the opinions of staff were not taken into account in any major 
way, such as the reconsideration of externalising services. 
WMI suggested that the reason front line staff felt anxiety was because "they get 
wrapped up in conditions issues", but that overall the staff had "embraced the 
challenges we've put to them and they're getting more involved". The manager 
proceeded to explain the pattern of decentralised housing management that was 
now in place, and finished the contribution on front line staff and their 
involvement in decisions with the comment: "We could probably have done 
more to be honest with you". 
Managers noted the place of councillors in the decision making frame as 
receptive and sympathetic to resident input, in that they were "by and large 
persuaded of the residents' particular arguments" (WM3). WM I commented that 
councillors were, and to an extent remained, reluctant to embrace Best Value 
fully: 
Members saw it as 'Come on we are already doing this', and there is 
still some cynicism amongst members that this was creating an 
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industry when what is needed is good management. Members have 
started to realise, that there can be benefits. 
It is unclear from this statement whether WMI feels that members are seeing 
tangible benefits under Best Value, or are persuaded by argument. This is a 
similar sentiment to the consideration of staff, above, where early doubts will 
prove groundless once the 'benefits are realised'. It is perhaps more significant to 
note that none of the managers reflected any practical edge to councillors' 
cynicism, where fundamental objections to this new 'industry', for example, 
resulted in any change in practice. As to whether councillors shape Best Value 
policy in Westminster, only WN13 provided any clear indication of an opinion, 
stating that "There is no doubt that it is finally honed and ratified by the 
members". 
This was the extent of Westminster managers' commentary on members' 
involvement and importance in decision making, and overall the suggestion is 
one of passivity, with their initial disquiet overcome to some extent. 
Concerning managements' self-reflection on the dominance they have in 
decision making, WN13 considered their influence, in broad terms, as one of 
interpreting the wishes of others, and translating that into service outcomes: 
Where senior officers come in is on the cost-quality issue, in that you 
get everything back on what people would like to see. I suppose the 
challenge perceived by officers is making that work, coming up with 
proposals about how that can work in real life (WM3). 
The potential for managers to lead the decision making process was expressed by 
WMI: "Managers, obviously, are fairly pivotal because if they don't buy into it 
they can always find ten good reasons not do something, they can be a stopper". 
WM2 chose to illustrate power by reference to a detailed anecdote, describing 
decisions being "Led by not only the residents but also the wider community, 
churches, local committee groups, police, probationary services, [and] the health 
authority", as an example of the 'housing village, concept taking shape in 
Westminster. While not readily applicable to, say, day-to-day repairs, it does 
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offer an illuminating perspective of the breadth of considerations WM2 drew into 
the analysis and diffuses any suggestion that power is concentrated in the 
housing department 
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14.6 Summary 
This section summarises the views set out by the respective actors relating to 
influence during Best Value, and is organised in two sections. The first sets out 
the views of respondents from both authorities, and the second is a consideration 
of change during the implementation of Best Value. 
14.6.1 Best Value and Influence: Respondents' Views 
Councillors 
The politicians of both authorities considered they had a place in decision 
making. The difference between the two concerned their level of involvement. 
The Newharn councillors felt that they actively controlled the overall shape of 
housing services, and this was achieved with the cooperation and assistance of 
their management team. References were made to the selection and supervision 
of managers as an active and ongoing part of their remit. The Westminster 
councillors conveyed a similar impression although their role and relationship 
with managers was relatively passive; 'monitoring and trust' compared to the 
'policing and guiding' of their Newham counterparts. Managers were therefore 
seen as subordinate to councillors by councillors, although the relationship was 
different between the two authorities 
on the place of residents the Newharn councillors were confident that their 
wishes were being met through funding to meet estate-based projects and the 
new front line organisational changes. There was some doubt as to whether 
residents were being fairly represented through current structures (dominance by 
NC2's 'negative white working class men' for example) or sufficient (NCPs 
'link strengthening'). Similar feelings were expressed by the Westminster 
councillors, although there was a less confident association with influence, 
varying between 'not much' and 'most increased' under Best Value. 
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The politicians of both authorities considered the role of front line workers as 
minimal. This was described in a matter of fact way in Westminster, compared 
with the charged distinction of staff 'with or against us' expressed by the 
Newham councillors. Those willing to provide a good service were welcome 
participants in Newham. Those who were not willing could leave. Their power 
was compliance. 
Markedly similar themes were reported by the councillors, therefore, with 
differing emphases. 
Front Line Staff 
The staff of both Boroughs gave varied accounts of influence. 
The Westminster and Newharn workers both relayed the message of 'no 
influence' for themselves, although the Newharn group did recall involvement 
characterised as information dissemination, not shared by the Westminster staff. 
A suggestion of managers' power permeated through both sets of accounts. Of 
those that expressed an opinion the Newham front line staff did agree that 
managers had most influence over Best Value policy. The Westminster workers$ 
impression was more diffuse with suggestions of a management 'fingerprint' on 
service organisation, with no clear agreement. Neither account was unequivocal 
or strident. 
On resident influence both sets of workers considered that they were consulted 
on Best Value changes, and this did not translate to influence. Isolated exceptions 
to this overall message included the notion of influence over estate issues in 
Newham, and that some resident representatives were able to influence contract 
specifications in Westminster. 
Councillors' influence was mentioned by two Newham respondents, with 
comments of 'powerful leadership' and 'dictating policy', and one worker was 
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unconvinced of councillors' awareness of organisational change at all. 
Westminster staff made few references to councillors in the context of power. 
Overall, the only two consensual points were that front line workers have little 
influence, and that influence seemed to come variously from either management, 
councillors or residents. 
Residents 
The resident representatives' accounts reflected opinion on a variety of themes. 
Views on the representativeness of resident delegates were expressed by both 
sets of respondents. In Newham three accounts highlighted 'disruptive table 
bangers' causing an unruly and non-productive atmosphere. Two of the 
Westminster respondents expressed concern that the demographic profile of 
residents had not been reflected in their representatives. This was an example of 
potential influence misplaced in both authorities, with different reasons attached. 
The probability of realising influence was considered limited by both sets of 
respondents. In the case of Westminster this conclusion is deduced from the 
opening responses when neither residents nor their representatives were listed as 
4of influence'. The one exception to this was the reference to an 'open forum' by 
one respondent, and the subsequent estate management success. In Newharn the 
situation was similar. Accounts of fruitful exchanges between council staff and 
resident representatives were recalled, when opinions could count. The clearest 
example of this was given by NR3 associated with local estate matters. Two 
other respondents (NRI and NR4) were less complimentary about the 
relationship, reflecting that they were told rather than asked about impending 
changes. 
Linked to the opportunity and merit of informing decisions was the notion of 
capacity; the ability to contribute constructively to debate. The issue was of most 
concern to Westminster respondents with comments such as 'lack of knowledge' 
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and large amounts of information to 'take in'. In Newharn by contrast one 
representative recollected giving assistance to councillors on occasion. 
On the influence of other actors, several comments arose. In Newham NR2 
expressed respect for council officers delegated to oversee a programme of 
resettlement. S/he felt that senior managers, approachable and helpful, were 
delegated to administer overarching changes in the Borough orchestrated by the 
political leadership. This sense of unassailable political process directly 
attributable to Best Value was also referred to by NRI. While powerless in this 
process, and deeply sorrowful of it, NR2 felt happy with the involvement and 
influence in day-to-day matters pending these more substantial changes. Other 
representatives in Newharn referred to variously obstructive, helpful and 
ostensible involvement by managers. Similarly one Westminster respondent 
recalled open and fertile dialogue with managers, the group identified with 
$getting things done'. Others referred to managers in a less complementary way, 
talking of 'control' and the difficulty in voicing opinion on strategic matters. 
These comments were couched in faintly optimistic terms as the new structures 
for involvement were just taking root. 
Four issues, therefore, were identified for the resident representatives: 
disagreement and conflict amongst their ranks; opportunity to input; capacity to 
input; and influence centred on politicians and managers. 
Senior Managers 
Two of Newham's managers placed great store in the Borough's vision. This was 
the source of inspiration governing change, and any decisions consistent with the 
vision were, more or less, justified. As for who made 'vision-like' decisions 
managers felt that they were a necessary ingredient with sufficiency arising from 
other sources: councillor agreement or complicity; resident and staff 
involvement, and guidance from consultants' reports. The Westminster managers 
did not refer to any underlying theme as informing decisions. Their account of 
influence was otherwise similar to that of the Newham group. It would be 
appropriate to conclude that managers of both councils see themselves as 
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juggling a variety of considerations, and that they interpret and implement policy 
according to these influences. 
Councillors in Newharn were considered influential by management, at least 
insofar as they would need to be persuaded of proposed policy changes. The 
impression gained from the Westminster managers was that councillors were 
benign yet involved, with an underlying, possibly patronising, view of that 
involvement as peripheral, with phrases used relating to 'persuading of 
argument', gradual awareness of issues, and 'honing and ratifying' decisions. 
While the place of councillors could be construed as an obstacle the relationship 
between the councillors and managers in both councils was portrayed as 
cooperative and productive. 
Staff were not considered influential by either set of managers. Their 
acquiescence and, in some cases, sacrifice was acknowledged together with an 
expression of remorse at not having involved staff to a greater extent by one 
Westminster manager. Taken at the extreme representation, managers considered 
that the legitimate way in which staff could express their disquiet would be to 
leave their job. 
The Newham managers articulated engagement of residents in decision making, 
and examples were given where they could inform policy. This affirmative 
stance was set against more subdued and qualified language such as a 'yearning' 
to involve residents, and 'hopefully' they would become more involved. In 
addition parameters for involvement were referred to, notably funding 
constraints, market choices and the vision. The emphasis narrowed in 
Westminster with involvement enthusiastically reported on contract 
specifications. The inference overall is that Newham managers see resident 
opinions informing the overall policy environment within constraints, and 
Westminster managers see residents' input as significant in manipulating a part 
of that environment. 
Taken as a whole the key differences between the managers' explanations of 
influence are Newham's underpinning importance of the vision, a more 
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reverential opinion of politicians, and broader resident involvement in change. 
The views on their own role and the role of staff were aligned between the two 
authorities. This finding only partially explains who or what drives change under 
Best Value from a manager's perspective. It serves mainly to highlight the 
variables and differing emphases between them. 
14.6.2 Influence, Best Value and Change 
Five aspects of change concerning influence and policy implementation can be 
identified. 
Firstly, the role of front line workers in Newharn appeared to have become 
consolidated. Chapter eleven contains references to working in partnership with 
employees and their unions to enable transformation. The co-operative spirit of 
this coalition was not reflected in the field research, with the overall impression 
that front line staff endured rather than embraced the changes that were taking 
place described in chapter thirteen. 
Secondly, the role of councillors in Newham shifted from frustrated 
powerlessness to active control over housing service changes taking place. Their 
vision statement that pre-dated Best Value, could now be pursued with greater 
ease. For the Westminster councillors concerns over controversy associated with 
past service decisions had, to a large extent, been allayed. References to 
particular councillors were made in the interviews. In Westminster the impact of 
a previous leader (Shirley Porter) was remarked upon, with no sense of a leading 
figure under Best Value. In Newham, the current council leader (Robin Wales) 
had been mentioned in the context of Compulsory Competitive Tendering and 
the direction of the Borough. In this chapter references were made to 'core 
councillors', and no single councillor Was attributed with particular dominance. 
Thirdly, residents of both authorities commented upon the increased opportunity 
to contribute to decision making processes, with a marked change for the 
Westminster respondents. This was tempered by comments relating to the 
inability to influence particularly strategic decisions, conflict within resident 
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groups, and the dominance of managers in Westminster, and the combination of 
managers and councillors in Newham. Managers of both authorities commented 
upon the increased role of residents in decision making. This was partially 
verified within the residents' accounts of day-to-day decisions, although these 
accounts recalled that influence over strategic matters had remained minimal. 
Fourthly, Newham's managers spoke of an improved environment in which they 
could pursue changes not possible under Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
Sustaining the semblance of a market-influenced housing service had created 
stress and stifled innovation. They now helped shape decisions (this was agreed 
by other respondents) with the vision serving as a crucial guide. The Westminster 
managers' accounts reflected continuity between Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering and Best Value. 
The final change during Best Value concerned the coalitions that had been 
formed. The clearest example of partnership that had arisen was between 
Newham's managers and councillors. Although this recent link has to be partially 
inferred - no explicit mention of difficulties between these two groups was 
revealed during Compulsory Competitive Tendering - clear evidence of mutual 
support and involvement arose on questions of Best Value implementation. 
Evidence of an alliance between managers and, to a lesser extent, front line staff 
and residents was also commented upon in both authorities. However, as 
discussed in point three, above, this could only be considered constructive in the 
case of day-to-day matters. 
This section has provided an account of influence, and changing influence, 
during Best Value. A fuller appreciation of altered relationships requires a 
consideration of each of the matters covered in this part: the situation prior to 
Best Value, and issues of interpretation and influence during this early stage of 
implementation. This is undertaken in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
Field Research Summary 
This chapter presents the field study findings in two sections. The first considers 
the changes that took place during the research period. The second section is an 
appraisal of how changes took place. It has been the contention that managers 
will, if they are able, direct change to suit their preferences. This chapter is 
therefore a reflection on the field data based on these two elements: change and 
influence. 
15.1 Change and Best Value 
The field data revealed a number of changes that arose following the 
implementation of Best Value, and these can be broadly categorised as changes 
to scrviccs, influcncc and idcological alignmcnt. 
Services received comparatively little comment during the interviews. The 
performance data (table seven) revealed significant changes in costs of service 
provision, with increases in Newharn and decreases in Westminster. Any effect 
of these changes was not reflected in actors' opinions of service change to any 
marked extent. 
Influence was the main theme of the field research, and received comment from 
all groups of respondents at each stage of the interviews. During the feedback on 
interpretation of Best Value (chapter thirteen) comments centred on the Compact 
as a potential vehicle of influence, with the optimism of managers countered by 
general negativity from the residents. Chapter fourteen predictably provided the 
clearest picture of shifting influence under Best Value, with the largest changes 
arising in Newham. Here, councillors reported a central role in determining 
service orientation not experienced under Compulsory Competitive Tendering; 
residents found inclusion on day-to-day matters had increased, although input on 
strategic decisions remained inadequate; staff had come to tolerate the new 
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regime; and managers were enjoying increased freedom to innovate and shape 
services according to Best Value. In Westminster the impression gained was one 
of safe consolidation; changes had been subtle with the key hurdles, including 
staff complicity and the move to contracted services, overcome during 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. 
Newham's ideological direction received emphatic comment from councillors, 
with Best Value seen as broadly compatible with changes envisioned. Managers 
were generally more cautious, providing qualified reinforcement of the 
politicians' enthusiasm. As with influence, Westminster respondents offered a 
more restrained appraisal of the impact of Best Value, centred on continuity 
rather than change. 
The following section provides a fuller analysis, again drawn from the field data, 
of how and why these changes arose. 
Context, Policy and Influence 
Best Value arrived as an answer to a problem. The problem was twofold: the 
need to increase the efficiency of local authorities, and the failure of the 
forerunner, Compulsory Competitive Tendering, to do this. Chapter ten was a 
description of the situation prior to Best Value, informed by interviews from 
those with first hand experience of events that took place. 
Westminster embraced Compulsory Competitive Tendering with enthusiasm and 
created a partially contracted model of provision. Newharn was originally 
politically opposed to Compulsory Competitive Tendering. The decision to later 
volunteer for Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and innovate generally, arose 
from a drive to solve problems by changing approach through a form of general 
dynamism. As one manager remarked: "Why do we do it? We've always been 
that way, and I think we've attracted good staff along the way, and over a period 
of time councillors, directors come and go, but that momentum to see change has 
always been there" (NIV13). The accounts, particularly those from the other 
managers, councillors and staff referred to a particular change that arose in 
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Newham, rather than this opinion of an innately flexible authority. Indeed, the 
adoption of Compulsory Competitive Tendering could at first sight be considered 
a radical response from a staunchly Labour authority. Overall, the respondents 
agreed considerable change happened around 1994 (this was also bome out in the 
literature survey) through councillor leadership - the "few young councillors" in 
the words of NC I. 
Change, to move away from a Borough synonymous with poverty, was 
characterised by 'blue sky thinking' and a new, open, engagement with 
alternative modes of provision set in the light of a blunt assessment of poor past 
service provision. As part of this introspective, two key events can be identified 
as significant. The first was the formulation of Newham's vision in 1997, a 
statement of clear intent and a near-universal point of reference for the 
councillors and managers. The second was the announcement, also in 1997, of 
Best Value. Best Value created an opportunity to meld Government policy with a 
new ideology. 
This notion of opportunity marks the difference between Newham and 
Westminster. Both shared a commitment to Best Value. The signiflicant point that 
arose in the field study was the nature of that commitment. For Westminster Best 
Value was seen as a continuation of past practice. For Newham Best Value 
created the opening to address what were seen as fundamental problems with 
their housing management service. 
The ways in which actors were engaging with Best Value was set out in chapter 
eleven. In Newharn the lead and general impetus arose from politicians, who in 
turn delegated the translation of Best Value process to Newharn method to their 
management tearn. In Westminster the implementation of Best Value was 
followed by their management team. The ways in which Best Value was 
implemented led from the signals generated by these groups. In Newharn 
implementation was characterised by reference to generalities set out within the 
vision such as customer focus and modernity: a political implementation. In 
Westminster implementation was enabled through managerial orientation of Best 
Value to existing practice: a technical implementation. 
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The technical rationale of Newham's decisions to shape services under Best 
Value was not shown to be understood by managers, or any other actor within 
the Borough. Decisions rested on the need to change, without any clear 
indication about why change was necessary beyond the vision, and the extent to 
which it and Best Value were compatible. As for the nature of change, the 
direction set, while appearing open, featured the frequent suggestion of external 
providers. The only evidence of this direction realised was Newham's housing 
benefit service, a decision unanimously discredited (by those that expressed an 
opinion) during the interviews and subsequently reversed. A similar lack of 
assuredness associated other aspects of the implementation of Best Value, 
including the Private Finance Initiative and the Local Service Ccntres. However, 
and despite the lack of precision with which current implementation could be 
appraised, it was clear that confidence in the political direction remained for the 
councillors and managers. 
In Westminster the technical basis of implementation was expressed in an 
assured manner, with managers drawing on refinements to past practice. The 
need for observance of underlying political direction was acknowledged, 
although it did not constitute a reason for any particular service decision. For 
Westminster the processual requirements of Best Value and the technical 
articulation of those processes could be accommodated within a consolidated 
ideological framework. In Newham this state had not yet been reached. 
Alongside these technical and political aspects of implementation is resident 
involvement. In Newham the residents indicated familiarity with and, in some 
cases, an understanding of the Authority's vision. The issue for the residents was 
the inability to negotiate any sense of control over strategic decisions that arose. 
This situation was in part related to capacity and the difficulties associated with 
understanding how, as the vision makes clear, those decisions would benefit 
themselves and their communities. The situation was also related to the 
relationships between the residents and the authority and within the 
representative groups. For day-to-day affairs the interface proved reliable and 
conducive, and residents were generally content with the exchange in this regard. 
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For strategic decisions, the resident representatives expressed frustration with 
both their own ranks and the conflicts within, and the direct involvement they 
had with Newham's management. In Westminster, the residents reflected a 
similar experience although their engagement with day-to-day issues, such as the 
negotiation of contract terms and lessee involvement, was more clearly 
expressed. 
In both boroughs, front line staff had little direct influence over changes under 
Best Value although a distinction could be detected in the way this was managed. 
in Newharn the staff were involved in the implementation of Best Value, with a 
ready flow of information and an awareness of the political context in which 
change was taking place. In Westminster staff were, in essence, told of service 
changes with little evidence of consultation. The requirement for compliance was 
the same in both authorities although the matter of information exchange 
appeared to be a necessary element in Newham. 
In conclusion the implementation of Best Value at a strategic level was marked 
by two characteristics. 
The first concerned the extent to which the ideological alignment of a local 
authority to a new policy is consolidated. If the political context is established, as 
it was in Westminster, that policy can be enacted in a methodical way by those 
technically able and empowered. 
The second concerned the management and reconciliation of relationships within 
the Authorities. This aspect of implementation was important in Newham 
pending political realignment. The councillors required strong assurance that 
their managers would devise methods of delivery in line with their vision and the 
requirements, as they interpreted them, of Best Value. Managers in turn required 
authority from the political leadership, and autonomy within ideological 
boundaries. An additional and complex aspect of relationships during 
implementation arose between managers, and residents and staff. These 
relationships were especially profound in Newham. Newham managers acted to 
conciliate these groups. For residents this involved an open dialogue, on the 
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matters of principle and detailed aspects of service provision, and for staff 
informing them of change. 
The key difference between Newharn and Westminster during the 
implementation of Best Value was the nature of leadership. In Newharn this was 
characterised by the mutually supportive partnership between managers and 
politicians. In Westminster implementation was dominated by strong managerial 
leadership. In essence political leadership marked the nature and pace of strategic 
change, and the character of Best Value implementation. 
The overall argument in this thesis is that the implementation of Best Value will 
produce unpredicted effects. The theoretical basis of this argument was that 
managers, far from facing constraints implicit within Best Value, would be able 
to enact strategies in their own interest. The adequacy of this line of enquiry is 
addressed in the thesis conclusion. The review of Best Value in part two 
suggested a variety of routes could be open to local authorities seeking 
compliance with Best Value. Whichever route becomes adopted is a product of 
the lattice of local relationships revealed in the field work and the political 
context in which they exist. 
A final consideration of the ways in which councils are interpreting Best Value, 
and the reasons behind certain patterns of implementation, is discussed in part 
'five, the thesis conclusion. 
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PART FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined Best Value policy; its background, content and possible 
manifestations. Implementation of the policy was explored from a theoretical 
perspective, and the ideas and observations were tested in a field study centred 
on two London local authorities. 
The central research question is: 'In what ways were local relationships redefined 
following the introduction of Best Value? '. This question was refined through 
the use of three specific questions: 'How is current implementation dependent on 
past practice and circumstance? '; 'To what extent is the implementation of Best 
Value in line with the expectations of those associated with Best Value 
processes? '; and, 'Is any group or individual associated with Best Value 
processes able to influence implementationT. 
This conclusion has two aims: to summarise the research, and to consider the 
answer to the central research question in the light of the theoretical approaches 
discussed. The objectives are to appraise the usefulness of the research and 
suggest avenues and approaches for future investigations in this field. 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
16.1 Thesis Summary 
In this section the approach used and the data findings are surnmarised. 
Part one, the thesis introduction, lists three reasons for this research and a central 
research question: 'In what ways were local relationships redefined following the 
introduction of Best Value? '. Concern with the notion of 'outcome' combined 
with insights from theoretical and policy analysis led to three sub-questions 
centred on the importance of context interpretation and influence. These 
questions, or hypothesised variables, were interrogated throughout the remainder 
of the thesis in three ways: analysis of Best Value policy; theoretical 
explanations of local policy outcomes and a field study. 
This analysis of Best Value in part one was marked by three broad investigable 
possibilities: 
1. The first concerned the context in which Best Value is set. It was suggested 
that this may be of importance in the interpretation and implementation of the 
policy, and led to the first sub-question relating to past practice and 
circumstance. 
2. The second concerned Best Value. In essence the leaning was to search and 
find precisely what 'kind' of policy this is. Best Value appears to necessitate 
a variety of requisites - increased quality of services at a lower cost, 
measurement of welfare services, accountability, detailed monitoring of 
provision, and a plurality of involvement and influence. Providing any kind 
of prognostic analysis from a description of this unique (for British public 
policy) fusion of elements was problematic. This was however the task set at 
the beginning of the dissertation, and to understand the likely modes of 
implementation the second sub-question concerning expectations under Best 
Value was presented. 
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3. The third concerned who might be in a position to direct the shape of service 
provision under Best Value. This facet was of particular interest given the 
prominence residents' opinions are explicitly given, and led to the third 
question on influence. 
These three elements were considered important aspects of policy 
implementation. Chapter two appraised a variety of theoretical ideas that could 
guide the research, and establish the direction local agencies and agents might 
like, and be able, to explore and attain. Achieving a measure of clarity was 
tackled through the theoretical examination of these points, with the conclusion 
that mcso-level field research, using theory developed by Patrick Dunleavy, 
would provide a suitable framework for investigation. 
Part two examined change during Compulsory Competitive Tendering, and 
anticipated change during Best Value. 
On the first point, it was concluded that local authority actors had experienced an 
environment in which significant changes had taken place. These related to, for 
example, councillors' reduced direct involvement with services, and poorer 
conditions for front line staff. These changes had been mediated at a local level 
between four main groups: councillors, residents, managers and front line 
workers. However, from the research available, it was not clear how change was 
managed beyond association with certain domains, with management and 
councillor interest centred on strategic matters, and staff and residents' 
involvement with day-to-day services. 
Concerning change during Best Value, the conclusion drawn was that a number 
of routes could be followed. Chapter five concentrated on three possible 
scenarios: continued in-house provision, stock transfer and hybrid solutions 
involving third parties. Of these, continued in-house provision would prove 
difficult, especially in light of the additional funding available to Arms Length 
Management Organisations for example. 
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The move from Compulsory Competitive Tendering to Best Value was 
summarised in chapter six. Three points were made. Firstly, past patterns of 
service delivery would be important in the implementation of Best Value. The 
reason this point held importance was related to the variety of routes open to 
local authorities. The second point concerned interpretation of Best Value. 
Having established that a number of interpretations could apply, and previous 
patterns of service delivery were of importance, it was necessary to determine the 
ways in which Best Value was being considered. Finally, the matter of local 
influence. This point was raised because of the significance of resident 
involvement within Best Value, and indications that resident influence had not 
been a prominent requirement of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Overall, 
the conclusion drawn at the end of part two was that considering change under 
Best Value involved more than appraising policy differences. Change would 
involve past circumstances, competing and complementary interpretations, and 
success and failure in rcalising those interpretations. 
The aim in part three was to explain, using theoretical ideas introduced in part 
one, how the questions of context, interpretation and influence could be 
considered within field-based research. 
The first stage of analysis was an explanation of the general shift in British 
public policy. This shift was explained in terms of public choice theory, with the 
conclusion that Best Value could limit the harmful intervention of managers as 
they, in public choice terms, inflate budgets, overstate supply and restrict the 
flow of information. 
The second stage involved deciding whether public choice was based on sound 
reasoning, and was addressed through an evaluation of another, broadly 
competing, theoretical idea. As the point of focus, the bureau shaping thesis 
advanced by Patrick Dunleavy was discussed in chapter eight. The basis of 
Dunleavy's ideas dovetailed with many of the issues raised to that point in the 
thesis, most specifically the three elements (context, implementation and 
influence) drawn from the earlier theoretical and policy discussions. These were 
also ideas that did fit with the key issues identified to answer the research 
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questions. The main attraction of Dunleavy's model was his suggestion of how a 
particular form of organisation would arise: the strategies of bureau shaping. 
Managers would act to isolate themselves from operational matters. 
Consideration of public choice rationality and bureau shaping strategies therefore 
lent an interesting perspective on the issue of change following the 
implementation of Best Value. In which direction would managers push: towards 
empires or enclaves? 
What remained was a practical test of these ideas. The chosen frame was simply 
and loosely based on the three research sub-questions generated earlier in the 
thesis. As suggested, these matched some of the crucial aspects of Dunleavy's 
ideas. Dunleavy placed importance on a 'safe' environment for strategies to be 
enacted: it was therefore important to establish matters of context and 
$alignment'; actors' 'place in time'. He also looked at the way in which 
organisations changed shape, and considered that managers would seek to 
distance themselves from 'front line drudgery': it was therefore important to 
understand how actors were interpreting Best Value. Finally, it was suggested 
that his ideas could be applied to 'empire checking' policies such as Best Value, 
whereupon managers could turn the policy in quite the opposite direction to that 
predicted by public choice thinking. It was therefore important to establish who, 
if anyone, was controlling the way in which Best Value would be implemented. 
The field study was based around these three constructs, upon which it was 
judged that a description and explanation of Best Value implementation could be 
established. 
Chapter eleven (Published Accounts) established two 'willing' authorities: both 
had enthusiastically adopted Best Value and set similar operational targets. Two 
significant differences were identified. The first was the relatively evolved nature 
of Westminster's housing service, with a largely contracted mode of provision. 
The second was the apparently smooth transition to Best Value in Westminster. 
Newham's adoption of Best Value was characterised by many obstacles: 'crap' 
services, ideological change, recalcitrant staff and a general failure to contract 
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services despite their early adoption of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. The 
point relating to poor services was not entirely borne out by perfon-nance data. 
The borough's costs, in particular, compared favourably with those of 
Westminster. Despite this apparent anomaly, the thrust of Newham's message 
was the drive for change and the borough, by the reasoning behind the 
4alignment' question, would in practice find the move to Best Value more 
difficult. 
Chapter twelve (Pre-Best Value Context) confirmed the message of the published 
accounts: Newham was heavily 'misaligned' to Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering notwithstanding their pilot experience. The main similarity arose with 
the consideration- of participation, with conflicts recalled by resident 
representatives seemingly 'forgotten' by the other respondents of both councils. 
The difference between the two authorities reported by actors was not any issue 
of administrative substance, such as a lack of funds. The difference lay in image, 
and this was vividly characterised by councillors in Newham as a time of 
'disruptive', 'fraught' and 'reactive' relationships with residents, workers and 
Government. Overall, advocates of Best - Value (broadly, managers and 
politicians in both authorities) would find their opinions more palatable and 
4enactable' in Westminster than Newham. If Newham could negotiate this matter 
of image, and smooth the relationships with antagonists, it appeared that the 
authority would be better placed to implement Best Value. 
Chapter thirteen (Interpretations of Best Value) revealed marked differences in 
the ways actors considered Best Value. The key interpretive theme was 
consultation, a major part of Best Value through the Tenants' Participation 
Compact. Councillors and managers considered that their relationship with 
residents was productive and open. Residents did not. The exception to this 
disparity related to inclusion on day-to-day matters, which had improved with 
Best Value. The interviews and non-participative observation revealed 
patronising and marginalising treatment of residents on strategic matters, 
particularly in Newham. 
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Managers and councillors projected the potion that they would accommodate any 
mode, contracted or in-house, provided that an improved service would follow. 
'Improved service' meant, by and large, adherence to the national Best Value 
indicators. Some irritation was expressed by managers and councillors with the 
monitoring and measurement regime.. These reservations were expressed in 
administrative terms, as a burden, rather than say lack of sensitivity or 
appropriateness. The technical performance, audit and inspection aspects of Best 
Value were of little concern to residents. 
The Newham councillors ascribed great significance to the importance of Best 
Value as a process to reinforce their vision, whereas the Westminster politicians 
were content to let Best Value 'unfold' as a coincidental aspect of what would 
have taken place in any event. Newham's vision was mentioned frequently by 
their management as an important locus and legitimacy for service changes. 
In Westminster the method of Best Value service provision was a matter of 
record. The service was already contracted, and the latest proposals reflected 
refinements to their contracting method. In Newham the future was uncertain. 
The clearest substantial example of change was Newham's Canning Town 
Private Finance Initiative scheme where residents were effectively blocked from 
contributing to the actual decision. 
Chapter fourteen (Influence and Best Value) established the powerlessness of 
front line workers. This was of significance in Newham in light of references to 
past union organisation and the suggestion of influence. This appears to have 
ended. The remaining influence in both authorities revolved around the triangle 
of councillors, residents and managers. Managers and councillors of both 
authorities thought residents had reasonable input into the manner of housing 
management under Best Value. Residents, with some exceptions relating to day- 
to-day services, disagreed. Within these common factors an important distinction 
arose: the place of councillors. In Newham the portrayal (by themselves and 
others) was one of a highly influential, 'hiring and firing' and determined 
political group. The Westminster councillors were passive to a greater extent. 
'Benign' would understate their role; the impression given was that they would 
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and could intervene if the need arose. That requirement had not arisen in 
Westminster. 
Within these accounts of context, interpretation and influence it became possible 
to clarify the answer to an important question: how local actors would like to see 
Best Value implemented. It is notable that none of the respondents chose to 
'interpret Best Value' in terms of quantitative data. For example, Best Value 
could have meant percentage increases or cost savings. 'Outcomes', or at least 
the route to them, was expressed in rather different ways between groups and 
individuals. 
For residents the key issue clearly related to involvement. In general there was an 
affirmative message attached to influence and involvement in day-to-day matters 
such as 'drug users on stairs' and the 'nuts and bolts' for example. The Newham 
representatives relayed a message of being excluded from any influence over the 
strategic issues they became aware of. 'Strategic' specifically meant the Private 
Finance Initiative, rent levels and redevelopment proposals in Newham. The 
Westminster representatives did not make such a clear delineation between 
strategic and day-to-day matters. Their message was that involvement was 
readily available, although whether their voice and opinion was taken notice of 
was difficult to determine: opinions varied between hope and pessimism. A 
similar feeling accompanied available forums, with Westminster's newly 
introduced panel 'on trial'. The cabinet system in Newham had changed the 
perception of decision making from one of 'bottom up' to 'top down'; matters 
had deteriorated since Best Value. Services such as repairs and estate cleaning 
were mentioned by respondents from both authorities. While improvements were 
desired, the key theme - the 'required outcome' for residents - was influence, 
and this had not arisen in either authority. 
Front line staff expressed dissatisfaction relating to their conditions of work, with 
the Newham. group dernotivated by workloads and the Westminster group by 
pay. Overall, their views were similar, and similarly split, relating to services and 
organisation of administration. It is therefore not possible to state with any 
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precision staff views on Best Value outcomes, and changes that might reasonably 
have been expected, aside from the comments on conditions. 
Staff and residents were not in the main satisfied by events under Best Value. 
Councillors and managers were more satisfied, and their views reflected 
optimism about the changes taking place. 
Managers in both authorities noted that since Best Value consultation with 
residents and administration of services, both lacking during Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering, had improved considerably. Both groups also expressed 
confidence in their authority's methods and performance. 
Newharn councillors felt that Best Value was an important adjunct to their 
continuing ideological reorientation while Westminster councillors, somewhat 
wary of 'deflection', maintained a stoical outlook. The significant distinction 
between the two authorities was expressed by Newham councillors and 
managers. This related to the change necessary to become a 'modem' council. 
Best Value in this sense was important for Newham and relatively 
inconsequential for Westminster. 
The summary of the field study, chapter thirteen, concluded that the essence of 
implementation lay with leadership. In Westminster leadership lay with 
management and their technical interpretation of Best Value. In Newham 
politicians and managers determined change. 
The account in this section has, to this point, described the main findings of the 
research. What follows is an answer to the central research question. 
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16.2 Relationships and Best Value 
The aim of this section is to summarise the evidence obtained from the field 
studies. This information is required to answer the central research question: 'In 
what ways were local relationships redefined following the introduction of Best 
ValueT. The answer to this question is, in the first instance, drawn solely from 
the field data organised according to the questions asked. 
Firstly, is current implementation dependent on past practice and circumstance? 
The answer to this question is a qualified 'yes', and the significant point to 
consider is the extent to which the fingerprint of past patterns of organisation 
delivery and political orientation mesh with the processual requirements of Best 
Value. The literature associated with Best Value indicates that Newham had 
progress to make in several areas. For example, references were made to 'hostile' 
staff, unions, and councillors, particularly on the issue of externalising services. 
In addition, the theme of Newharn's future was change. This was in contrast to 
the picture portrayed by Westminster, where change was characterised as 
evolution, and not the transformation anticipated in Newham. It is likely that 
Westminster will implement Best Value, and produce the types of cost-quality 
outcomes described in chapter one, with relative ease compared to Newham 
because of its strategic alignment. It might therefore be assumed that 
relationships in Westminster will not change to the extent of those in Newham. 
Whether this assumption holds, and the matter of which relationships change and 
in what way, can be assessed following consideration of the second research 
question. 
The second question to inform the central research question concerned actors' 
expectations and Best Value. Managers and councillors were broadly in favour of 
the policy although for different reasons. Councillors were concerned with 
bolstering (Newharn) or maintaining (Westminster) their respective ideological 
directions, and in this sense 'doing' Best Value presented no problems in use. 
When taken in this manner of a verb, the managers' interpretation gave a 
practical meaning to Best Value. Best Value meant improved resident 
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involvement and administration of services and an open appreciation of 
competition. Both sets of managers supported performance indicators, although 
not necessarily those prescribed by Best Value, and a confident and possibly 
tolerant view of the inspection service. In other words Best Value process could 
achieve Best Value costs and quality. These two sets of interpretations were 
compatible: the process 'sits' within the ideology. 
Residents' expectation of Best Value was expressed, in the main, in terms of 
their involvement in Best Value processes. There was a general satisfaction with 
involvement in day-to-day service provision, and with some exceptions, services. 
Feelings differed, between frustration and resignation, on the matter of 
involvement in Best Value strategic decisions relating to the mode of provision 
including service organisation (location of housing service off"ices for example), 
Arms Length Management and PFI. 
Analysis of staff views was problematic in that 'strong' opinions were hard to 
elicit. The consolidated sense of resignation to issues such as pay, stress and 
workload with no sign or sight of respite or remedy broadly charactcrised their 
view. 
The expression of expectation is an important aspect of implementation for two 
reasons. Firstly, if any group's (or groups') interpretation is put into practice, 
particularly if their interpretation is not shared by others, then it is the joint 
matter of group and perception that is of importance. Secondly, interpretation has 
heightened significance if it varies considerably within an organisation. The 
substantial point of variation concerned resident representatives', interpretation 
of consultation and involvement. In essence resident representatives in Newham 
were excluded from input over broad strategic decisions. Where influence could 
be detected it was on local, estate or even dwelling specific affairs. On broader 
decisions, such as the PFI and office locations, residents in Newham had little 
effective control. This sense of powerlessness was detected in Westminster, 
although it was not relayed with the same urgency, emotion or significance. The 
pace and nature of change in Newharn far exceeded that in Westminster, with 
261 
associated heightened 'trauma'. The significant point is that this was not a shared 
interpretation: it did not 'sit' within that of councillors or managers. 
Therefore interpretation is significant if it varies, and if it leads to realisation of 
that interpretation. This latter point leads to the third sub-question and influence. 
The field studies revealed a form of 'group lobby' in the realisation of influence, 
and this arose from the relationship between managers and politicians. The lattice 
of the six potential primary relationships was illustrated earlier in the dissertation 
(p. 61). 
The relationship between managers and councillors was the most dependent to 
arise, and was portrayed as one of constructive cooperation. Should this link 
become characterised by conflict it is uncertain with which group - councillors 
or managers - influence would lie. The strong inference that could be drawn was 
that politicians' will would prevail, although this could not be enacted in an 
operational sense without management application. Significantly councillors 
would only 'fire' (if this was an option) if managers had in some way acted 
improperly. This finding can be drawn with confidence from the Newham. data 
where councillors 'hire and fire' according to a vision-type mandate. The key 
broad certainty is that managers and councillors act in a way that complements 
the political direction and the operational realisation of that direction. 
A simplified representation of issues arising, and interpretation under Best Value 
is set out in figure seven which illustrates a process for managers from 'issues' 
arising, to 'actors' and their place in addressing these issues. I'llis figure lists a 
variety of issues discussed throughout part four, each of which have been 
affected by Best Value. An important point when comparing the two councils is 
that Newharn managers have to do more, they have to work harder to persuade 
actors, because the distance from what Newharn is to Newharn as a Best Value 
authority is greater than the transition faced by Westminster managers. For 
example, Westminster has far fewer staff to 'inform', and a well established 
competitive environment that has virtually passed the stage of 'promotion' and 
'justification'. However, the reflections of actors overall suggest that this is an 
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accurate representation of the dynamic experienced by both sets of managers. 
Most of the managers interviewed would not accept this portrayal simply 
because they maintain that their view, or 'persuasion' as it has been put here, is 
one informed by the views of others. Theirs is a delegated role. This has not been 
the finding of this research: they inform, include and comply. Compliance with 
councillors' views on the issues listed in figure seven was the most significant 
aspect of variance between the authorities. 
The relationship between councillors and residents was for both authorities 
distant and imprecise. Councillors certainly 'cared' about residents and the 
services they received, although there was no clear impression of being 
responsive in policy-process terms. The paternalist nature of this relationship was 
most evident in Newharn. Here, councillors had influence over residents for (as 
they saw it) their benefit. 
The relationship between residents and front line staff was generally portrayed as 
cordial rather than one from which influence would arise. 
The relationship between front line staff and managers was characterised by 
management direction and staff implementation. Staff voiced no impression of 
influence over management. 
For councillors and staff the relationship was distant to the point of disinterest 
(with vitriolic exceptions in Newham). Councillors expressed little concern for 
the views of staff, and staff did not see their local politicians as a conduit of 
expression. The sole exception to this was one Westminster councillor's concern 
that workers' rights had been "swept away" during Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. 
The relationship between managers and residents was the most affirmed, yet 
disparate, bond. Managers saw themselves as receptive and responsive to the 
views of resident representatives. The representatives of both authorities were 
divided on this view. On day-to-day issues concerning for example local estate- 
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specific repairs or impromptu meetings, representatives acknowledged 
managernent interest and action. 
Figure Seven - Issues, Interpretation and the 'lloute of Persuasion' 
Maitagers' Interpretation 
un(ler Best Value 
Staff Involvement Inform 
Resident Involvement Include 
Councillor Involvement Comply 
Internal Organisation Systernatise 
'Tender Friendly' Promote 
Competitive Environment 
Outsourcing Justify 
Service Improve 
Costs Reduce 
'Vision' Rclay 
Actors 
Issues 
The answer to this SUb-question is that the prime SOUrcc of' influence rcsts %% ilh 
politicians and managers. Residents are placated With IIIIILICnce %%ithin tile 
broader parameters of strategic change set by these two groups. This answer 
needs to be set within tile understanding that the relationship between nlanagcl-s 
and councillors varies, and the natUrc of' variation depends Upon tile CXtCllt 01' 
alignment to the policy. 
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Overall, therefore, influence has arisen within a policy and local context, and 
interpretations become realised through that influence. Influence has crystallised 
because of the local context, the policy, and the interpretations of respective 
actors. Best Value can be seen as the legitimising bedrock of local enactment, 
although it is by no means the sole cause of what eventually happens. 
The central research question can now be answered by assembling the answers to 
the sub-questions. The ways in which councils are implementing Best Value are 
partly a product of the policy and political environment prior to its introduction: 
the matter of alignment. From this research, Westminster will align more readily 
and quickly than Newham, to Best Value. This sense of preparedness was 
identified in an evaluation of the pre-Best Value pilots where "it is clear that 
['citizen-centred services'] will take longer than government is prepared to 
allow" (Martin 2000, p. 225). It is for the actors' to become reconciled to Best 
Value processual mechanics such as performance measurement, new landlords 
and service providers, and accountability to move recognisably from the local 
authority provider to the local authority enabler. Newham has not achieved this 
shift to the extent of Westminster, and this matter of reconciliation remains a 
point of negotiation and conflict. The 'blue sky' of new thought, as Newham's 
documentation termed it, has different hues for different local actors. These 
different opinions were revealed when examining the expectations of various 
groups and individuals, and the degrees of influence between and within them. 
The way in which Best Value is implemented, the method, is through the 
realisation of what the policy is taken to be. In this study those groups achieving 
realisation were primarily councillors and senior managers. They were realising 
their interpretation, and this CHANGE . Two riders are attached to this 
conclusion: 
1. Day-to-day and short-term decisions were in some circumstances informed 
by residents, and 
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2. Councillors in Westminster, by virtue of the consolidated and 'aligned' 
nature of their council, informed decisions to a lesser extent than their Newham 
counterparts. 
This answer is now considered in the light of the theoretical ideas, and the 
discussion of Best Value earlier in the dissertation. 
16.3 The Contribution of Theory 
Chapters eight and nine examined two aspects of implementation from 'rational' 
managers working with 'loose' policies (public choice), and the strategies of 
, bureau shaping' managers. For this research the notion of the bureau shaping 
manager was taken as a theory to test. This section explains the usefulness of the 
theoretical ideas in light of the practical findings. 
Focus on Managers: The Bureau Shaping Thesis 
Dunleavy's theory of bureau shaping suggests that managers will shape rather 
than expand their bureaus. Westminster's 'housing bureau' has undergone year. 
on-year change, and has indeed become shaped to what Dunleavy describes as 
the 'control' model. Newham is currently at the delivery agency phase, although 
the recent externalisation of the housing benefit service and indications from 
respondents suggests some movement towards a contract agency. Set out below 
is a reflection on the extent to which managers adopted the five strategies 
identified by Dunleavy, and with which they shape their organisations. 
Firstly, the strategy of major internal reorganisation: both authorities had 
implemented the client-contractor split as they were obliged to do under 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. This was not considered a palatable change 
in Newham: the managers became policed by their client team. In Westminster 
the situation was different. The managers were, effectively, the client team and 
the arrangement worked well in their view. Under Best Value, the Newham 
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managers reported an improved relationship with this aspect of internal 
organisation. 
The main physical organisational change in Newham was the reduced number of 
local housing offices providing a comprehensive service. This was reported by 
the residents as a management-orchestrated initiative,, although it does not 
correspond to an improved bureau for managers in Dunleavy's terms except to 
say that the operational activities remained "shunted into well-defined enclaves" 
((Dunleavy 1991, p. 203), albeit fewer enclaves. Managers in Newham had 
therefore maintained organisation shape, rather than drawing service operations 
closer to or further from themselves. Substantively, there was no sense of 
geographical separation of managers from the remainder of the workforce or 
client group. No respondent reflected a notion of 'cocooned' senior management. 
Changes in internal organisation had arisen with evolved, or new in the case of 
Westminster, forums by which residents could offer direct input. Through the 
Tenants Participation Compact residents should have influence over decisions 
affecting housing services. This arrangement was well-received by managers and 
councillors who had remarked on poor past relationships. For the managers it is 
difficult to reconcile the ready engagement with consultation processes with 
bureau shaping: they are effectively closer to operational entanglements. 
Residents of both Councils were less enthusiastic, describing the Compact 
variously as "conveniently forgotten" and "meaningless". As for consultation and 
influence in general, several examples were given by all respondents of influence 
over day-to-day matters, although the feeling by all except management and 
some councillors was that residents had been excluded from major strategic 
decisions such as to contract services in the first instance in Westminster, or to 
use a PFI scheme in Newham. Residents could certainly inform the detail. The 
increased contact was therefore conditional: influence the detail, not the course. 
This aspect of organisation cannot be attributed wholly to managers. The 
Compact and increased contact with residents is a Best Value requirement. 
However the implementation does appear to have provided an opportunity to 
inject a manner of interpretation about what influence means for managers. 
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Secondly, on the notion that managers will seek high status work practices, there 
was no suggestion that managers were troubled by the pressurised and 
unrewarding work environment reported by the front line staff. Some evidence 
was given of managers wishing to move away from bureaucratic entanglements 
(Westminster) and conflicts (Newham) apparent under Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering. These observations could not be construed as necessarily high status, 
and indeed it is difficult to extrapolate any sense of preferred direction managers 
were seeking in relation to status from any of the accounts. 
In terms of their current work environment it is possible to identify certain 
distinctions. The Westminster managers spoke frequently in strategic terms, 
referring to joined-up thinking, methods as philosophies, working smartly, 
innovatory processes and liaison with consultants, for example. The Newham 
managers were, to a far greater extent, entwined with operational realities such as 
managing reorganisation and associated conflicts. However, there was no sense 
that managers were trying to distance themselves from what might be considered 
routine or laborious aspects of process, which is the essence of Dunicavy's 
contention. If such a link is to be suggested, it has to be inferred from other 
strategies, particularly the fifth strategy discussed below. 
Dunleavy's third strategy involved redefining relationships with partners so that 
overall control can be established or maintained. This strategy had been largely 
enacted in Westminster with the movement of staff to private contractors. It 
could not reliably be termed a management strategy however, and on this point it 
is interesting to compare Westminster with Newham. Newham's councillors and 
managers, in tandem, expressed a strong wish to apply this strategy and 
'distance' services. This was therefore a strategy at a stage of formulation, and 
shares the same characteristics as the fifth 'hiving out' strategy below in this 
regard. Westminster may have experienced this partnership and balance of 
relationships during the time it made the transition from 'pure' delivery 
(Newham's current state) to contracting authority. This appears to be the critical 
moment of inertia for major service changes, and is a point raised again when 
considering application of this work below. 
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Fourthly, competiti , on with non-housing bureaus is Dunleavy's fourth strategy. 
Other bureaus such as health, police and social services received little mention 
throughout the interviews. It appears that despite the emphasis on partnership 
working implicit within Best Value, and explicit elsewhere in other Government 
policies, partner agencies do not affect housing departments at least in terms of 
service delivery. The one exception was a Westminster manager's (WM2) 
reference to 'joined up thinking' and the recent involvement of social services in 
housing provision for older people. There was no sense throughout the 
interviews, this example included, of either housing imposing importance, or 
being imposed upon, in the borough-wide organisation of services. 
The final strategy identified by Dunleavy is that of load-shedding, hiving-off and 
contracting out. The externalisation of services did receive frequent guarded 
references, followed by a suggestion of adoption, most explicitly by Newham 
managers. Here, the managers referred to awarding contracts "hand over fist"; 
66serious about outsourcing"; "we'll give out everything we have problems with": 
juxtaposed by the removal of the "blinkers of slavish in-house provision" in the 
vision document (LBN 1997). The managers did not express this likelihood in 
terms of a solution to a problem. It was simply an inevitable process. in other 
words it appears to be a strategy managers are trying to use, yet they appeared 
genuinely unsure why they were using it beyond it being a part of a process. 
The Westminster managers made no reference to a strategy of contracting out 
beyond affirming the success of their current, evolved and largely contracted out 
service. The contract change, from the City to external providers, was not 
attributed to managers by any actor. Arms Length Management, a tabled option, 
was mentioned twice: once by a councillor as "prompted by Best Value and 
coerced by Government"; and once by a resident representative who said that 
discussions on Arms Length Management led to a situation where "Managers 
control meetings totally. Some councillors feel that they are almost being used". 
The representative's comment has significance in that it reflects influence. It 
does not establish a manager's strategy, and the councillor's remark suggests that 
the cause lies elsewhere. If managers were associated with this strategy, they 
would effectively extend the contracting out movement within Westminster. 
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However, as suggested no such link could be confirmed. Within Dunleavy's 
thesis, the separation of the operational and the strategic that would arise from 
service transfer is the ultimate manifestation of bureau shaping because it would 
isolate senior staff from, as Dunleavy terms it, 'line functions'. The problem with 
aligning Westminster managers with such a strategy is that they have largely 
achieved this state. To progress, and isolate themselves further, evidence of a 
management enacted strategy advocating Arms Length Management would be 
needed. The support, or at the very least the acceptance, of Arms Length 
Management appears unanimous in Westminster. The only voice of dissent 
referred to the manner in which the decision was taken, not the decision itself. 
The movement is therefore consensual, and not a management strategy. 
The situation in Newharn was marked by a clear and explicit reference to 
contracting. This would support Dunleavy's fifth strategy in all but the 
significant detail that it cannot be marked as a strategy created by their senior 
management team, and it had not been enacted. 
- overall, while Dunleavy's strategies appear loosely evident in Newham, the 
notion of Best Value implementation in large part caused by these management 
strategies appears slight. The reason for this finding could be pinned, primarily, 
to two reasons: limitations of the theory and an inappropriate research approach. 
These possibilities are explored in the subsequent sections, where the theory and 
research method are appraised further in light of the field study findings. 
Critique of the Bureau Shaping Thesis 
At the outset it is important to state that Dunleavy marked the enactment of the 
five strategies with an important caveat: a safe environment. Given that no 
objection to tendering services was expressed, why was Westminster successful 
in finding contractors and Newham was not: why was Newham 'unsafe'? Three 
reasons are suggested, drawn from the field research: 
1. Newharn had not decentralised their services into 'contractible units' during 
Voluntary and Compulsory Competitive Tendering, whereas Westminster 
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had. The business opportunity for a non-public housing service provider was 
too complicated to even consider for many potential tenderers. 
2. Newham's reputation as an 'old left', unionised and non-business friendly 
authority acted as a deterrent to prospective bidders. There could have been a 
perception that bids could be deflected by decisions in favour of the in-house 
providers, and there was therefore little to be gained from the expense and 
inconvenience of bid preparation. Westminster had a track record of 
contracting successes prior to Compulsory Competitive Tendering in housing 
management. 
3. Newham's housing stock, and the residents within it, presented a 'housing 
management challenge' too far. The cost and complexity of taking on a 
contract that involved the management of poorly designed, built and 
maintained housing, and a resident group characterised from one point of 
view as poor and ethnically diverse, could not easily be incorporated into a 
business plan reliant on secure revenue streams and attainable management 
performance. This is obviously an extreme representation, and one that could 
equally be viewed constructively as a 'challenge', rather than a barrier to 
commerce. Further, Westminster's housing stock and demographic 
characteristics are similar to those of Newham. While Newham's difficulties 
may be greater in some respects, it was the perception of Newham that might 
set it apart as a 'problem borough', rather than one ripe for enterprise. 
These points are presented as reasons for the difference in service contracting 
under Compulsory Competitive Tendering. The unavailability of service 
providers is a possibility, although the proximity of the two councils 
(approximately seven miles) renders this factor unlikely. 
These three obstacles require negotiation before managers can enact Dunleavy's 
strategies, and evidence exists of this action. The indications from each of the 
Newham groups suggested that Newharn was in a state of transition immediately 
prior to the introduction of Best Value. The fact that Newham volunteered to 
pilot Compulsory Competitive Tendering, managers spoke of a willingness to 
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consider a range of methods centred on devolving services, and councillors 
engaged with 'vision' focus rejected any intransigent reliance on 'old Labour' 
practice does indicate an authority anxious to innovate. This is therefore a 
Borough in the throes of change. What this research reveals, possibly, is that the 
change is not at this point sufficient to enable overt enactment of Dunleavy's 
strategies. It appears, therefore, that the environment described in chapter eight - 
when class interests override service considerations and costs do not relate to 
social benefits - has not been fully realised from the findings in this study. 
As for Westminster, again following Dunleavy's logic, the environment had 
become consolidated and none of the three issues affecting Newham (above) was 
evident. The point of interest was the strategies managers might adopt once they 
had effectively bureau shaped: would they affect the implementation of Best 
Value? The key change arising, ostensibly in line with Best Value requirements, 
was the move to Arms Length Management. This was a clear strategic direction 
and could be seen as a refinement to Dunleavy's fifth 'hiving out' strategy. It 
could not, however, be seen as a strategy of management making on two counts. 
Firstly, the option was heavily contrived following Government incentives 
encouraging its adoption. Secondly, no single voice of dissent could be identified 
with this direction from the respondent groups. 
The problem with Dunleavy's thesis is not related to the general trend arising: 
Westminster has become a control agency, and Newham is moving between a 
delivery and contract agency: it is why this is happening. This particular outcome 
is arising for factors beyond managers and their strategies. Given this lack of fit 
between what Dunleavy predicts, and what has been observed in this work, other 
possibilities have to be explored. 
Public choice theory identifies managers as bureau expanding: their main source 
of utility in non-profit public sector organisations. They achieve this by 
ownership of information that informs budgetary decisions and overstating 
supply of services. A policy that stems this behaviour, and exposes actual costs 
and performance, will deter managers' expansion programmes. No evidence of a 
managerial wish to return to mass municipal housing - the ultimate 'empire' - 
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was apparent. The expectations other actors had from Best Value did not include 
a return to local state provided and managed housing. Even despite this lack of 
empire building tendency, the significant limitation of public choice is the 
concentration on managers as the key local group. Notwithstanding the local 
focus of this study, implementation is in part determined by groups in league, not 
managers alone. This criticism applies equally to Niskanen and Dunleavy. While 
Dunleavy's model is not 'simple' in the public choice sense 22 , there remain many 
aspects of complexity that it does not consider. The prospect that Dunleavy's 
bureau shape is more a pragmatic than a contrived response, where managers are 
boxed in by government financial restraints on the one hand and the immediate 
needs of the client group on the other, is not accommodated and crucially 
underplays the impact of other key actors. Further, managers are not a 
homogenous mass, and to suggest that uniformity arises with grade or position 
within the hierarchy is simplifying what is a highly complex system of 
interaction, responsibility, pressures and personality. Gunning, an advocate of 
public choice, feels that Dunleavy's preoccupation with senior management is 
inappropriate in the highly politicised arena of British local policy: 
In my view, the weakness with the bureau-shaping thesis is its failure 
to get at the fundamental forces that impact on bureaucracy through 
democratic government in general. Its main strength is that it is 
general enough to be helpful in describing man y bureaus, particularly 3 
those that are relatively independent of politics 3 
This reference to 'fundamental forces', the role of politicians in government, 
cannot be ignored. Perry, in a study examining Indian bureaucracy, came to a 
similar conclusion when considering the influences behind decentralisation: 
The bureau-shaping model's application to the Indian context is most 
limited by a lack of reference to important elements, perhaps peculiar 
to India, based on the political environment in which senior officers 
work (1996, p. 271). 
22 "The real strength of the theory of private enterprise lies in this ruthless simplification which 
fits so admirably into the mental patterns created by the phenomena] successes of science" 
(Schumacher 1983, p. 137). 
23 Email to author, 8'h December 2000. Pat Gunning is Professor of Economics at Feng Chia 
University, Taiwan. 
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Perry's criticism of bureau shaping ideas centred on a research finding of 
political strength: 
As one former chief secretary commented, 'if what bureaucrats 
thought really mattered, the system would never have come into 
being because they fought against it tooth and nail' ... politicians are 
the source of bureaucrats' authority (1996, pp. 269-270). 
Perry's observation matches that of this research with three additions. 
The first is the way in which political authority manifests itself. In Westminster 
the initial impression gained was one of an almost benign, and certainly passive, 
political element. Underlying this was the impression that councillors would 
intervene and act if necessary. In Newham the politicians directed the activity 
and determined the nature of senior management. 
The second concerned matters of importance to politicians. The Westminster 
politicians were interested in stability, and the avoidance of controversy. 
Newham politicians were concerned with recasting image to accommodate their 
vision. 
Finally, if politicians are the source of authority, residents are the legitimacy. For 
managers and politicians that legitimacy rests with engaging with residents on 
short terrn matters, rather than the strategic decisions. 
The key limitation of both theories is their failure to recognise and engage the 
significance of other actors, particularly politicians, in affecting the 
implementation of policy. Linked to this are the local context and the extent to 
which local authorities are aligned with the broader policy environment. These 
factors provide a fuller explanation of how Best Value will be implemented. 
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16.4 From Theory and Practice: Limitations of the Study and Future 
Research 
This section is an appraisal of the usefulness of the approach adopted and 
possibilities for future research in the field of public policy implementation. 
This study has concentrated on actor influence and relationships. An important 
basis of these relationships related to the environment into which this new policy 
is introduced. Relationships become redefined as sponsor agencies set out 
expectations and processual requirements. Understanding the extent of change 
required, and the inertia in place restricting change, aid considerably during 
analysis of existing and shifting relationships. 
A problem for this research was locating the cause of changes that arose during 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Interrogating the 'alignment, research 
question yielded limited insights because of the lack of previous research, and 
uncertainty within the field research caused in large part by the absence of many 
actors that witnessed change. For staff, for example, it was boldly acknowledged 
that those who disagreed with change should leave. More generally, Westminster 
managed a large shift in their mode of service delivery. The feeling gained was 
that this was achieved through autocratic political leadership, although this was 
difficult to verify within the literature or the field study. Verification would have 
been useful given the prominent place of the Newham politicians, and may have 
contributed to answering questions related to the point at which councillors 
become less active in determining change. Greater awareness of historical 
development is therefore required in order that a 'time layered' approach can 
become an integrated part of policy research. This is not a limitation of this 
research necessarily, although it is appreciated that concentrating further on this 
period of local authority development may have yielded further insight. It is 
mentioned here to promote such research during, rather than after, the event. 
The theoretical work used in this thesis focuses on management as a cause of 
local outcomes. The subsequent case research has highlighted the need to not 
focus on one group. The relationships that develop and exist within the local 
275 
arena are fluid and complex, and concentrating on one group would have led to a 
distorted view of events. Ingarfield chose not to interview managers at all for this 
reason - "That managers are unlikely to state openly that they are engaged in 
bureau shaping to achieve welfare gains for themselves is an assertion" (1996, 
p. 7). Indeed, any actor may disguise the actual intention behind actions, and this 
is always a problem in research involving people. This truism is not considered, 
on reflection, to be a significant problem with the method and frame adopted. 
The field studies yielded a valuable insight into local policy unfolding. 
The key limitation in this regard related to the sample sites and agencies. The 
reasoned emphasis on the four groups considered here led to the range adopted. 
However, a wider range of local contexts (political, geographical and 
administrative, and stock size, type and condition) would test these 'shaping' and 
'empire' ideas to a greater extent. Cities such as Birmingham, Leeds and 
Sheffield have similar profiles to Newham, and the consideration of this work 
and the conclusions drawn to these localities could be illuminating. By the same 
token research activity in 'liberal' Conservative areas, such as Broxboume 
(Hertfordshire), could test the notion of manager as 'technicist' and provide a 
greater understanding of the relationships between politicians and managers. 
Other agencies and agents including contractors, Registered Social Landlords, 
central government departments and the Audit Commission could have usefully 
informed aspects of the thesis, and set 4 broader appreciation of the local policy 
context. An additional 'realm' to have surfaced in the field research was the local 
government political structure, and particularly the local cabinet systems in use. 
Study logistics, plus the wish to remain focused on the local authority Imeso. 
network' (chapter one) and four closely involved groups, resulted in a 
worthwhile focus in the final analysis. 
Concerning the application of this work in future studies of national policy and 
local implementation Maclennan and More point to a "need to examine the 
outcomes of different organizational configurations and management processes" 
(1999, p. 19). This has been a key theme of this work. The extent to which 
management processes, albeit linked to those of others, inform understanding of 
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policies unfolding is a critical component of research in this field. However, it is 
also important to understand quite what an 'outcome' is. Far from closing the 
4policy loop', where results are prescribed and easily mapped, the concept of 
outcome under Best Value is nebulous because of the ways it is interpreted and 
implemented. From this study outcomes have rather different meanings for those 
involved. The emphasis on and application of technical and rhetorical aspects of 
Best Value has revealed disaffected groups, most notably residents. Thus: 
A danger remains that the problems of measuring improvement will, 
in practice, drive the regime towards an increasing focus on 
processes and procedures rather than outcomes, addressing what can 
be measured most easily rather than actual improvements that matter 
most to service users and citizens (Davis and Martin 2002, p. 67). 
it is suggested that the focus has shifted markedly in Westminster towards 
matters of measurement through technical process, rather than 'improvements 
that matter'. Understanding what those processes are, and the outcomes they 
propose, will be useful for understanding what is actually happening and its 
cause. 
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Epilogue 
Best value remained an active policy at the time of the thesis submission in 
March 2005. Certain aspects of the policy were modified after the final 
interviews and these changes were not included in the findings or analysis of the 
thesis. This section sets out the main aspects of change and events that have 
transpired after the field study, and concludes with a reflection on the impact 
such changes may have on the main research findings. 
Best Value 
The requirement to provide Best Value in line with the description given in 
chapter one remains. The latest consultation relating to Best Value is framed 
within the statutory requirements, where the aim is to "reflect the need to build in 
continuous improvement, in line with the best value duty in the Local 
Government Act 1999" (Audit Commission 2004a, p. 11). 
Performance Measurement 
The annual method of reporting performance changed towards the end of 2002 to 
include Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs) produced by the 
Audit Commission. CPAs are published in December each year and take account 
of the BVPIs, inspection and audit reports, corporate governance assessment and 
self-assessment by the local authority. The BVPls outlined in this research have 
on the whole remained, although maintenance and repair costs are no longer 
required, and the ethnic origin of residents is recorded in the measure of 
satisfaction (table eight). The CPA scores for the authorities examined in this 
research are shown in table nine. 
The CPA provides a simplified representation of the performance of local 
authorities compared to the multi-indicator format required prior to December 
2002. The scoring uses two measures: the numerical one to four range, where 
one is considered 'worst' and four 'best'; and overall assessments of either 
excellent, 
- 
good, fair, weak and poor. A further change was proposed in 
December 2004, where housing management could be assessed in terms of 
decent homes, repairs and maintenance, resident involvement and housing 
278 
management, with a method of measurement to follow (Audit Commission 2004, 
p. 21). 80 per cent of local authorities supported CPA (Audit Commission 2002a, 
p. 2), and they "were broadly supportive of the principle of self assessment" 
(Audit Commission 2002a, p. 6) 
Table Eight: Tenant Satisfaction and Opportunities for Participation and 
Involvement in Decision Making: LB Newham and Westminster CC 2003-4 
Newham Westminster 
Overall satisfaction of tenants of council 70.00 64.00 
housing with the overall service provided by 
their landlord and broken down by: - 
black and ethnic minority 65.00 56.00 
non-black and ethnic minority 74.00 67.00 
Overall satisfaction of tenants of council 44.00 61.00 
housing with opportunities for participation in 
management and decision making in relation to 
housing services provided by their landlord and 
broken down by: - 
black and ethnic minority 39.00 55.00 
Lnd ethnic minority 48.00 63.00 
Source: Audit Commission 2005 
Table Nine: Comprehensive Performance Assessments: LB Newham and 
Westminster CC 2002-4 
Authority Overall Overall Overall Council Overall Housing 
2002 2003 2004 ability service 
to score 
improve 
Newham fair good good 3 31 3 
Westminster excellent , excellent , excellen 4 
Source: Audit Commission 2005a 
Inspections 
It is intended that the CPA results will enable a more selective use of inspections, 
with the focus on poorer performing local authorities rather than the blanket 
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coverage anticipated at the outset. Inspections are anticipated to fall to 68 per 
cent of 2002/03 levels by 2006/07 (Audit Commission 2004a, p. 2). 
Newham's housing management service was inspected in December 2004, and 
received a 'good' two-star housing management service with promising 
prospects for improvement (Audit Commission 2004, p. 4). Overall positive 
findings included the success of the Local Service Centres "which deal 
effectively with most enquiries at the first point of contact", and "tenants and 
lessees are well informed and their views actively canvassed resulting in 
effective consultation and involvement" (Audit Commission 2004, p. 4). Areas of 
concern included tenant satisfaction, under-representation of ethnic minorities in 
the manual workforce, and rent collection (Audit Commission 2004, p. 5). The 
inspection report concluded that Newham recognised areas of poor performance, 
and was willing to consider alternative providers to redress performance 
shortfalls. 
The inspection process involved several focus group meetings with residents and 
front line staff. The findings were generally positive, with concerns directed at a 
lack of information relating to new resident representative structures (Audit 
Commission 2004, p. 28), and: 
From our focus groups, we saw that the annual service plans 
were understood by staff to be the backbone Of performance 
management. Service plan targets were seen by councillors and 
senior managers as managerial and are not published. Targets 
are identified and assessed through customer feedback rather 
than consultation. (Audit Commission 2004, p. 11) 
The privileged aspect of targets was identified as a possible source of diff-Iculty 
in two respects. Firstly, it would not always be clear what the 'success criteria' 
for aspects of service improvement might be: staff and residents could not know 
the required standard. Secondly, the inspectors found that, in the view of one 
councillor, once targets had been achieved they would be instantly revised to 
improve the service further. The inspectors reflected that the target could be 
maintained "using this success to reallocate resources to areas of less successful 
performance" (Audit Commission 2004, p. 11). 
280 
Westminster's housing management service was inspected in March 2002, soon 
after the completion of the field research. The housing management service 
received a 'good' two star service judged to offer 'excellent' prospects for 
improvement (Audit Commission 2002, p. 6). Positive findings included the 
setting up of Tenant Participation Compacts, clear business planning, and 
comprehensive provision of information and service standards for tenants and 
leaseholders (Audit Commission 2002, pp. 6-7). Aspects of the service requiring 
attention included the availability of information relating to resident profiles, a 
strategic approach to tackling poverty and social exclusion, and providing 
information at local offices (Audit Commission 2002, p. 7). 
Specific findings included an observation that tenants' concerns included kitchen 
fittings, heating systems and a lack of 'customer focus' within repairs systems. 
The inspectors found that the authority had "responded by developing a service 
improvement plan to address the areas of most concern" (Audit Commission 
2004, p. 52). The housing panel (the Compact forum) received comments from 
the inspection's random sampling of residents and staff. - 
[A resident] representative said 'The housing panel are not 
informed by the people they represent ... and they have no 
profile of the residents they represent'. This was echoed by 
staff, who felt that: 'a lot of residents' associations (RAs) are 
unrepresentative - we rely on people to feed back - but they 
don't always pass on the information. ' (Audit Commission 
2002, p. 20). 
On this point the report concluded that "Tenants, leaseholders and prospective 
tenants have only partially been involved in shaping the Service" (Audit 
Commission 2002, p. 20). This aspect of performance was not included in the 
report's main findings summary. 
Finally, the route of substantial change such as that considered in chapter rive has 
become clearer. Newham has decided to transfer all service provision to an Arms 
Length Management Organisation after a "resident-led commission was set up 
and supported by council staff and independent advisers" (LB Newham 2005). 
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This transfer is scheduled to take place by mid-2005. In April 2002, immediately 
after the field research, Westminster transferred housing services for all 22,000 
homes to CityWest Homes, through an Arms Length Management arrangement. 
Reflections on Change 
This epilogue has provided an update on two aspects of Best Value: procedural 
and progressional. 
On the procedural elements all local authorities will, in addition to their local 
performance publication (the Best Value Performance Plan), see their Best Value 
performance published each year by the Audit Commission. The CPA may 
impact upon the implementation of Best Value, in that a poor CPA result will 
result in an increased likelihood of inspection. In this research the Newharn 
managers expressed the greatest antipathy towards inspections, therefore (the 
recent inspection notwithstanding) it could be expected that they would welcome 
good CPA performance. This will need to reflect factors similar to those subject 
to inspection, including corporate governance and self-assessment, in addition to 
performance measures. The important point is that the information for the CPA is 
generated locally, and therefore some control can be exercised over priorities and 
compliance. This was not an aspect of performance considered in the 
dissertation, where focus was placed on the prospect of external inspections, and 
not self-assessment. It is suggested that the CPA would have received the support 
of both boroughs considered in this research, mainly on the basis of concerns 
expressed relating to inspections. 
In terms of progress made under Best Value, it can be seen from tables seven and 
eight that both authorities have sustained good performance between 2002 and 
2004 in housing, the way they are run, and services in general. Westminster has 
received particular praise. The 'small print' of the inspection reports and 
CPA/BVPI data do reveal certain anomalies. Black and ethnic minority residents 
were less likely to be satisfied with their landlord, and less likely to be satisfied 
with opportunities for involvement. Average figures for satisfaction with 
involvement in Westminster and Newham - 61 per cent and 44 percent 
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respectively (table seven) - could be inferred from this research, yet these 
statistics do not from part of the 'headline' assessments of performance. A 
service can be 'excellent' without large-scale resident satisfaction, with the 
inference that 'prospects for improvement' remain high. 
An additional point that could affect an authority's outlook relates to the Audit 
Commission's observation that "for most of the performance indicators used in 
the assessment framework there is no evidence of a relationship with 
deprivation" (Audit Commission 2002, p. 8). This would be of particular interest 
to Newham, and possibly increase their resolve to become disassociated with 
poverty. 
Finally, substantial changes to the provision of services have been either 
programmed (Newham) or implemented (Westminster) through the Arms Length 
Management provisions. The extent to which these changes can be considered 
'progressional' or 'processual' in terms of Best Value will become clear in time, 
although on recent performance, as illustrated in table seven, Westminster 
remains a high performing local authority after the transfer. The point at issue is 
how Westminster and Newham arrived at the decision to transfer services. The 
inference that would be drawn from this work is that the decision was taken, or at 
the very least steered, by the managers and politicians of the boroughs. 
The impact of CPA, the occurrence of inspections, and the use and emphasis of 
performance information could contribute to a shift in the way Best Value is 
considered by local government. What is certain is that Best Value continues to 
underpin service delivery, although the role of residents especially remains an 
interesting and uncertain aspect of implementation. 
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Appendix A 
Best Value ý- Twelve Provisional Principles (June 1997) 
1. The duty of Best Value is one that local authorities will owe to local people, 
both as taxpayers and the customers of local authority services. Performance 
plans should support the process of local accountability to the electorate. 
2. Achieving Best Value is not just about economy and efliciency, but also about 
effectiveness and the quality of local services - the setting of targets and 
performance against these should therefore underpin the new regime. 
3. The duty will apply to a wider range of services than those covered by CCT. 
4. There is no presumption that services must be privatised, and once the regime 
is in place there will be no compulsion for councils to put their services out to 
tender, but there is no reason why services should be delivered directly if other 
more efficient means are available. What matters is what works. 
5. Competition will continue to be an important management tool, a test of Best 
Value and an important feature in performance plans. But it will not be the only 
management tool and is not in itself enough to demonstrate that Best Value is 
being achieved. 
6. Central government will continue to set the basic framework for service 
provision, which will in some areas as now include national standards. 
7. Detailed local targets should have regard to any national targets, and speci fled 
indicators to support comparisons between authorities. 
8. Both national and local targets should be built on the performance information 
that is in any case needed by good managers. 
9. Audit processes should confirm the integrity and comparability of 
performance information. 
10. Auditors will report publicly on whether Best Value has been achieved, and 
should contribute constructively to plans for remedial action. This will include 
agreeing measurable targets for improvement and reporting on progress against 
an agreed plan. 
11. There should be provision for intervention at the direction of the Secretary of 
State on the advice of the Audit Commission when an authority has failed to 
deliver Best Value. 
12. The form of intervention should be appropriate to the nature of failure. 
Source: DETR 1998, s. 2.1 
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Appendix B 
Best Value Performance Indicators 2001/2 
BVPI description BVPI Type 
The average weekly costs per local authority dwelling of Local 
management. 
The average weekly costs per local authority dwelling of Local 
repairs. 
Local authority rent collection and arrears: proportion of rent Local 
collected. 
Local authority rent collection and arrears: rent arrears of Local 
current tenants as a proportion of the authority's rent roll. 
Local authority rent collection and arrears: rent written off as Local 
not collectable as a proportion of the authority's rent roll. 
Proportion of homelessness applications on which the Local 
authority makes a decision and issues written notification to 
the applicant within 33 working days. 
Average relet times for local authority dwellings let in the Top quartile 
financial year. 
Percentage of rent lost through local authority dwellings Local 
becoming vacant. 
The number of local authority dwellings receiving renovation Local- 
work during 2001/02 as a proportion of the number needing 
renovation work at I April 2001. 
The percentage of urgent repairs completed within Local 
Government time limits. 
The average time taken to complete non-urgent responsive Local 
repairs. 
Satisfaction of tenants of council housing with the overall Local 
service provided by their landlord. 
Satisfaction of tenants of council housing with opportunities Local 
for participation in management and decision making in 
relation to housing services provided by their landlord. 
Does the authority follow the Commission for Racial Local 
Equality's code of practice in rented housing? 
Source: DETR 2000a, Chapter 8 
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Appendix C 
BVPI 1998/9 to 2004/5 Comparison - LB Newham 
1998/9 Position Actual 2004/05 BVPI reference and description BVP1 Type Actual (inner London top Target 25% ranlZe) 
BVP165a - The average weekly costs 
per local authority dwelling of Local f 18.94 L17.27-LI9.14 118.69 
management. 
BVP165b - The average weekly costs Local f 14.07 L19.12 - L24.85 WAS per local authority dwelling of repairs. 
BVPI66a - Local authority rent 
collection and arrears: proportion of Local 102% 100.2%-101.04% 101% 
rent collected. 
BVP166b - Local authority rent 
collection and arrears: rent arrears of Local 7.24% Not Available (New 7% 
current tenants as a proportion of the Indicator) 
authority's rent roll. 
BVP166c - Local authority rent 
Cost/Efficiency collection and arrears: rent written off Local 2.12% Not Available (New 
as not collectable as a proportion of Indicator) 
the authority's rent roll. 
BVP167 - Proportion of homelessness 
applications on which the authofity 59% in 100% in 
makes a decision and issues written Local 30w/days 12 - 27.5 calendar days 30 w/days 
notification to the applicant within 33 (1998/9) 
working days. 
BVP168 - Average relet times for 
local authority dwellings let in the Top quartile 55.3 4-5.3 weeks 30 
financial year. 
BVP169 - Percentage of rent lost Not Available (New through local authority dwellings Local 2.2% Indicator) 1.2% becoming vacant. 
BVP171 - The number of local 
a) 
<L5,000 
authority dwellings receiving 81.6% Not Available (New a) 90% 
renovation work during 2001/02 as a Local b) Indicator) b) 8.4% 
proportion of the number needing 000 >L5 (1999=) Service renovation work at I April 2001. , 6.6% Delivery BVP172 - The percentage of urgent Outcome repairs completed within Government Local 88.9% 93,05-96% 95% 
time limits. (1998/9) 
BVP173 - The average time taken to Not Available (New 10 complete non-urgent responsive Local 18 Indicator) (I 999=) repairs. 
BVP174* - Satisfaction of tenants of 
Quality council housing with the overall Local 66 Not Available 75% 
service provided by their landlord. 
BVP175* - Satisfaction of tenants of 
council housing with opportunities for 
Fair Access participation in management and Local Not Available 
decision making in relation to housing 
services provided by their landlord, 
BVP1164 (EX-ACPI DI) - Does the 
Other authority follow the Commission 
for 
' Local Yes 
Not Available (New Y s s code of practice in Racial Equality Indicator) e 
rented housing? 
* Indicator not required for 2001/2 - National Housing Federation's STATUS (standard tenant satisfaction 
survey and methodology) to be used in informing the two indicators. 
Source: LBN 2000 - Best Value Performance Plan 2000/2001 
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Appendix D 
BVPI 1998/9 to 2004/5 Comparison - Westminster City Council 
1998/9 Position Actual 2004/05 BVPI reference and description BVPI Type (Inner London Actual 
top 25% range 
Target 
BVP165a - The average weekly costs 
per local authority dwelling of Local f27.38 L17.27-119.14 E29 
management. 
BVP165b - The average weekly costs Local L22.13 f 19.12 - L24.85 
Maintain 
Upper 
per local authority dwelling of repairs. Ouartile 
BVP166a - Local authority rent 
collection and arrears: proportion of Local 96.4% 100.2%-101.04% 96.2% 
rent collected. 
BVP166b - Local authority rent 
collection and arrears: rent arrears of Local 2.74% Not Available (New 3 4% current tenants as a proportion of the Indicator) . 
authority's rent roll. 
BVP166c - Local authority rent Target to be 
collection and arrears: rent written off oca 2% Not Available (New set once as not collectable as a proportion of Indicator) comparators 
the authority's rent roll available 
BVP167 - Proportion of homelessness 
applications on which the authority 13.2 12 - 27 5 calendar makes a decision and issues written Local calendar . days 88% 
notification to the applicant within 33 days 
working days. 
BVP168 - Average relet times for 
local authority dwellings let in the Top quartile 4 weeks 4-5.3 weeks 19 working 
financial year. days 
BVP169 - Percentage of rent lost 
through local authority dwellings Local 2.73% 
Not Available (New Keep below 
becoming vacant. 
1 Indicator) 4% 
BVP171 - The number of local 
a) 
<5,000 Target to be authority dwellings receiving 
renovation work during 2001/02 as a Local 
14.8% Not Available (New set once 
proportion of the number needing 
b) Indicator) comparators 
renovation work at I April 2001. 
>15,000 available 
29.3% 
BVP172 - The percentage of urgent 
repairs completed within Government Local 95.8% 93.05-96% 97% 
time limits. 
BVP173 - The average time taken to 13.3 Target to be 
complete non-urgent responsive Local calendar 
Not Available (New set once 
repairs. days 
Indicator) comparators 
available 
BVP174* - Satisfaction of tenants of Not Satisfaction 
council housing with the overall Local Available Not Available to be 
service provided by their landlord. measured 
BVP175* - Satisfaction of tenants of 
council housing with opportunities for Not Satisfaction 
participation in management and Local Available Not Available to be decision making in relation to housing measured 
services provided by their landlord. 
BVP1164 (EX-ACPI Dl) - Does the 
authority follow the Commission for Local Yes Not Available (New Racial Equality's code of practice in Indicator) Yes 
rented housing? 
* Indicator not required for 2001/2 - National Housing Federation's STATUS (standard tenant 
satisfaction survey and mcdiodology) to be used in informing the two indicators. 
Source: WCC 2000 Best Value Performance Plan 2000/2001 
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